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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1. THE NEED FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATIONS
The 20th century, like those preceding it, has been marked by such significant milestones
that it is difficult to agree on what is the phenomenon that has best characterised the flux of
events over the past 100 years. Nonetheless, from the fresh perspective of the century in which
this document has been drafted (with its accompanying information and communications tech-
nologies), it would not be out of place in the economic sphere to highlight the paramount impor-
tance of industry during the recently concluded last century. A straightforward comparison between
1900 and 2000 of citizens’ daily life and of the societies in which they are organised offers clear
evidence of the impact that industrial activity has had. As it advanced the 20th century witnessed
the gradual population shift from rural areas to the cities and, in parallel, from agriculture and
animal husbandry to industrial activities, with a subsequent move from the latter to services.
The slow loss of weight of industrial activity across the global economy in recent decades in
favour of services does not lessen the significance of industry. This is because of the continuing
interrelatedness between the two and the great significance of the study of industrial activity, due to
its link to the business cycle and to the fact it is the driving force of cyclical accelerations and slow-
downs. Further, it is industrial activities which have been most affected by the opening up of do-
mestic economies and, in this respect, they have been first in line to face the challenges that compe-
tition and market globalisation pose for corporate structures in terms of costs, margins and pric-
es, and – in sum – of employment-generating capacity and competitiveness.
This change and challenge has proven to be of key importance in Europe. The latter part
of the century saw, as a feature distinguishing Europe from other economic areas, the construc-
tion of a single market culminating in the emergence of a common currency. That more than
justifies interest in gaining detailed knowledge of how European industrial corporations have
evolved, from both an aggregate and macroeconomic perspective, and from a microeconomic
or business standpoint. The latter may be done on the basis of the individual information availa-
ble on the companies that report to the European Central Balance Sheet Data Offices, a task in
fact pursued by the Committee of European Central Balance Sheet Data Offices (ECCB) since
it was set up in 1987. The experience gained from the creation and use of the BACH (1)
project, which revealed the problems of homogeneity in European accounting information,
spurred the ECCB to undertake comparative studies among its member countries with a differ-
ent methodological base. The documents “Equity of European Industrial Corporations. CECB,
(1) The BACH (Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonized) project was launched and promoted by
the European Commission. Its participants are the central balance sheet offices or corresponding statistical services
of the European Union countries, the United States and Japan.
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1997” and “Corporate Finance in Europe from 1986 to 1996. CECB, 2000” looked into the dif-
ferences in the level of capitalisation of German, Austrian, French, Spanish and Italian manufac-
turing companies, and the relation to the assets in which companies invest. These papers high-
lighted the importance of analysing, along with the annual accounts of the non-financial corporations
available, the information on the economic scenario, which is important when explaining the differ-
ences found among countries and, in particular, on institutional factors. Briefly, these studies,
which are available to those readers interested, revealed the existence of significant differences
in financial structures, which are linked rather to the size of corporations than to their sector
of activity. Finally, as stated, institutional factors (tax regime, bankruptcy law, access to financing
from the banking system and bank-company relationships, etc.) were seen to exert considera-
ble influence, providing, summing up, for the division of the countries analysed into two behav-
ioural blocks [France and Spain share many aspects, compared with the group made up of Aus-
tria, Germany and Italy (the latter to a lesser extent)], although these factors could not be ana-
lysed in detail.
The findings of the studies confirmed the validity of the approach of using the data in the
hands of central balance sheet data offices (CBSDO) (although these, as will later be seen, do
not constitute a sample in statistical terms) and the advisability of pursuing the analysis of the
corporate environment by means of bilateral country studies. The French and German central
banks decided to build on prior studies, preparing in this connection the document “Corporate
Finance in Germany and France. 1999”. The findings of this work have been widely disseminated
through full editions and also in abridged versions in the economic bulletins of the two institu-
tions.
2. FRENCH AND SPANISH INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS
Following the substantive approach described in the previous section, i.e. using corpora-
tions’ individual annual accounts and studying significant institutional factors, the Banque de
France and Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Offices have analysed the aggregate of
both countries’ industrial corporations over the period 1991-1999. The study did not confine
itself to analysing financial structure, as was previously the case in the above-mentioned refer-
ences. Rather, it widened the subject of study to analysing corporations’ results, in the broad
sense of the term, namely the content of the profit and loss account (income, expenditure and
surpluses), and derived ratios (from the P&L account directly or through comparing balance
sheet data, as is the case with profitability or average collection and payment periods). To give a
full picture of the position of and developments in industrial businesses, information on employ-
ment is included in the study, relating it to the significant accounting variables. Work has had to
be conducted using a highly detailed volume of information. Thus, although on one hand previ-
ously undisclosed data have been provided, on the other, this means the timeframe of the study
is restricted to 1999, and that data for 2000 are not included despite being available at the time
of publication at both central balance sheet offices, since such data were being edited when the
document was being drafted. The absence of data for 2000 in this study does not affect the
main results obtained, given the nature of the work: the aim of the analysis is to detect the differ-
ences and similarities between both countries’ industrial corporations, rather than to conduct a short-
term economic study on recent developments relating to the aggregate.
It was considered preferable to provide potential interested readers with all the informa-
tion compiled on drafting the document and, at the same time, to minimise as far as possible
the content of the main body of the text. Accordingly, the four chapters into which the docu-
ment is divided, which are presented in the following points, have been relieved to some extent
of references to the long-term macroeconomic environment, the descriptive sections relating
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to institutional factors and the detailed statistics (the main statistics are included twice: in the
text alongside the commentary and in the statistical annex), which are published at the end of
the text in the form of annexes. The statistical annex is only published in the electronic version.
2.1. Gradual convergence between Spain and France. The macroeconomic
environment
The analysis of both countries’ Balance of Payments data highlights both the growing de-
gree of interdependence between both economies and the need to acquire information about
the similarities and differences between the two countries’ non-financial corporations. While
France is Spain’s most important trading partner (in 1999, 13% of Spanish goods exports were for
France and 15% of Spain’s goods imports were from its neighbour), it is no less notable that
bilateral trade between the two countries in the nineties was clearly in France’s favour. At the
end of the nineties, Spanish economy was more opened up than French economy. In Spain the
weight of the exports over Spanish GDP was 27% and the weight of the imports was 29%
while in France, these figures were 26% and 24% respectively. Chapter I (“The French and Span-
ish economies: a macroeconomic perspective”) helps explain the rapid convergence between
both economies over the past decade and offers some references that frame industrial corpo-
rations within their macroeconomic setting (economic growth, foreign trade, saving, investment
and financing, the labour market, costs and prices, and monetary and financial conditions).
Moreover, these references explain some of the reasons behind the balance sheet and ratio dif-
ferences detected between both countries. However, the nominal convergence of the nineties
has not prevented differential aspects remaining in place. Thus, for instance, the strong reduc-
tion in the price gap exists alongside the dual inflation phenomenon, which have a major intensity
in the Spanish case. And net lending shown by the national accounts in the second half of the
nineties, in a context of increase in national gross saving, came together with net financing to
the external sector provided by the French economy, while in Spain, with the intense invest-
ment made by the Spanish economy, in step with the catching-up process. Annex I (“Fundamentals
of the economic growth in France and Spain”) briefly reviews the process of convergence be-
tween both countries over the last 30 years, which have seen Spain gradually catching France
and Europe up. Connected with this process have been the changes in the Spanish labour mar-
ket and the intensity of public investment in this period. Annex I addresses the conditioning fac-
tors of the process and underscores the determinant factors of competitiveness and of productiv-
ity in both countries (infrastructure, human capital and investment in technology), where France has a
clear advantage in relation to Spain. Lastly, annex II summarises current French and Spanish labour
market regulations, in those areas that may influence in the hiring process (minimum wage, col-
lective bargaining arrangements, dismissal conditions, types of contract, regulation of the work-
ing day length, etc.). It further makes, in Spain’s case, a historical reference to the main changes
of recent years in connection with labour market liberalisation.
2.2. Population of corporations, samples and accounting standardisation
To analyse properly the results obtained from the study of the annual accounts reported
by corporations to central balance sheet offices, the following should be defined beforehand:
the portion of the differences attributable to the different composition of the population of
corporations; the samples available (that are not statistically representative of the former); and
lastly, the accounting practices used in both countries. Chapter II and its accompanying statisti-
cal annex provide full breakdowns of the composition of the population of French and Spanish
non-financial corporations, of the industrial sector as a whole and, finally, of the samples used. It
further addresses the general characteristics of the Spanish and French central balance sheet
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offices. Finally, it gives the methodological references on how the data for both countries have
been homogenised to strip out the accounting differences in the underlying information, entail-
ing the elimination of certain items and the estimation of others. As will later be seen in con-
nection with the population structure, the study highlights both the bigger average dimension of
French corporations compared with their Spanish counterparts, in all size brackets, and the
slightly greater service-based orientation of French companies. The samples available show a
bias in both countries towards large corporations and industries.
2.3. Results of the comparison between Spanish and French industrial
corporations
Chapter III gives the results of the comparison of the information available in the French
and Spanish central balance sheet offices on both countries’ industries. The results are outlined
in a text, a statistical annex and several text annexes (annexes III to VIII), allowing interested
readers to learn of the degree of influence of the so-called institutional factors in the differenc-
es detected.
The chapter comprises two main sections, the first of which analyses the main differenc-
es between balance-sheet structures. Some of the conclusions reached in relation to this part
of the study are highlighted:
• Greater weight of tangible fixed assets in Spanish industries compared with their French
counterparts (13 percentage points on average).  As will be seen, this does not affect
the profitability ratios. Several factors account for this difference, including most nota-
bly the different weight of leased assets (this is greater in France) which, moreover,
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have not been included in the balance sheet, so as to be able to homogenise the infor-
mation between the two countries. Annex III offers a detailed review of the character-
istics of asset leasing arrangements in both countries.
• Greater maturity of French industries in organising French companies into corporate group-
ings. Spanish corporations are lagging here, having only begun to follow this pattern at
the end of the decade. The greater weight of financial investment in the shares and par-
ticipations of French corporations (8 percentage points above Spain) would appear to
demonstrate this. Annex IV, which gives an overview of the French and Spanish financial
systems, may help clarify the interrelatedness of balance-sheet structural characteristics
(on both the asset and liabilities sides) and how the respective financial systems are
organised. Testifying to the improvement in management techniques, inventory stocks have
fallen uninterruptedly in both countries over the period considered.
• Gradual convergence in the weight of commercial assets and liabilities in both countries, with
notable differences based on company size, owing to the favourable relative bargaining
position of large corporations.
• Average maturity period collection from customers has not converged in all the sizes of corpo-
rations: it remains greater in small and medium corporations Spain’s case. That might be
considered indicative of the commercial practices used in Spain, and represent an extra
implicit financial cost arising for Spanish small and medium companies compared with
their French counterparts.
• Gradual convergence in both countries in their financing structures and in the division between
fixed and current assets.
• Loss of weight of financial debt and, hereunder, bank-intermediated financing in both econo-
mies. Annex V reviews legislation and specific procedures under bankruptcy law in both
countries, the treatment of business failure and suspensions of payments to creditors,
showing the similarity between both systems. Such is the similarity between both sys-
tems that it may be concluded that any differences in the financial structure of corpo-
rations will not arise from this factor.
Regarding financing structures, annex VI examines the social welfare systems financed
or promoted by corporations for their employees (pension funds in both countries;
Épargne Salarial in France), which explain the relatively low weight of these liabilities in
companies’ balance sheets.
The second section studies the current flows included in the profit and loss accounts,
employment developments, performance and the data available on investment. The study does
not set about analysing financing flows directly, though it does so indirectly through analysis of
changes in the aforementioned balance sheets. As regards this second part of the chapter, the
following aspects are of note:
• The two countries’ industries show that their activity and fund-generation capacity are
tightly linked to developments in the general business cycle. In Spain’s case, fluctuations are
relatively sharper than in France, during both growth phases and downturns.
• Both countries’ industries have undergone pressure on their surpluses owing to the fact
that average compensation has outgrown the general level of prices. Such behaviour, which
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might be prompting a loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis agents in other regions, did not
affect the employment-generating capacity of Spanish industrial corporations and to a
smaller extent of French firms. The analysis of the weight of the personnel expenses
over net turnover shows that both countries have reduced the participation of these
costs in the sales, but the reduction was more intense in the Spanish firms. This reduc-
tion is influenced for the different contributions of the firms to the social security sys-
tem in each country. Annex VII goes deeper on this issue.
• Conversely and positively, both Spanish and French industries, which have benefited
from the creation of the single currency, have seen an unprecedented fall in nominal and
real interest-bearing debt. Practically up to the end of the decade, this was accompanied
by a parallel reduction in their financial costs.
• That has freed resources for investment in a broad sense (i.e. not only gross capital
formation, but also the taking of positions in corporations in other sectors and econo-
mies). At the end of the period, both countries’ corporations are on an equal competi-
tive footing in this area, having to face virtually identical borrowing costs. The reduction
of the financial costs over net turnover, has contributed to the increase of the funds
generated inside the companies. Thus, companies could afford in better conditions
their investment projects.
• The gradual convergence between industries in the two countries is accurately reflect-
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Despite its sound level, investment, which is theoretically influenced by these ratios,
moved on a similar trend during the decade, and followed a dissimilar one in the two final years
in both economies (in 1998 and 1999: on a rising trend in Spain and on a falling one in France).
The data for 2000 and 2001 will show a decline in investment in the Spanish industries too,
against a background of high profitability levels. This highlights two phenomena:
1. The path pursued by French industrial corporations, which have opted to invest out-
side their borders in meeting the challenge of internationalisation and globalisation, is
one Spanish corporations are now beginning to follow. This may perhaps be a symp-
tom of the maturity of the industries of these two economies, but it is doubtless also
a warning of a change in the rules of the eminently domestic game, only too well
known by these firms; the expected returns they find in these investments, could also
be associated with a higher degree of uncertainty and risk. However, it is clearly not
possible to stand back from this process of globalisation.
2. The picture given by the data provided by the firms qualifies the information ob-
tained from the National Accounts aggregates, insofar as it refers specifically to cer-
tain particular firms (the larger firms which, as mentioned above, bias the aggregate
studied). This fact, besides explaining the greater intensity of the rates of change of
investment of these companies, confirms the interest in carrying out this kind of
study, based on the annual accounts of the corporations, and serves as a contrast for
business trends and for macroeconomic analysis.
2.4. Investment and financial constraints in France and Spain: a study
based on individual firm data
A final aim of the joint research project presented in chapter IV has been to determine
whether France and Spain share the same patterns of behaviour in the investment decisions of
their industrial corporations, in the face of liquidity or financing constraints. To this end, a test of
excess sensitivity of investment to the internal generation of funds based on the estimation of a
standard Euler equation investment model derived from Bond and Meghir (1994) is presented.
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The analysis performed uses as a source of information a significant sub-set of the corporations
used in chapter III, enabling one of the main problems facing this kind of work to be avoided,
namely, lack of homogeneity in the basic information of the countries subject to comparison
which, as explained in chapter II, has been almost completely eliminated in this document. The
study shows in both countries (for which no significant differences are found) the sensitivity of
investment to the trend in the corporations’ capacity to generate internal funds (cash-flow)
and, at the same time, defines a useful signal for the analysis of business investment: the dividend
policy (specifically, its absence), is an indicator of the potential presence of financial constraints
affecting gross capital formation.
CHAPTER I
THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ECONOMIES:
A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (*)
All the tables and graphs in this work are part of a statistical annex disseminated
separately on the Internet at www.bde.es. This chapter includes only those that
are most relevant, but retains the same numbering as for the statistical annex.
That explains any gaps in the numbering used in this chapter.
(*) The authors of this chapter are Concha Artola and Teresa Sastre (Banco de España) and André Tiomo
(Banque de France).
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CHAPTER I
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter surveys the main macroeconomic features of the French and Spanish econ-
omies. It does not attempt to review the extensive macroeconomic background of the two
economies. The performance of the French and Spanish economies is compared within the
framework of the European economy, i.e. whenever the data are available, the relevant variable
is shown for both France and Spain and also for the aggregate of the 12 countries making up
the euro area in 1999. This comparison is carried out using data from the main macroeconomic
indicators of both countries, including growth, foreign trade, inflation and unemployment. Over
the last forty years there have been fundamental changes in both economies, but the change
has been more dramatic in Spain, which has been going through a process of catching-up for
most of the period. In fact, from 1986 to the early 1990s, Spain benefited strongly from a sub-
stantial improvement in the terms of trade and the economic upswing in Europe.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2 sets out the growth performance of the
two economies in the light of the changes that have taken place in the productive structure of
the two countries; section 3 focuses on the foreign trade between the two countries over the
last ten years; section 4 describes the patterns in saving, investment and financing in both the
French and Spanish economies; the labour market in the two countries is presented in section
5; section 6 considers very briefly cost and price developments in the two countries; lastly, an
overview of monetary and financial conditions is given in section 7.
2. GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
Since its accession to the European Union in 1986, the Spanish economy has experienced
a significant growth, outpacing most of the European countries. This section analyses this posi-
tive growth differential in the light of the changes that have taken place in the Spanish and
French productive structure.
Growth performance in Spain, France and the euro area during the last two decades is
shown in graph I.1 where the common trends along all the period can be analysed. For the
whole period, Spain has maintained a positive growth differential with the euro area, while the
French economy closely followed the European pattern. While the 1992-1993 recession was
deeper in Spain, the recovery from 1994 was very strong in relative terms; in the subsequent
years the gap between the growth rate in Spain and its European partners widened up to 2000,
when the gap substantially narrowed (1).
(1) The growth differential with the euro area was 1.5 p.p. between 1997 and 1999 and 0.6 p.p. in 2000.
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Table I.1 presents the changes in the productive structure in Spain and France over the
last twenty years. The main trend in the two countries is the move towards a service society,
and the continuing decline in the importance of agriculture and industry. When measured in
nominal terms, the increased in the weight of the service sector was the same size in both
countries (around 10 p.p.). However during the nineties the advances towards a service society
went further in Spain than in France (between 1990 and 1997 the share of service activities in
total VA rose 5 p.p. in Spain and 3 p.p. in France). The increasing participation of the services
sector in the generation of value added is much weaker when measured in real terms (less than
5 p.p. in both Spain and France), reflecting faster price increases in the service sector than in
goods production. This «dual inflation» phenomenon reflects the large non-tradable component
of services as well as a lower level of domestic competition than in other activities, and in par-
ticular in manufacturing.
Production specialisation differs in the two countries. As table I.1 shows, relative to Spain,
France appears to be specialised in financial services, real estate and business services, and in
other service activities (which include, inter alia, education, health and personal services). That
said, the productive structures of these two economies have become more similar the last two
decades.
3. FOREIGN TRADE
Joining the European Union has been beneficial for France and Spain’s trade with the rest
of the world. Most industrial sectors found themselves largely unprotected after customs tariffs
were scrapped and trade barriers came down. Consequently, the two countries’ economies
opened up further. In the case of Spain, for example, exports rose from 17.1% of GDP in 1991,
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to 27.5% in 1999, while imports increased from 20.3% to 28.8% over the same period. In
France, there was also an opening trend; exports rose from 21.5% of GDP in 1991 to 25.9% in
1999 and imports from 22% to 23.7% of GDP in the same period (see table I.2.A). At the end
of the nineties, the Spanish economy was more opened than the French one.
The table I.2.B shows the bilateral trade between the two countries. The most notable
fact is that France is Spain’s most important trading partner. A constant level of 13% of Spanish
goods exports went to France in all the years analysed, while imports of French goods grew by
almost two percentage points from 1991 to 1999, to 15.1%. From the viewpoint of France,
trade with Spain almost doubled between 1991 and 1999; exports rose from 3.9% in 1991 to
7% in 1999, and imports from 3.2% to 6.3% in the same period. The bilateral trade balance has
remained constantly positive for France, while in Spain it has been negative in every year. How-
ever, between 1994 and 1996 the Spanish deficit fell significantly owing to the successive devalu-
ations of the peseta.
4. SAVING, INVESTMENT AND FINANCING
The French and Spanish economies have displayed rather similar patterns of national sav-
ing and investment. The slowdown in economic activity during the period 1992-94 was mainly
reflected in a decrease of gross national capital formation and of gross saving in relation to
GDP (see graph I.2). As a result, the negative net lending to the rest of the world, characteristic
of the early nineties, turned positive in 1993 in France, and in 1995 in Spain. In both countries
the reduced domestic saving was mainly due to a lower level of general government gross sav-
ing (graph I.3) in accordance with the cyclical position. During the second half of the nineties,
the net financing needs of the general government were progressively reduced in both coun-
TABLE I.1
CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF VALUE ADDED
Agriculture 7.4    5.4    4.5    4.6    3.7    3.1    
Industry 28.6    24.6    22.2    28.0    22.7    21.0    
Construction 8.2    8.7    7.1    6.6    5.7    4.7    
Total Services 55.8    61.2    66.2    60.8    68.0    71.2    
Wholesale, retail, hotels, transport 24.5    24.8    27.0    18.5    20.0    18.9    
Financial intermediation, real estate 15.9    17.8    18.9    23.0    27.0    28.9    
Other service activities 15.3    18.7    20.3    19.3    21.0    23.4    
TOTAL 100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    
Agriculture 5.4    4.8    5.1    3.6    3.2    3.4    
Industry 26.3    22.8    22.5    23.1    20.8    21.4    
Construction 7.8    8.4    7.2    6.8    5.9    4.6    
Total Services 60.6    64.0    65.2    66.5    70.1    70.6    
Wholesale, retail, hotels, transport 28.1    25.8    26.7    18.4    19.6    19.3    
Financial intermediation, real estate 17.5    19.1    18.3    25.9    28.6    28.1    
Other service activities 15.0    19.1    20.2    22.2    21.9    23.2    
TOTAL 100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    
   Sources: OECD ANA database and INE (Spanish Statistical Institute).
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tries, in the context of fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria for public finances. This enabled
gross national saving to increase, making room for higher levels of gross fixed capital formation
by Spanish firms, while net lending to the rest of the world remained positive. In the case of
France the increase in gross national saving pushed up net lending to the foreign sector. The
reduction in the net financing needs of general government also led to a decline in public in-
debtedness during the second half of the nineties. Thus, the ratio of debt to GDP, which was
66.6% in Spain and 59.3% in France in 1997, was reduced to 60.4% and 57.6%, respectively, at
the end of 2000.
When focussing on the sectoral breakdown of saving and investment (see graph I.3),
there appear to be three main differences between France and Spain. Firstly, in the context
of the catching-up process of the Spanish economy with respect to the main EU countries,
gross fixed capital formation was generally higher in Spain during the nineties, as a propor-
tion of GDP. Secondly, this higher level is attributable to investment by non-financial firms
and general government, since households’ capital formation remained at a lower level in
Spain than in France during this period. Lastly, while gross national saving showed a similar
pattern and similar levels in both countries, there were differences in its sectoral break-
down. On one hand, household saving was higher, as a proportion of GDP, in France than in
Spain. On the other hand, Spanish non-financial firms significantly increased their saving
from 1994, in an attempt to reduce their dependence on borrowed funds, while French
firms maintained their saving fairly stable.
 Graph I.4 looks at investment from a broader perspective, showing the evolution of its
main components. From 1986 the private investment rate in Spain has been continuously above
the French rate, the difference being particularly high since 1996, period when the average pri-
vate non-residential investment rate was 14.3% of GDP in Spain as compared to 11.4% in
France. The total investment rate in the two economies, which was very similar up to the mid-
eighties, has diverged during the last fifteen years due to the speeding up of the investment
TABLE I.2
FOREIGN TRADE IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
A. Exports and Imports as % of GDP
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Spain
   Exports / GDP 17.1 17.6 19.4 22.3 22.6 23.9 26.7 27.2 27.5 
   Imports / GDP 20.3 20.4 20.0 22.1 22.8 23.4 25.7 27.2 28.8 
France
   Exports / GDP 21.5 21.5 20.7 21.5 22.5 23.1 25.5 26.1 25.9 
   Imports / GDP 22.0 20.9 19.2 20.2 21.1 21.4 22.5 23.5 23.7 
B. Bilateral goods trade between Spain and France (%)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Spain
Exports of goods to France/ Total Spanish exports 13.2 12.8 12.0 13.7 14.2 14.1 12.7 13.3 13.0 
Imports of goods from France/ Total Spanish imports 13.2 13.4 13.7 15.0 14.8 14.3 14.8 15.1 15.1 
France
Exports of goods to Spain/ Total French exports 3.9 4.2 4.4 5.3 5.5 5.9 5.9 6.4 7.0 
Imports of goods from Spain/ Total French imports 3.2 3.5 4.0 5.1 5.6 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.3 
Bilateral goods trade balance (‰) -4.1/1.3 -4.8/1.6 -4/1.3 -2.8/1 -1.5/0.6 -2/0.8 -4.1/1.6 -4.9/2 -7.9/3.3
(as % of Spanish GDP/ French GDP)
   Sources: Balance of Payments of Banque de France and Banco de España, INSEE and INE (French and Spanish Statistical Institutes) and 
Customs Statistics. 
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process in Spain. This development is partly explained by the relative dynamism of private non-
residential investment, but also by the fast growth in government investment. As seen in table
I.3 and graph I.4, the government investment rate was very low in Spain, relative to both France
GRAPH I.2
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and the euro area, and followed a downward trend until 1980. From 1982, public investment
surged, peaking in 1990-1991 when it reached 4.8% of GDP in real terms (2). The recent slow-
down in Government investment, observed both in France and Spain since 1996, is related to
the drive to reduce fiscal imbalances, in order to meet the requirements established in Maas-
tricht to participate in Stage Three of EMU.
5. THE LABOUR MARKET
In 1970, employment in Spain as a percentage of the working-age population was
about the same as in the euro area and only three percentage points lower than in France
(table I.4). As seen in the statistical annex (graph I.6), until the mid-eighties this ratio de-
GRAPH I.3
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   Source: OECD.
(2) The fast growth in the 1990-1991 period is associated with the events which took place in 1992; the
Universal Exposition in Seville and the Olympics Games in Barcelona
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clined steeply, recovering only slightly during the 1986-1992 expansion, experiencing a
stronger recovery in recent years, after the 1992-1994 recession. Despite the strong em-
ployment growth of the last five years, the Spanish employment/working-age population ra-
tio is still relatively low, both compared to the levels at the beginning of the seventies
(56.4% in 2000, 63.3% in 1970), and to its European partners (almost 6 p.p. below both the
French and the euro Area level in 2000).
 The pattern of decline in the employment/working-age population ratio during the
seventies and up to the mid-eighties is mainly accounted for by a huge increase in the
unemployment rate and to a lesser extent, by a decrease in the participation rate. The
unemployment rate, which was a mere three percent at the beginning of the seventies in
Spain, France and the euro area, went up by 8 p.p. in the euro area. In France the unem-
ployment closely followed the European pattern, while in Spain the unemployment rate
increased by 18 p.p., over the same period. The singularity of the Spanish unemployment
growth during theses years is the result of two overlapping shocks of a very different
nature; first, the oil crisis of the seventies, and second, the end of the dictatorship, which
led to wholesale political reform followed by far-reaching changes in economic institu-
tions. The participation rate fell by 5 p.p. in Spain during that period, in contrast with the
small declines in France and the euro area (about one percentage point); this relatively
big drop in the Spanish participation rate was mainly a consequence of the discouraged
worker effect, reflecting the low probability of finding a job given the high unemployment
rates. As seen in the statistical annex (graph I.6), both unemployment and participation
rates have been more volatile in Spain than in its European counterparts, volatility that is
partly accounted for by the relatively higher weight of fixed-term employment contracts
(see graph I.8 in the statistical annex). This pattern is all the more noticeable during the
fast unemployment growth which took place during the recession of the early nineties,
when Spanish unemployment increased by 8 p.p. in only four years, reaching a peak of
24% in 1994. This was followed by a similarly fast recovery; in only six years, the unem-
TABLE I.3
INVESTMENT RATE (GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION AS A % OF GDP. VOLUME)
SPAIN 1964-1975 1976-1985 1986-2000 1964-2000
TOTAL 22.7       19.5       22.5       21.8       
Private 19.9       17.1       18.7       18.7       
Non-Residential 10.1       10.6       13.1       11.5       
Residential 9.7       6.5       5.6       7.2       
Government 2.9       2.3       3.8       3.1       
FRANCE 1964-1975 1976-1985 1986-2000 1964-2000
TOTAL 22.1       19.8       19.5       20.4       
Private 18.2       16.7       16.3       17.0       
Non-Residential 10.7       10.2       11.4       10.9       
Residential 7.4       6.5       4.9       6.2       
Government 3.9       3.1       3.2       3.4       
EURO AREA 1964-1975 1976-1985 1986-2000 1964-2000
TOTAL 24.0       20.3       20.3       21.5       
Private 20.2       17.2       17.5       18.3       
Non-Residential 11.6       10.6       11.9       11.4       
Residential 8.6       6.6       5.6       6.9       
Government 3.8       3.1       2.8       3.2       
   Source: OECD ADB database.
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GRAPH I.4
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ployment rate went down by ten p.p. to 14% in 2000. From a long-run perspective it is
worth mentioning that the unemployment rate in 2000 both in France and in the euro
area is still 7 p.p. higher than the rate prevailing at the beginning of the seventies. This
difference amounts to 11 p.p. in the case of Spain.
GRAPH I.5
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH













































UNEMPLOYMENT AND PARTICIPATION RATES (%)
SPAIN 1970 1986 2000 1986-1970 2000-1986 2000-1970
Employment/Working-Age Population 63.3      47.9      56.4      -15.4      8.5      -6.9      
Participation rate 65.1      60.3      65.6      -4.8      5.4      0.6      
Unemployment rate 2.7      20.5      14.1      17.8      -10.0      11.4      
FRANCE 1970 1986 2000 1986-1970 2000-1986 2000-1970
Employment/Working-Age Population 66.0      59.6      62.0      -6.3      2.4      -4.0      
Participation rate 67.6      66.5      68.6      -1.1      2.1      1.0      
Unemployment rate 2.5      10.4      9.7      7.9      -0.7      7.2      
EURO AREA 1970 1986 2000 1986-1970 2000-1986 2000-1970
Employment/Working-Age Population 63.7      57.5      62.2      -6.3      4.7      -1.6      
Participation rate 65.2      64.1      68.3      -1.1      4.2      3.1      
Unemployment rate 2.3      10.3      9.0      8.1      -1.4      6.7      
   Sources: OECD ADB database.
   Note: The employment/working-age population figures for Spain are different from the variable shown in annex I.
   The employment variable in annex I is consistent with National Accounts, whereas here the employment variable comes from the LFS.
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The other singular feature of Spanish labour market dynamics is the high variability of the
participation rate. The strong decline in the participation rate up to the mid-eighties was due to a
decrease in the male participation rate (3) (see graph I.7 in the statistical annex), this decline being
particularly intense in the two extreme age groups; both youths and men over the age of 55 experi-
enced sharper reductions in their participation in the labour market. This decline is to be seen, in
part, as a consequence of more time being spent in education and partly as a consequence early
retirement. These factors, while also being present in France, are nevertheless more acute in Spain,
as the lack of opportunities in the labour market reinforced both of them. With the recovery of
economic activity, in 1985, the Spanish participation rate started to increase rapidly, reflecting the
end of the discouraged worker effect and, in particular, entry into the labour market of large numbers
of women who had previously been discouraged by the gloomy labour market performance. The
presence of women in the labour market has traditionally been very low in Spain when compared
to European levels. This is to some extent a cultural feature; but the delayed growth in female par-
ticipation in the labour market in Spain also reflected also the lack of opportunities that character-
ised the market at the time. Despite the faster growth in the female participation rate in Spain since
1986, the gap between Spain and France is still wide, amounting to 13 p.p. in 1997.
The fast economic growth experienced by the Spanish economy since 1994, and particu-
larly during the last four years, with average GDP growth of 4%, well above the euro area aver-
age, has translated into a remarkable employment performance, with an average of around
500,000 net jobs created per year. In France, from 1995 onwards, particularly at the end of the
period (1998-2000) an upward trend was observed, in terms of job creations. The growth of
employment increased by 2,6 % in the manufacturing sector and 3,4 % in the service sector:
460 000 jobs might have been created or kept between 1994 and 1997. Net job creation fur-
ther increased at the end of the period (4).
However, as shown in graph I.5, Spain maintained a positive differential with respect to
France, which closely followed the pattern observed in the euro area, although with a narrowing
gap. Graph I.5 depicts employment over a complete cycle, showing the relatively high volatility of job
creation in Spain. This is one feature of the Spanish labour market that is closely linked to the high
weight of fixed-term contracts in Spain. Until the mid-eighties, with the exception of temporary jobs
in seasonal activities (agriculture, tourism), employment contracts were assumed to be open-ended
and workers could be dismissed only under limited conditions entailing sizeable redundancy pay-
ments. This was considered to be as an important obstacle to the hiring of new workers. In order
to overcome these rigidities in employment contracts, a new law was passed in 1984, which intro-
duced a new type of contract namely, fixed-term contracts, with low severance payments. Since
their introduction this type of contracts has been widely used by firms. in fact, the fast employment
growth during the recovery that started in 1985 relied mainly on this type of temporary jobs (graph
I.8 in the statistical annex), which very soon accounted for a high proportion of total employment
(one-third). The effects of this type of contracts on the various labour market variables have been
extensively studied. They seem to have increased labour turnover, lowered labour and total factor
productivity owing to the lack of investment in human capital formation for workers on fixed-term
contracts, and to have enhanced the bargaining power of workers with permanent contracts, lead-
ing to unjustified wage rises at the beginning of the nineties. With the aim of counterbalancing the
negative effects of the high use of temporary contracts, reform initiatives were implemented in
1994 and 1997 and further measures were approved in March 2001 in order to encourage new
(3) The LFPR series shown in the statistical annex (graph 1.7) comes from OECD Labour Force Statistics
and differs from the one shown in graph 1.6, which came from OECD ADB database. In the case of France these
differences are unimportant. In the case of Spain the differences are wider.
(4) Crépon B, et Deplatz R. “Une nouvelle évaluation des effets des allègements de charges sociales sur les
bas salaires” Économie et Statistique, n° 348, 2001-8.
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permanent jobs and thereby reduce, the share of temporary contracts in the economy. The central
element was a new type of permanent contract with lower firing costs for those groups with spe-
cial difficulty finding permanent jobs (the long-term unemployed, temporary workers, young people
and elderly workers and women in particular sectors). These contracts included, as an additional
incentive, a two-year reduction in social security contributions of between 20 and 60 per cent de-
pending on the targeted group. As shown in graph I.8 in the statistical annex, the impressive job
creation in the Spanish economy during the last four years has been mainly based on the permanent
segment, so that, from this viewpoint, the reform has been successful. Nevertheless, the use of fixed-
term contracts has also expanded, and the reduction in the share of temporary contracts has been
small declining from a peak of 35% of total employment in 1995 to 32% in 2000.
In France, over the whole period (1991-1999), the use of fixed-term contracts was not as
developed as it was in the case of Spain: their proportion in the total employment only amounted
to 4.1 % in 2000 (2.7 % in 1990). However, the high proportion of permanent jobs contracted dur-
ing the 1998-2002 period contributed to the decrease in the number of precarious jobs. On the
other hand, in terms of wages, the measures taken to reduce contributions on low salaries, imple-
mented from 1993 onward have been developed, so as to play a key role in employment policy. The
measures aimed at reducing the decrease in the number of unqualified jobs, which represented a
high proportion of low paid employees. The gradual decrease in employers’ contribution rates con-
tributed to reducing the labour cost on low wages. For a worker earning the guaranteed minimum
wage, the decrease in the rate of social security contributions was only 5.4 % of gross salary in July
1993, then it was 18.2 % in October 1996. Under the “Aubry” act, companies which implement a
collective bargaining agreement with a 35 hour working week along with an undertaking to create
new jobs or protect existing ones can get support measures in the form of a reduction in social
security contributions especially on low and medium wages. For a worker earning the “guaranteed
minimum wage” this reduction represents about 20 % of the labour cost. Such incentives contribut-
ed to the increase in job creations between 1994 and 1997. (See annex II on characteristics of the
French and Spanish labour markets).
6. COSTS AND PRICES
At the beginning of the nineties the Spanish inflation rate was about 6%, two percentage
points above the average rate in the euro area. This differential declined rapidly up to 1997,
when it reached a minimum of 0.3 p.p. with respect to the euro area, reflecting the fast process
of nominal convergence driven by the Maastricht treaty. During the following years, and particu-
larly in 1999-2000, the relative performance of prices deteriorated somewhat with respect to
the euro area, partly reflecting the rise in oil prices which began in 1999 and affected to a great-
er extent countries like Spain, with a higher degree of dependence on imported energy. In 2001
the inflation gap between Spain and the euro area amounted to 0.7 p.p. During the whole peri-
od the inflation rate in France was below the euro area average. There was a progressive nar-
rowing of the gap until 1996, which was subsequently reversed. In 2001 the gap between infla-
tion in France and the euro area was 0.7 p.p. (graph I.9).
The main reason for the persistence of a positive inflation differential between Spain and
the euro area is to be found in the higher intensity of the dual inflation phenomenon in Spain, i.e.
the tendency of inflation rates to be faster in the non-tradable goods sector than in tradable
sector is more intense in Spain than in other European countries. This is shown in the last two
panels of graph I.9, where prices of non-tradables are proxied by the service component of the
HICP, while tradables are proxied by the HICP industrial goods component. During the first
part of the past decade, the behaviour of goods prices rapidly converged with the pattern ob-
served in the euro area as a whole. In 2001, a negative differential with respect to the euro area
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was attained for the first time, of –0.7. Final prices of services also followed a pattern of conver-
gence up to the mid-nineties, when the inflation differential reached a low of 1 p.p. with respect
to the euro area. This development has stopped in the last few years, with the service compo-
nent of inflation remaining stable at an average annual rate of 3.6%, while in the euro area it
followed a declining trend up to 2000. In 2001, both in Spain and in the euro area, final prices of
services experienced an acceleration of similar magnitude, so the service differential of inflation
stood at 1.7 p.p.
The main features of cost and price developments in the two economies are shown in
graph I.10, for both manufacturing and services sectors. Starting in the mid-nineties, unit labour
costs in manufacturing declined in France, as compensation per employee grew less than the
labour productivity. This decline in unit labour costs was partially passed through to prices, as
GRAPH I.9
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measured by the GVA deflator, while also enabling unit margins to be widened. This contrasts
with the developments in Spanish manufacturing, where unit labour costs have grown steadily
since 1996, reflecting a rate of wage growth well above the slow pace of improvements in la-
GRAPH I.10
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bour productivity. Given the high degree of exposure of manufacturing to international compet-
itiveness, this relative wage pressure has resulted in downward adjustment of unit margins (the
GVA deflator increased by a yearly average of 1.4% from 1994, one percentage point below unit
labour cost growth)
The higher unit labour costs observed in the service sector in both countries, rela-
tive to the manufacturing, which reflect the lower productivity performance of the former,
have had different effects on prices in the two countries. In France, the GVA deflator in
services has been closely linked to the growth path of unit labour costs (the average yearly
growth of the GVA deflator was 2.3% in the period 1990-1998, which as the same growth
experienced on average by unit labour costs). By contrast, in Spain, inflation in services has
outpaced the growth of unit labour costs (the GVA deflator grew by 4.9% on average over
the past decade, one p.p. above the growth rate experienced by unit labour costs). This
resulted in a widening of unit margins, possibly reflecting the inadequate degree of compe-
tition in this type of activity.
7. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
The nineties was a decade characterised by a progressive easing of monetary and finan-
cial conditions in both the Spanish and the French economies. During this period short-term
interest rates saw significant reductions (see graph I.11), which in Spain amounted to 12 per-
centage points and which were more moderate in France (about 7 percentage points). Long-
term interest rates also displayed a declining trend influenced by the monetary policy stance,
the ensuing reduction in fiscal deficits and the progressive deceleration of prices, which helped
to push nominal interest rates down towards historically low levels. The latter factor was par-
ticularly important in Spain where the inflation rate declined from 6% in the early nineties to
2% at the start of Stage Three of EMU. Lastly, the prospects for the creation of a monetary
union were a major factor in promoting the convergence process, thus favouring the easing of
monetary and financial conditions in both countries.
The easing of financial conditions was also remarkable in the stock market where share
prices showed unusual increases in the second half of the nineties (see graph I.11). From 1996
to 1998 prices on the Spanish stock market rose at an average annual rate of 42%, benefiting
from the significant reductions in interest rates. Nonetheless the rate was lower in the last two
years. In France stock market developments followed a similar pattern although with a different
timing. At first the increase in prices was smaller than in Spain, but in the last two years the
French index outperformed the Spanish one.
 During the nineties the exchange rate, which is also an asset price relevant to any
assessment of the monetary and financial conditions of an economy, showed strong fluctu-
ations (see graph I.12 in the statistical annex). These were particularly intense in the period
of crisis in the ERM (1992-1993), which very much affected the Spanish peseta and ended
up with a widening of fluctuation bands. After that period in which several currencies in
the ERM were devalued (the peseta among them), the basket of currencies that were sub-
sequently to participate in Stage Three of EMU appreciated against the dollar. The Spanish
peseta and the French franc followed this general pattern. In the three years prior to the
start of Monetary Union fluctuations in French and Spanish foreign exchange markets be-
came more moderate as required by the criteria established in the Maastricht Treaty. The
nominal effective exchange rate also followed the pattern that has just been described, al-
though with more moderate fluctuations. During the period crisis in the ERM the Spanish
effective exchange rate experienced its largest depreciation in the nineties, in contrast to
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the French index which appreciated even though the exchange rate against the dollar de-
preciated. The importance of non-dollar transactions with the rest of the world may under-
lie this development in the case of France. Since 1995, however, there has been virtually no
significant difference between the effective exchange rate developments of Spain and
France, so that international competitiveness advantages have become determined by pro-
duction costs rather than exchange rate developments.
The significant reductions in interest rates that took place in Spain and the growth of
private expenditure led to an acceleration of domestic credit to the private sector in the sec-
ond half of the nineties (see graph I.13 in the statistical annex). This followed a period of slow
growth against the background of a slowdown in economic activity in the first years of the dec-
ade. The fast pace of credit growth in the most recent years was the result of an acceleration in
loans to households and in bank lending to non-financial firms. In the case of France, domestic
GRAPH I.11
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credit to the private sector followed a rather different path, recording negative rates of growth
in several years. Nonetheless, at the end of the decade the rate of growth of credit also in-
creased progressively in France, to reach 10% in 2000. In accordance with the developments in
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early nineties, rose by 20 percentage points to stand above the French ratio at the end of the
decade. In contrast, the ratio declined in France by about 15 percentage points up to 1999, re-
bounding slightly in 2000.
In most countries bank lending is the main source of financing for households. How-
ever, in the case of firms, bank lending is just one of several sources of funds. According to
data from the financial accounts of French and Spanish non-financial companies, loans
amounted to only 25-35% of their resources, although that proportion declined in France
during the period 1995-2000, while in Spain it increased. The remaining sources of funds
were market financing (short-term paper, bonds, shares and other equity) and trade credit.
However, the importance of these items is different in the two countries and has also
evolved in a different way (see graph I.14). In Spain the main sources of funds during the
second half of the nineties were loans and trade credit, resources from share issuance ac-
quiring greater significance in 1999 and 2000. Market financing from securities other than
shares was virtually irrelevant. However, in France short-term securities and bonds issues
were more important, although this cannot be seen in the graph due to the importance of
other items, which partially offset the amount of short-term securities and bonds issued.
Share issuance has generally been more significant in France than in Spain, although as
mentioned above it became increasingly important in Spain during the last two years. Final-
ly, trade credit seems to be a more important source of financing for Spanish companies
than for French ones, although, when netting trade credit assets and trade credit liabilities,
Spanish firms appear to have been net lenders throughout the period while French firms
have been net borrowers most of the time.
 The portfolio of financial assets has also experienced significant changes as a result of
the notable increase in the acquisition of foreign companies and the proliferation of mergers,
acquisitions and cross-shareholdings. In 1995, the acquisition of shares and other equity
amounted to only 0.7% of GDP in Spain, and 1.3% of GDP in France. These percentages in-
creased throughout the period to reach 14.2% and 10.4% respectively in 2000. In both coun-
TABLE I.5




Direct & portfolio investment abroad 1.5         1.2         12.7         
Direct investment 0.8         0.8         5.5         
Portfolio investment 0.7         0.3         7.2         
Inward foreign direct & portfolio investment 8.5         1.4         8.7         
Direct investment 2.8         1.4         3.0         
Portfolio investment 5.7         0.0         5.7         
FRANCE
Direct & portfolio investment abroad 3.6         3.3         13.4         
Direct investment 2.1         1.6         6.3         
Portfolio investment 1.4         1.7         7.1         
Inward foreign direct & portfolio investment 4.4         0.6         8.6         
Direct investment 1.4         1.4         2.4         
Portfolio investment 3.1         -0.7         6.2         
   Sources: IMF and Banco de España
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tries a large part of this increase was related to the complete or partial acquisition of foreign
companies and cross-border alliances. In the case of Spain, investment in Latin America played a
significant role (representing between 50 and 65% of direct investment outflows in 1998 and
1999) although its share decreased in 2000. European Union countries, meanwhile, have ac-
counted for about 30 – 40% of these outflows during the last three years. To give an idea of this
process of increasing international expansion of French and Spanish companies, table I.5
presents some figures from the balance of payments.
Although a sectoral breakdown of flows is not available, the figures for direct investment
presented in the table are fairly representative of non-financial firms’ foreign investment and
financing. Portfolio investment has also been included since participation in foreign companies
or funds by non-residents investors is sometimes included in this category. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that sectors other than non-financial firms – financial institutions and general
government – are also relevant in this kind of investment. According to these figures three dif-
ferent periods may be distinguished. In the first one the Spanish economy received funds from
the rest of the world representing 8.5% of GDP, in annual average terms, although a good deal
of that amount was portfolio investment. Foreign investment in France was also significant dur-
ing this period, but of lesser importance. In the second period (1994-1996) both countries ex-
perienced a slowdown in funds from the rest of the world, mainly related to the weaker eco-
nomic conditions prevailing in most industrialised countries. The most recent period (1997–
2000) was mainly characterised by a large increase in outward direct and portfolio investment
both in France and Spain, as a result of the big interest of domestic companies in foreign mar-
kets and the surge of cross-border mergers and alliances. At the same time inward foreign in-
vestment also rebounded in both countries, reflecting this same process as well as an interna-
tional reallocation of portfolio investment after the start of Monetary Union.
CHAPTER II
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BANQUE
DE FRANCE AND BANCO DE ESPAÑA
CENTRAL BALANCE SHEET DATA OFFICES
POPULATION AND SAMPLES (*)
(*) The authors of this chapter are Ana Esteban (Banco de España) and Annie Sauvé (Banque de France).
All the tables and graphs in this work are part of a statistical annex disseminated
separately on the Internet at www.bde.es. This chapter includes only those that
are most relevant, but retains the same numbering as for the statistical annex.
That explains any gaps in the numbering used in this chapter.
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1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BANQUE DE FRANCE CENTRAL
BALANCE SHEET DATA OFFICE
The Fiben company database is at the core of the Banque de France’s company informa-
tion system. This is a database of descriptive accounting and financial information on non-finan-
cial corporations, updated in real time as and when annual accounts are received.
The database covers an extensive population of natural persons and legal entities. De-
scriptive and accounting information is gathered, encompassing all items of the balance sheet
and profit and loss account, as well as key points from the notes to the accounts.
In 1997, year selected to describe the sample and calculate the coverage rate in comparison with
the total population of firms registered at INSEE (France’s national statistics office) some 36,000 compa-
nies have supplied the Banque de France with additional information. This sub-population is made up of
companies that contribute data to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSDO).
1.1. The Fiben database
Previously, as part of its task of refinancing commercial paper, the Banque de France used
to collect information in order to verify the credit quality of the issuers of bills presented to it
for discounting. This information was useful to the Bank during the period when discounting
was a monetary policy instrument. In 1971, France ceased this type of refinancing, but the cen-
tral bank continued to gather information on companies. In 1976, the Banque de France set up
the Fiben database using this data. Since 1982, all banks have been able to access the base. Eco-
nomic bodies are also entitled to consult Fiben. Before lending to a company, a commercial
bank will check the applicant’s solvency in the Fiben base.
1.1.1. Information contained in the Fiben database
The population of the database includes natural persons and legal entities that have regis-
tered offices or are domiciled in metropolitan France, and that belong to one or more of the
following categories:
• Companies with a significant economic or financial presence in terms of their turnover
(i.e. over EUR 0.75 million), workforce or capital;
• companies with bank loans over a certain threshold, requiring disclosure to the Bank’s
central credit register;
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• businesses giving rise to concerns owing to their financial position, their failure to pay
debts on time, or the personal situation of their senior managers;
• companies with economic and financial ties to legal entities or sole traders included in
the population of the base;
• de jure managers of the above companies.
A broad range of information is gathered, including:
• descriptive details, such as the firm’s name, legal status and NAF business code, the ad-
dress of the registered offices, a list of managers and partners, details of equity owner-
ship, etc.;
• accounting and financial data from the balance sheet and profit and loss account;
• information on bill payment incidents and risks reported by credit institutions in ac-
cordance with the regulations of the Banking and Financial Regulations Committee;
• legal information pertaining to judgements handed down by a commercial or a civil
court ruling over a commercial case.
The information is gathered from a variety of sources, including journals of legal notices,
registrars of commercial courts, France’s national statistics office (INSEE) and credit institutions,
as well as the companies themselves.
Information is deleted when:
• it becomes obsolete, e.g. a ruling with a specific date (such as insolvency or disqualifica-
tion from managing a company); details of the judicial liquidation of a sole proprietor-
ship taking place over 10 years ago;
• it is covered by an amnesty law.
These data supply invaluable information for the conduct of monetary policy. The current
refinancing process is based on underlying securities that are eligible for money market opera-
tions, and, in particular, on commercial paper issued by companies that receive the Banque de
France’s top rating (“3”).
1.1.2. The Banque de France rating
The information gathered on each natural person or legal entity is analysed and then is-
sued as a succinct overall assessment that can be easily interpreted by the different users. The
rating represents the central bank’s opinion on the short-tem viability of a given company. In
order to establish this opinion, the Bank relies on its branch network, which supplies it with the
necessary information acquired from local sources.
The rating process is in no way automatic. Ratings are reviewed whenever important
new information is brought to the attention of the branch managers concerned.
Companies submitting their accounts for consideration are apprised of their rating. Man-
agers and sole traders are informed if their rating reflects a particular concern or an unfavoura-
ble assessment.
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THE AIMS OF THE RATING
The rating awarded by the Banque de France is intended to reflect the Bank’s assessment
at a given time of the situation of an industrial or commercial business at a two-year horizon.
In terms of refinancing of the banking system, the rating is used to determine which pri-
vate bills are eligible for use in the central bank’s interventions on the interbank market on be-
half of the European System of Central Banks. Only commercial paper representing claims on
companies with the best rating (“3”) is deemed to be eligible.
In terms of risk assessment, the rating acts as an analytical tool used not just internally by
the Banque de France, but also by the banking community. In particular, ratings provide an over-
all view of the creditworthiness of rateable companies.
A company’s rating can be used to situate the firm in terms of its turnover, financial
health, environment and ability to meet payments.
COMPANY RATING
The company rating reflects the opinion of the Banque de France on the company’s abili-
ty to honour its financial commitments at a two-year horizon. Ratings have three components:
— a turnover rating denoted by a letter between A and H, J, N or X
— a credit rating denoted by a number: 0, 3, 4, 5 or 6
— a payment rating denoted by a number: 7, 8 or 9
The rating may be accompanied by additional information pertaining to transparency or
indicating that the accounts were filed late or not at all.
TURNOVER RATING
This part of the rating indicates the level of the company’s turnover, as follows:






















150 and 750 million
75 and 150 million
30 and 75 million
15 and 30 million
7.5 and 15 million
1.5 and 7.5 million
0.75 and 1.5 million
0.75 million
4.92 billion
984 million and 4.92 billion
492 and 984 million
197 and 492 million
98.4 and 197 million
49.2 and 98.4 million
9.84 and 49.2 million
4.92 and 9.84 million
4.92 million
Non significant (companies whose turnover is unrepresentative of their business, or compa-
nies that do not directly carry out an industrial or commercial activity, notably, holding firms
that do not publish consolidated accounts).
Turnover unknown or data too old (relative to a financial year ending more than 21 months
previously).
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CREDIT RATING
The credit rating is mainly based on:
— an analysis of the company’s financial position and profitability, if the size of the business
justifies obtaining accounting information. This analysis takes account of the features
inherent to the large sectors of activity, as well as specific characteristics of sectors
considered to be atypical.
— an assessment of management, shareholders, affiliated companies or those with which
the company has close financial or commercial ties, the immediate environment of
the company (markets, regulation, etc.).
— the existence of payment incidents or legal proceedings.
The credit rating given to companies belonging to a group takes account of the financial
position of the economic group to which they belong.
There are five credit ratings:
— a credit rating of 0 is given to companies on which the Banque de France has not re-
ceived any unfavourable information and which economically, are not sufficiently im-
portant to warrant the collection of accounting records;
— a credit rating of 3 is rating of excellence awarded to companies deserving the best
Banque de France assessment of their creditworthiness and whose ability to meet
their financial commitments is entirely guaranteed.
— a credit rating of 4 is given to companies that are able to satisfactorily meet their fi-
nancial commitments, notwithstanding certain factors of fragility or uncertainty. A
credit rating of 4 is incompatible with a payment rating of 8 or 9, which signifies a
deterioration in the firm’s cash position;
— a credit rating of 5 is given to a company whose ability to meet its financial commit-
ments gives cause for concern;
— a credit rating of 6 is given to a company whose ability to meet its financial commit-
ments gives serious cause for concern.
PAYMENT RATING
The payment rating provides information on the company’s ability to make timely pay-
ments. There are three payment ratings:
— a payment rating of 7 indicates that in the last six months, payments were made on
time or that reported incidents were not serious and do not reflect real cash flow
difficulties;
— a payment rating of 8 indicates that the cash flow difficulties of the company do not
appear to cast serious doubts on the firm’s creditworthiness;
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— a payment rating of 9 applies when reported payment incidents denote serious cash
flow difficulties and that the company’s solvency is seriously at risk.
RATING OF MANAGEMENT AND SOLE PROPRIETORS
In order to make a more comprehensive assessment of a company, it is also useful to
take into account information on its managers, as long as this information is publicly available.
For this reason, the Banque de France awards a rating to natural persons exercising a
management function or to sole proprietors in their capacity as natural persons. This Banque de
France rating given to natural persons is expressed by one of the following three-digit codes:
• 000: the information collected by the Banque de France on the manager gives no
cause for concern;
• 040: the information calls for special attention;
• 050: the information gives cause for concern;
• 060: the information gives serious cause for concern;
— the 040 rating is given to a manager:
• who holds office as the legal representative of a company that, regardless of its pay-
ment rating, is given a rating of 6 owing to a judicial liquidation order being served
in the last five years;
• or who holds office as the legal representative of at least two companies with a
payment rating of 9.
— the 050 rating is given to a manager:
• who holds office as the legal representative of two companies that have both been
subject to a judicial liquidation order within the last five years, unless these compa-
nies are the subject of a judgement binding on them by third-party notice, or the
judgement has been extended to also apply to them;
• or who is ordered by the courts to pay the debts of the legal entity, whatever the
amount of the pecuniary liability.
— the 060 rating is given to a manager:
• who holds office as the legal representative of at least three companies that have
been subject to a compulsory winding-up order or a judicial liquidation order with-
in the last five years, unless these companies are the subject of a judgement binding
on them by third-party notice, or the judgement has been extended to also apply
to them;
• or who is personally the subject of a court decision (court-ordered turnaround
procedure, judicial liquidation, personal bankruptcy, or a ban on directing, managing,
administering or controlling a company).
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1.2. The Central Balance Sheet Data Office of the Banque de France
1.2.1. Description
In 1968, at the request of the France’s General Planning Commission (Commissariat
général du plan), the Banque de France set up a company database intended to provide the na-
tional accounts with additional statistics on the size and sector of businesses. The Central Bal-
ance Sheet Data Office’s (CBSDO) remit was set forth in the agreement between the Banque
de France and the national statistics office, INSEE: “On the basis of samples taken from all its
member companies, [the Centre] shall process and supply all the information that can possibly
be derived from accounting records (balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, notes to the ac-
counts etc.)”. The Banque de France provides the monetary authorities and economic decision-
makers with valuable information on the economic environment through the analysis of aggre-
gated data on firms. The data derived from company annual accounts constitute the source ma-
terial for conducting studies at the macroeconomic or microeconomic level and for undertak-
ing sectoral and financial analyses. The Balance Sheet Office database is a collection of data from
firms that volunteer to submit their annual accounts.
Industrial, commercial and services companies in the competitive sector are encouraged
to participate, irresepective of their size, tax treatment or legal regime. Companies contribute
on a voluntary basis.
A debt-burdened or vulnerable financial position is not a barrier to membership.
Without the assent of the company concerned, the Balance Sheet Office will refrain from
divulging, in any form, individual information received that is not subject to a legal disclosure
requirement. Nor will the Centre publish aggregate data in the form of leaflets of sectoral re-
sults if they may reveal the individual position of a participating company.
Every year, in return for its voluntary participation, each company receives an individual
report with a detailed financial analysis of its position, which is a valuable tool for decision-mak-
ers, as well as a leaflet of aggregate results for its sector. Historical series from 1971 to the
present make it possible to study long-term economic cycles. In 1997, some 36,000 firms from
the broad Fiben population mentioned earlier have submitted their corporate tax returns as
well as an additional information report (a “dossier de collecte”) containing more precise de-
tails of certain balance sheet items, debt and inter-year flows. An additional sheet may also be
submitted on construction, public works, temporary employment and haulage.
The information requested, which is not intended to constitute an exhaustive inventory
of the company’s accounting data, is needed to:
— check the consistency of the file;
— construct a table of flows;
— examine closely the key aspects of the business or certain particular features, such as
leasing transactions and debt.
Like all bodies that use company accounts, the Balance Sheet Office is heavily dependent
on the degree of accounting standardisation in force.
Since 1986, the branch of the Banque de France that receives accounting statements
from companies has also responsible for the whole data processing operation. The data are en-
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tered and checked by means of an interactive computer program, in collaboration with the
company and its accountant, if necessary.
Once the balance sheet has been validated, a Financial Analysis File (FAF) is generated
and sent to the company. The lead-time between submission of the balance sheet and sending
of the FAF has been cut to one week at the most.
Since individual data are centralised, they have to be grouped according to appropriate
criteria. Generally speaking, the key determinant of a company’s classification is its core busi-
ness. Since 1994, the Balance Sheet Office has used INSEE’s NAF 1993 classification, which ar-
ranges the activities of different companies according to their Principal Activity Code (Code
APE).
The additional data collected in the database are presented in a very detailed form and
are extremely important for financial analysis, especially when making international compari-
sons.
Regular checks are carried out to ensure that the database is representative. Investiga-
tions are conducted to control the quality of the sample and the coverage based on the
number of employees. These controls are performed by size and sector. The aim is to reach full
coverage for large companies (500 + employees), especially in manufacturing. The coverage rate
should reach 50% for medium-sized companies employing 20 to 500 people and 10% for small
businesses. If coverage does not reach this threshold, the branches are asked to contact new
companies from the sectors or of the sizes that are poorly represented in the database.
Over the last few years, active efforts have been made to increase participation in under-
represented sectors. Representativeness is satisfactory in industry (with an overall coverage
rate of 60%) and acceptable in construction (34%) as well as in the retail sector (32%). In the
services sector, some sub-sectors are well represented and others are currently being can-
vassed.
 The Balance Sheet Office database contains historical series as the Banque de France has
been collecting accounting data on the earnings, cash flows and financial structures of industrial
companies.
1.2.2. Specific data supplied
The main additional data supplied by companies contributing to the database include:
DETAILED INFORMATION ON CAPITAL GOODS ACQUIRED UNDER FINANCIAL LEASE
OR FINANCIAL RENTAL AGREEMENTS
While tax returns provide partial information on finance leases (amount of rental payments,
lease liabilities), they provide no details on financial rental, which is a widely used technique in the
transport sector. Furthermore, the Balance Sheet Office is the only database to identify the amount
of lease-financed investment and the value of fixed assets used by the company, regardless of how
they are financed. The lease-financed investment is booked as a tangible asset, considered as if it
were financed by a bank loan which decreases at the same pace as the estimated depreciation. This
information is key to assessing the breakdown between the factors of production and company in-
vestment. It also makes international comparisons more meaningful.
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SOURCES OF CREDIT
The data provided by the Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSDO) is used to distin-
guish banking-system financing from funds obtained from the group and partners.
This breakdown is not revealed in the company’s tax return. Yet this sort of information is
vital at a time when mergers and consolidations are increasing, even among the smallest firms. Fur-
thermore, these breakdowns are essential for the reclassification necessary for international studies,
in view of the fact that we do not always use the same accounting methods as our partners.
INTEREST EXPENSE
The concept of interest expense used by the Balance Sheet Office is much more precise
than that used in tax returns, which include not only annual interest expense, but also discounts
granted to customers and miscellaneous financial charges. Only the Balance Sheet Office pro-
vides a precise picture of the interest expense incurred in a given financial year.
These data can be used to analyse the calculated cost of financial debt, broken down into
the different sources of financing (credit institutions, group and partners). Moreover, the ques-
tion of introducing risk premiums according to company size into the cost of credit was con-
sidered as part of a research project on the cost of credit conducted by National Credit and
Securities Council (Conseil national du crédit et du titre – CNCT).
FLOW ANALYSIS
Flow analysis mainly concerns the company’s investment drive and working capital re-
quirements and how these are financed over the course of the year. Flows are calculated net of
contributions linked to restructuring and describe “intrinsic” changes.
The different types of financing are tracked closely over time because the breakdown of
new credits and redemptions is listed in detail. This ensures an in-depth analysis of how firms
are financed.
In order to consider the situation of the productive base from the standpoint of short-
term solvency, it is vital to obtain data on cash receipts and payments, which give an accurate
insight into the cash situation at the level of individual firms.
CONTRIBUTIONS LINKED TO RESTRUCTURING
Data from the Balance Sheet Office are used to assess the scale of restructuring and to per-
form the restatements needed to include the balance sheet of the affected company in studies.
Using this type of data, it is also possible to conduct more in-depth studies on restructur-
ing – a phenomenon that is affecting an increasing number of companies.
SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN SECTORS
Certain additional information reports contain specific data that enable more meaningful
analyses of the transport, temporary employment and construction sectors.
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1.3. Outlook
The detailed approach taken by the Banque de France’s Central Balance Sheet Data Of-
fice (CBSDO) enables it to respond swiftly and accurately to questions from economic and
monetary policymakers.
The representativeness of the CBSDO’s data is checked by calculating a coverage rate
with respect to Insee’s comprehensive database. This guarantees meaningful results and author-
ises adjustments, if necessary.
Using the Central Balance Sheet Office’s data, it is also possible to compare individual
company analyses (available in the Financial Analysis File) with the overall or sectoral analyses
(performed using statistics). This is a valuable exercise, for two reasons:
• it makes it possible to evaluate each company with respect to its sector of activity;
• it gives economists a critical appreciation of the concepts used in studies, and especially
in the construction of scores (which are produced using from statistical studies) and
ensure that the right variables are used by making this research more efficient.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA CENTRAL
BALANCE SHEET DATA OFFICE
The Banco de España created its Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBBE) in 1983 with
the aim of compiling and maintaining economic and financial information on the activity of
Spanish non-financial corporations and of enhancing knowledge thereof (1). To comply with this
remit, the CBBE is entrusted with gathering annual information on non-financial corporations
which co-operate voluntarily by completing an annual questionnaire (CBA). Since 1993, infor-
mation has been compiled on a quarterly basis (CBQ) on the most significant corporations
among those reporting to the CBA. And since 1991, under the agreement entered into with the
Spanish Mercantile Registries, information has been processed from the accounts that corpora-
tions are obliged to file with the Mercantile Registries. Further, the annual accounts of small and
medium-sized corporations suitable for study are incorporated into a specific database (CBB).
The results discussed in Chapter 3 of the study are based on the information in the databases
CBA and CBB.
2.1. Main aims of the Central Balance Sheet Data Office
• To contribute to knowledge of the non-financial corporations sub-sector using two an-
alytical approaches. These are, namely, a business approach, i.e. from the standpoint of
the corporation itself and the proprietor, and a general economic analysis approach,
which seeks to describe the income generation and distribution and accumulation
processes, along with the opening and closing balance sheet positions. This latter ap-
(1) The Banco de España Law of Autonomy, promulgated in 1994, stipulates the tasks under its remit.
These include, among others, the preparation and publication of statistics relating to the functions of the Banco de
España, and the promotion of the sound functioning and stability of the financial system. The creation, maintenance
and dissemination of the CBBE databases are subordinate to the performance of these tasks.
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proach provides information on the financial transactions, assets and liabilities of the
non-financial corporations sub-sector (2). The rules applied for their preparation are
drawn from National Accounts systems, specifically the 4th Revision of the United Na-
tions System of National Accounts published in 1993 (SNA 93) and its version for the
EU, the European System of Regional and National Accounts (ESA 95). These data are
necessary for contrast in the preparation by the Statistics and Central Balance Sheet
Data Directorate of the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy. Sectoral data are also
being used by the Spanish National Statistics Office (INE) in its Analysis of National Ac-
counts and as a cross-check source in the preparation of its Input-Output Tables.
• To maintain databases with full uniform information on individual corporations, thereby
enabling the Research Department to analyse corporate behaviour and the effects of
monetary policy measures on corporate financing and results. At the same time, the
itemised information available is one of the bases on which the Operations Directo-
rate evaluates and proposes to the ECB the inclusion and maintenance of corporations
in the “Tier 2” collateral list (corporations whose liabilities are provided and accepted
by the Banco de España as collateral for liquidity injection operations in the financial
system).
• To prepare quarterly articles contributing to knowledge of the economic position of
non-financial corporations with the shortest time-lag possible. In drafting these articles
CBQ data and, once a year, CBA and CBB data are used.
• To provide the reporting corporations with aggregated and homogenous sectoral in-
formation as consideration for their co-operation.
• To disseminate aggregated sectoral information for use by other non-Bank analysts: fi-
nancial institutions, universities, researchers, central government, regional governments
and public, national and international agencies.
2.2. Central Balance Sheet Data Office annual results (CBA)
Drawing on a directory of about 100,000 corporations (of a total of 700,000 in Spain),
the CBA currently maintains a non-statistical sample of around 8,000 mainly medium and large-
sized corporations. For the 1983 database, 3,271 corporations co-operated, with coverage – in
relation to the gross value added at basic prices of the total for non-financial corporations ob-
tained from National Accounts – of 36.9%; for the 1999 database, information was received
from 8,159 corporations with coverage of 32% (for the 2000 database it has been processed
7.240 companies at the date of presentation of this document; the database is still open). The
Central Balance Sheet Office does not have a sample of corporations that has been designed
through statistical procedures, since co-operation with the database is voluntary. Certain biases
are present which should be taken into consideration by analysts of CBA data. Regarding the
various economic activities, these are unevenly represented, although the weight of data on
manufacturing activity in the database is considerable. In practice, neither agriculture nor servic-
es other than transport are sufficiently represented in the CBA. The following key activities are
well represented: the production and distribution of electricity, gas and water; the manufacture
(2) The information is obtained after several steps: a) change to the format of ESA95; b) include some
adjustments to the accounting data, i.e. valuation at market prices; c) mix the CBA and CBB databases to create an
integrated database (called “CBI”); d) extrapolate to the total population; e) include some final adjustments to the
final data, to rank the information provided by other sources.
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of transport equipment; transport, storage and communications; the chemical industry; and oil
refining and nuclear fuel processing.
The CBA information is of high quality and is highly detailed as it is obtained from a
questionnaire completed by the reporting corporations. Once the questionnaire is re-
ceived, it’s checked in a direct contact with the corporation. Since 1992 the CBA has been
using two questionnaires – one normal and one abridged – which are sent to the reporting
corporations depending on whether their staff numbers 100 or not. The essential differ-
ence between both questionnaires lies in the number of data requested in each, as indicat-
ed in the following table:
The CBBE questionnaires are revised periodically to incorporate regulatory changes the
previous year in the General Chart of Accounts and to include improvements and suggestions
received from users. The following table briefly outlines the contents of CBA questionnaires:
The CBA obtains information for two years in each data base (to calculate rates of varia-
tion for a common sample) and generally classifies corporations according to various criteria
(main activity, size, public- or private-sector, regional community where registered office is lo-
cated), which are the bases for the analyses of the different groupings of corporations:
• As regards productive activity, corporations are classified according to their main activ-
ity. The available aggregates of activity have a four-tier structure. The lowest level is that
of the groups in the NACE 1993 statistical classification of economic activities in the
European Community (four digits), in which the CBA has coded all the corporations
available in its databases, whether opened or closed. Allocating a corporation (which
may engage in differentiated productive activities) to a single activity code is done by
Information items for each year in the questionnaire
Type of questionnaire
Accounting information 452 151
Additional information 113 61
Total 565 212
Normal Abridged
Content of CBA questionnaires






Restructuring in the past year
Information to ascertain whether an individual corpo-




Profit and loss accounts
Proposal for distribution of profits
Value-added tax
Information required for calculating a statement of
source and application of funds and similar
Restatement and restructuring of balance sheets, and
other information
Data requested of the corporations concerned which
are normally obtained through direct contact with
them
Breakdown by currency, residence of counterpart
agents and inter-company relationship
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the top-down method defined by INE. Subsequently, once each corporation is classified
in a NACE group, the CBBE table of activities is used to allocate each corporation to a
sector (82 of which have been defined), a major sector (26) and activity group (14) in
the annual CBBE publication.
• As regards classification by nature of ownership, the aggregates of public- and private-
sector corporations are presented separately. A corporation is considered to be in the
public sector in the CBBE databases if: a) the direct plus indirect general government
ownership interest exceeds 50%, and b) while not holding a majority interest, effective
control of the corporation (or, what amounts to the same, company management deci-
sions) is exerted by general government. Also included as public-sector corporations
are those where corporations fitting either of the two foregoing cases exert control or
have a majority ownership interest. Classification of corporations into one of these
groups takes place each year, according to their position as at 31 December.
• Turning to classification by size, the explanatory variable here is the average number of em-
ployees of each corporation in each of the database years. Also, two secondary parameters
are used: the total assets figure and the total figure on the credit side of the profit and loss
account, whose value is set as a security threshold that prevents classification errors (to
ensure, for instance, that an apparently small company, according to the number of staff, is
not classified as such when its balance sheet, expenditure or income are high enough to
invalidate the aggregate). In 1996, EC Recommendation 96/280 established the need to ap-
ply uniform criteria in defining SMEs (small- and medium-sized enterprises), a definition
that should consider, in part, the three above-mentioned criteria. The CBBE has essentially
adopted this Recommendation (i.e. small corporations up to 50 employees; medium, from
50 to 249; and large, 250 employees and above).
• Lastly, the CBBE classifies corporations in the province and regional community where
their registered office is located.
The following table summarises the classification criteria:






Based on main activity. Activity aggregates available:
— NACE 93 (four digits).  Allocation by top-down method, defined by INE.
— CBBE sectors: 82.
— CBBE major sectors: 26.
— Activity groups in the annual publication: 14.
Mixed allocation criterion based on Recommendation 96/280/EC, but bearing the fol-
lowing parameters in mind:
— Average number of employees.
— Total assets.
— Total on credit side of the profit and loss account.
1. Average number of employees.Small: up to 50 employees.Medium: from 50 to 249
employees.Large: 250 employees and over.
2. Assets and Credit
Total assets and the total Credit figure are set as a security threshold so that a small
corporation in terms of number of employees, but one which is large in terms of its
balance sheet or profit and loss account, is not classified among small corporations
and so does not distort the aggregates.
Regional community in which its registered office is located.
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2.3. The database of annual accounts filed with the Mercantile Registries
(CBBE/RM or CBB)
Since 1991, the CBBE has been using another supplementary CBA database to ascer-
tain the position of and recent developments in non-financial corporations. The CBB is
based on a different work methodology that uses the data available in administrative
sources. That further enables the various obligations falling on corporations to be exploit-
ed for statistical purposes. Since 1990, Spanish corporations have been obliged to file their
annual accounts with the Mercantile Registry of the province in which their registered of-
fice is located in order to make the accounts public. The CBBE and the Mercantile Regis-
tries co-operate in respect of the filing of accounts. The information from the Mercantile
Registries provides for cross-checking which, moreover, allows the characteristics of a
most extensive sample of non-financial corporations to be known. And on the basis of this,
population totals may be deducted and the strata of the non-financial corporations that
are worst represented in the CBA database (services and small corporations) may be
monitored. The CBBE is obliged not to disclose individual information, whereby it publishes
the results of its work only in aggregated (not corporation-by-corporation) form, and this
exclusively for economic analysis purposes.
As a result of this co-operation with the Mercantile Registries, the CBBE offers them
technical advice and maintains a database with information for the years 1990 to 2000 on a
growing number of companies. The Banco de España promoted the promulgation of the Minis-
try of Justice Order dated 14th January 1994, which made the completion of an official stand-
ardised annual accounts format obligatory. This fundamentally changed the project, since there-
after the number of accounts expanded exponentially (420.342 corporations in 1999, compared
with 24,479 in 1992). Information is expected to be received from over 450,000 corporations
for 2000. There is a field which identifies whether a corporation also co-operates with CBA so
that any overlapping may be avoided in the preparation of studies that use both databases. In
conformity with the rules of the General Chart of Accounts, there is a normal form and an
abridged one.
General characteristics of the database
• The CBB corporations accounted in 1990 for 0.4% of the total gross value added at
basic prices of non-financial corporations compared with 12% in 1998. This sample is
not statistical either. In the studies performed using this database medium and large
corporations are excluded, although all resident corporations file their accounts with
the Registries and, therefore, they are finally also available to the CBBE. The lack of di-
rect contact and of correlative exhaustive editing, on one hand, and the specialisation
of the CBA in processing medium and large corporations, on the other, mean that only
small corporations received from the Mercantile Registries are used in the CBBE/RM,
provided they were not already available to the CBA.
• The number of corporations provided in each base differs greatly. The early years
(1990 to 1992) are the least representative owing to the scant number of corporations
studied. The number of common corporations, which is low in percentage terms com-
pared with the total available, is on the increase (approximately 87,820 for the latest
three bases). Nonetheless, the number of corporations apt for study has stabilised at
over 200,000. Consequently, given the amount involved and the uniformity of size, this
means that this database, whose latter years are more comparable, is an information
source of the first order.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA - BANQUE DE FRANCE / FRENCH AND SPANISH INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS52
CHAPTER II
• The corporations incorporated into the databases are classified according to their
main activity (NACE 93) and size. With regard to the size of the corporation, the CBBE
follows a similar procedure to the CBA, using a triple classification criterion. The main
one is the average number of employees during the two years of each base, which is
supplemented with certain security criteria, taking as a reference total assets and the
total on the credit side of the profit and loss account.
• The activities covered by this database are notably different from those addressed by
the CBA database. The share of manufacturing industry in the database total is much
less than that observed in the CBA. In parallel, the wholesale and retail trade and other
services are notably significant in this base. For 1997, 54.8% of the corporations were
engaged in these activities.
• Most are very small corporations, according to the triple criterion applied by the
CBBE. As a reference, it may be noted that the small corporations in the CBA databas-
es have, on average, about 20 employees, while in this database corporations with few-
er than 50 employees have an average staff of about 7 employees.
2.4. Central Balance Sheet Data Office quarterly results (CBQ)
This database was created in 1993 to obtain initial information on the basis of a quarterly
survey acting as a counterpoint for the studies on the economic situation prepared by the Ban-
co de España Research Department. In October 2001, the draft date for this report, a series of
31 consecutive quarterly observations is available.
As it is a quarterly survey, the information requested is less detailed than in the annual
survey. Approximately 900 medium and large corporations co-operate, covering 17% of GDP.
The information obtained is presented with a lag of 15 weeks. The classification criteria of size,
activity and ownership status are the same as in the CBA.
2.5. Integrated Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBI)
Conceptually, a new database was created to provide the source for the extrapola-
tion process to obtain the non-financial corporations sector of the National Accounts,
from the addition of the CBA and CBB databases. Obviously, these data are not the official
and final information of the NA; It will never be, because the system and process of getting
the information (from aggregation and extrapolation of the annual accounts) invalidates
the data for this purpose. Although some changes are made to the final results (in order,
for example, to value some elements closely to market prices), the NA are obtained in a
complete coherent and inter-linked way that the simple extrapolation of annual accounts
will never fit.
Anyway, the result of the extrapolation is a complete framework of an incredible val-
ue as contrast for the elaboration of the Financial Accounts, that is the responsibility of
Banco de España. Moreover, some elements of the Financial Accounts can be obtained only
directly from the results of this CBI: shares not quoted, and other equity of the non finan-
cial corporations; commercial credit internal to the institutional sector; portfolio of Public
Administrations in non financial corporations; and the assets of the non financial balance
sheet.
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3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH CORPORATION
POPULATIONS
The data that have provided knowledge of the corporation populations for Spain and
France have been obtained from the National Statistical Offices of both countries, and refer to
the corporations existing in each country at 31 December 1997 (3).
Information is available on the number of corporations and the number of employees
existing as at that date, and for this analysis the following classification criteria have been used:
• Employment range: from 0 to 49, from 50 to 199, from 200 to 499 and 500 or more
employees. Tables II.1.1 (See summary table in the text and rest of the tables in the
statistical annex)
• Sector of activity: section of the NACE classification (4). Tables II.1.2 (See summary ta-
ble in the text and rest of the tables in the statistical annex)
• Legal status: a distinction is drawn between public limited companies, private limited
companies and others (co-operatives, general partnerships, limited partnerships and
autonomous agencies). Tables II.1.3 (See summary table in the text and rest of the ta-
bles in the statistical annex)
Tables II.1.1 provide information on the number of corporations (table II.1.1.1) and the
number of employees (table II.1.1.2) in each country by employment range in absolute values
and in structural terms. The average number of employees for each of the ranges has also been
obtained (table II.1.1.3). On the basis of these, one differentiating characteristic of the two
countries can be seen: although the number of corporations in both countries is similar, the
number of employees is almost double in France. This means that the average size of French
corporations is virtually double that of Spain’s. Thus, the total denotes that Spanish corpora-
tions have 11 employees on average compared with almost 20 employees in French companies.
If the analysis of the figure is made in terms of corporation size (according to employ-
ment range), the structure in terms of the number of corporations can be seen to be very sim-
ilar for all sizes. In both countries most corporations are concentrated in the 0-49 employees
range (97.2% in Spain and 95.3% in France). But if this same figure is analysed on the basis of
the number of employees, the differences are most marked in corporations with between 0 and
49 employees and those with 500 or more. In both ranges there are 13 points’ difference be-
tween the two countries. Hence, 47.6% of Spanish employment is concentrated in small corpo-
rations compared with 34.4% in the case of France, while the related figures in corporations
with over 500 employees are 23.9% for Spain and 37.4% for France. The other two employ-
ment ranges show very similar weights in both countries. These data are confirmed once more
in the summary table II.1.1 on analysing the average size of corporations in each employment
range. Small Spanish corporations have an average of 5.4 employees compared with 7.1 for
French firms, and large Spanish companies employ 1,688.8 workers on average against 2,105.5
for their French counterparts.
(3) Analysing the population of corporations required prior work, performed by the CBBE, on the homog-
enisation of the different legal forms included in the population (this, among other things, meant taking the decision
to include the non-financial corporations in each country with 0 employees). The apparent contradiction whereby
there are more non-financial corporations in Spain than in France would then be explained – other than by reason
of the different population structure (the high share in Spain of micro-corporations) – by the high growth rate of the
population of corporations registered in Spain in the last five years.
(4) In Spain’s case there is no information for sections A and B of the NACE.
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Tables II.1.2 provide the same information but classified by sector of activity and show that
there are no major structural differences in the business activities pursued in both countries. The activ-
ity with the largest number of corporations in both countries is section G of the NACE, which essen-
tially encompasses wholesale and retail trade corporations (around 30%). There are two activities in
which bigger differences are observed. On one hand, in the Spanish case, construction accounts for
14.8% of total corporations, while in France this figure is 8.9%. And on the other, 17.9% of total firms
engage in “real estate and rental activities; business services” in Spain, while this figure is 29.7% in
France. These figures highlight the greater weight of the tertiary sector in the French economy, in
keeping with the increasingly service-based orientation of more developed economies.
Table II.1.2 also confirms that the distribution of employment by activity in both countries is
quite similar. In this case it is manufacturing that absorbs most employment (almost 30.7% in Spain
and 33.5% in France). The transport, storage and communications sector shows most differences:
while in Spain 7.3% of employment is concentrated in this sector, the related figure is 11.6% in
France. Lastly, the analysis of the average number of employees in each sector (summary table II.1.2
and table II.1.2.3 of the statistical annex), shows that the average size of French corporations can be
seen to be bigger in virtually all sectors. Most prominent here are the “production and distribution
of electricity, gas and water” sector (236.0 employees per French corporation compared with 47.2
for Spain), the “transport and communications” sector (54.2 employees on average in France, 14.7
in Spain) and, lastly, manufacturing (41.8 employees in France against 18.6 in Spain).
Lastly, tables II.1.3 offer information on the corporate make-up of each country in terms
of the legal status of corporations. In Spain, the private limited liability company is predominant,
owing to the fact that the small corporation is the most used form since the capital stock re-
quirement is much lower (3,000 Euros) as there is for public limited liability companies (PLCs)
(60,100 Euros). Thus, 73.5% of the Spanish companies are private liability and 22.0% are PLC.
This is also the case in France, although the breakdown is more even: 28.6% for private limited
liability companies and 63.6% for PLCs. Regarding employment in both countries, the propor-
tion differs: 55.4% of employees work in PLCs and 36.8% in private limited liability companies in
Spain, while the related proportions are more marked in France, at 63.6% and 21.7%, respec-
tively. The other legal corporate forms play a residual role in both countries in terms of both
the numbers of corporations and of employees.
4. CHARACTERISTICS AND COVERAGE OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH
CENTRAL BALANCE SHEET DATA OFFICE SAMPLES
4.1. French and Spanish Central Balance Sheet Data Office samples
Tables II.2 provide information on sample coverage in respect of numbers of corpora-
tions (tables II.2.1) and numbers of employees (tables II.2.2) both by employment range and by
sector of activity for 1997. As discussed in previous points, for this study, the CBBE has used in
conjunction information from its two annual databases, CBA and CBB, while its French coun-
terpart has, from its two databases (FIBEN and CB), drawn on the latter’s corporations for this
study. Nonetheless, tables II give information on both databases. Coverage in terms of the
number of corporations in Spain stands at 22.1%. In France the FIBEN database covers 29.1% of
total corporations and the CB database, 6.4%. In respect of staff numbers the Spanish sample
accounts for 31.6% of total employment and the French sample for 75.9% in the case of the
FIBEN and 36.0% in that of the CB (see summary table II.2).
As to the analysis based on employment range, a bias is seen in both countries towards large
corporations (over 500 employees). There is coverage in the Spanish case of 53.5% of the number of
corporations and 70.2% of the number of employees, and of 85.4% and 88.0%, respectively, in the
French FIBEN and of 51.6% in its CB for corporations and employees. Table II.1.1.2 also confirms this
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over-representation of large corporations in both samples; while in the population this group accounts
for 23.9% of Spanish employment and 37.4% of that in France, in the samples of both countries (CB in
the case of France) the figures stands at 53.0% and 53.4%. This bias is also discernible in the analysis of
the average size of corporations. In the case of the Spanish sample, average employment per corpora-
tion is 15.8 employees (compared with 11.1 employees on average in the population). In France’s case,
the sample shows average employment of 111.6 employees, substantially higher than the average figure
in the population, which stands at 19.8 employees per corporation.
Coverage by sector of activity in Spain shows uneven representation (5). The sectors
where the large corporation predominates, such as “production of electricity”, “transport, stor-
TABLE II.1
POPULATION: COMPARISON SPAIN-FRANCE. SUMMARY TABLE
1. By range of employment TABLE II.1.1
Spain France Spain France Spain France
Range of employment
0- 49 employees 97.2      95.3      47.6      34.4      5.4    7.1    
50-199 employees 2.2      3.7      18.1      17.4      89.1    93.8    
200-499 employees 0.4      0.7      10.4      10.8      300.2    302.1    
500 and more employees 0.2      0.4      23.9      37.4      1,688.8    2,105.5    
TOTAL 100.0      100.0      100.0      100.0      11.1    19.8    
2. By activity TABLE II.1.2
Sectors Spain France Spain France Spain France
C MINING AND QUARRYING 0.3      0.3      0.7      0.5      25.7      29.3      
D MANUFACTURING 18.2      15.9      30.7      33.5      18.6      41.8      
E ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY 0.2      0.1      1.0      1.8      47.2      236.0      
F CONSTRUCTION 14.8      8.9      11.9      8.0      8.9      17.8      
G
30.1      30.3      20.5      20.3      7.5      13.3      
H HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 6.0      5.0      5.5      3.4      10.1      13.5      
I TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS 5.5      4.2      7.3      11.6      14.7      54.2      
K REAL STATE, RENTING AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 17.9      29.7      13.7      16.6      8.5      11.0      
M EDUCATION 1.7      0.7      3.1      0.3      19.9      8.6      
N HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK 1.5      1.1      1.9      1.9      14.6      32.8      
O
3.8      3.8      3.7      2.3      10.5      11.9      
TOTAL 100.0      100.0      100.0      100.0      11.1      19.8      
3. By legal form TABLE II.1.3
Legal form Spain France Spain France Spain France
Public limited companies (PLCs) 22.0      28.6      55.4      63.6      27.8      44.0      
Private limited companies 73.5      63.6      36.8      21.7      5.5      6.8      
Other companies 4.5      7.8      7.8      14.7      19.3      37.1      
TOTAL 100.0      100.0      100.0      100.0      11.1      19.8      
Number of non financial 
companies (%)
Employees of non financial 
companies (%)
OTHER COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES 
ACTIVITIES
Number of employees (%)
Number of non financial 
companies (%)
Employees of non financial 
companies (%)
Company average size 
(number of employees)
Company average size 
(number of employees)
Company average size 
(number of employees)
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIR OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES, MOTORCYCLES AND PERSONAL ARTICLES
Number of non financial 
companies (%)
   Sources: Spanish and French National Statistical Institutes and Central Balance Sheet Offices of Banco de España and Banque de France.
(5) The biases arising from the difference between the structure of the population and that of the sample
could be eliminated, in part, by the re-weighting of the sample information on the basis of the weights the different
sub-sectors have in the population. The central balance sheet offices, which have used this approach in other studies
with different aims, have opted to work with the data obtained directly from their samples. The direct connection
thus obtained between the aggregate data and the individual information of the corporations, which is necessary for
the type of study being conducted, advises direct use of the aggregate data.
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age and communications”, “mining” and, to a lesser extent, “manufacturing”, exhibit coverage in
respect of numbers of employees of 100.0%, 66.5%, 45.9% and 34.7%, respectively (see table
II.2.2.1 in the statistical annex). By contrast, sectors where the number of small corporations is
higher, such as “hotels and restaurants”, “construction” and “real-estate”, are less well repre-
sented, with employment coverage of 19.3%, 23.5% and 25.4%, respectively.
In the case of France, the situation differs according to the database analysed. Employ-
ment coverage in the FIBEN database rises to figures of 95.7% in “production of electricity”,
89.0% in “transport, storage and communications” and 82.3% in “manufacturing”, while in the
CdB database the figures are 9.0%, 29.9% and 55.3%, respectively (see table II.2.2.2 in the statis-
tical annex). As the purpose of this study is the analysis of industrial corporations and since the
CdB represents this sector well and is more in keeping with the figures from the Spanish sam-
ple, it is this database which has been selected by the Banque de France.
4.2. Criteria in the construction of the sample in this study
The analysis of the financial structure and performance of companies is based on the
analysis of the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of non financial companies available
in the databases of each national central bank. In the case of France a number of two-year slid-
ing samples (6) were drawn from the base material, covering the period under review in over-
lapping sections. Such an approach, which is in fact commonly adopted by the Bank of Spain
since the annual accounts of the companies are available two consecutive years in the Spanish
database is appropriate to mirror economic evolutions. The same companies are analysed in the
years N and N-1; the companies which were declared bankrupt or ceased to exist in year N as
well as those which were set up in year N will be set apart from the two year (N-1, N) sliding
sample. This way of processing data provides the most valuable and accurate information on the
economic evolution by analysing the highest possible number of companies.
In chapter III of this document, the industrial companies of the CdB French sample and CBA/
CBB Spanish samples have been analysed for the years 1991 to 1999. Thus, studied companies are
classified in section D of the NACE- Rev 1 (CNAE 1993 in Spain and INSEE’s NAF 1993 classifica-
tion in France) excluding “Refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel”. Within the industrial com-
panies, an analysis by size and by sector of activity has been developed in the mentioned chapter.
TABLE II.2
COVERAGE TABLE: COMPARISON SPAIN-FRANCE. SUMMARY TABLE
SPAIN
Sample 128,831    22.1%       2,034,723    31.6%       
Population 582,936    6,442,364    
FRANCE
Samples: FIBEN 165,708    29.1%       8,517,082    75.9%       
                CdB 36,244    6.4%       4,044,900    36.0%       







   Sources: Spanish and French National Statistical Institutes and Central Balance Sheet Offices of Banco de España and Banque de France.
(6) The figures and ratios of the second year of each sliding sample were used to make the graphs.
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• Size: Industrial companies have been analysed considering their size. In this study, the
three following sizes have been considered:
1. Small companies: Between 0 and 49 employees
2. Medium: Between 50 and 249 employees
3. Large: From 250 and more employees. Within this size, two more categories have
been analysed:
— From 250 to 499 employees
— 500 or more employees
• Sector of activity: French and Spanish companies have been divided in three categories
attending to the type of product they manufacture, with the aim to know better their
behaviour. In this way, we can distinguish:
1. Industry of consumption goods
2. Industry of intermediate goods
3. Industry of capital goods
• Statistical indicators: The two statistical indicators used are, the weighted mean and oc-
casionally the median for some information. The weighted mean can be calculated by
dividing the combined numerators by the combined denominators. The median, which
once the companies have been ranked in rising order of ratios, separates the popula-
tion studied into two equal parts. The weighted mean reflects the aggregate position of
the industrial sector in each country but this indicator, can be influenced by large firms.
The median gives the central value of the distribution and in that case each firm, what-
ever its size, has the same weight.
A table referred to one specific year of the sample analysed in this study (1997) is pre-
sented next. In this table, we can find the number of companies and employees existing in the
French and Spanish samples for the industry sector. The table II.3 distinguishes the sizes and the
sectors used for this study.
5. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS IN THIS STUDY
5.1. Leasing: Differences in national accounting plans
5.1.1. Financial Leasing in France
Owing to the fact that the Fourth EC Directive does not provide any rule for the disclo-
sure of leased assets, the requirements for the disclosure of leasing are not harmonized in the
European Union.
In general, it can be stated that under French law, the juridical ownership principle forms
the basis of disclosure in individual accounts whereas an economic approach can be adopted in
consolidated accounts. French financial statements disclose finance-leased assets within the bal-
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ance sheet of the lessor and not the lessee until a purchase option is exercised. Under these
conditions, the accounting of leasing in individual accounts is not the same in France and in Spain.
In this study, to comply with the French accounting principles, leased assets are not in-
cluded in the total balance sheet on the assets side and lease commitments are not included in
the balance sheet on the liabilities side. However supplementary information provided by mem-
bers of the Central Balance Sheet Office makes it possible to evaluate the weight of financial
leasing and improve the quality of comparisons made between companies.
Therefore extra information is given:
— On the one hand the weight of leased assets can be appreciated by the ratio “ net
leased assets/total balance sheet ”.
— On the other hand the weight of lease commitments has been measured by compar-
ing its amount to the total financial debt.
In the profit and loss account, the annual finance lease charge is split into two parts:
— The first corresponds to an estimate of the depreciation charges that the company
would have paid if it had acquired the fixed assets instead of entering into a finance
lease agreement;
— The second part corresponds to the interest expense of the imputed loan.
In flows, productive investment, has been increased by the amount of the value of the as-
sets appearing in the contract.
To sum up, in French accounting there is a dual approach of leasing, the juridical approach
is adopted in French individual accounts whereas the economic approach is favoured in consol-
idated accounts. In this study based on the analysis of individual accounts, the juridical approach
is adopted, so, leased assets are not booked on the assets side nor are lease commitments on
the liabilities side. However to evaluate the importance of financial leasing in the total assets,
the ratio of “leasing over total assets” has been calculated.
TABLE II.3
SAMPLE OF THE STUDY. YEAR 1997
Spain France Spain France
Total industry 23,473    14,833    734,818    1,863,130    
By range of employment
0-49 employees 21,904    9,249    217,529    237,106    
50-249 employees 1,094    4,278    112,171    465,190    
250 and more employees 475    1,306    405,118    1,160,834    
250-499 249    714    80,766    248,536    
500 and more 226    592    324,352    912,298    
By sector
Consumer goods 10,635    4,843    243,699    544,644    
Capital goods 3,957    3,347    218,933    586,877    
Intermediate goods 8,881    6,643    272,185    731,609    
Number of companies Number of employees
Sources: Banco de España and Banque de France. 
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5.1.2. Financial Leasing in Spain
The Spanish General Accounting Plan, conferred by RD 1643/1990 establishes in its valu-
ation rules a specific reference in relation with leasing accounting.
“When due to the economic conditions of a financial leasing there are no reasonable
doubts that the purchase option will be carried out, the tenant should register the operation in
the following terms.
The rights derived of financial leasing contracts referred in the above paragraph, should
enter in the accounts as intangible assets by its cash price, it has to be registered in the liability
side the entire debts, finance lease payments plus purchase option value. The difference be-
tween both prices, the financial expenses of the transaction, has to be registered as expenses to
be distributed in several years. The rights registered as intangible assets have to be amortised,
whenever necessary, attending to the lifetime of the asset. When the asset is purchased, the
value of the rights registered and its correlative accumulated amortisation will be cancelled and
this amount will be transferred to tangible assets. Expenses to be distributed in several years
should be attributed to results according to a financial criterion.
In case of lease back, when the economic conditions of a sale, related to the financial
leasing of sole assets, show out that this is a way of financing, the tenant has to register the
transaction in the following way. He has to cancel the asset with its net value and has to recog-
nise the intangible asset with the same value. He also has to register in the liabilities the finan-
cial lease payments plus purchase option value; the difference between the debt and the re-
ceived finance should be registered as expenditures to be distributed in several years”.
To sum up, the Spanish General Accounting Plan, establishes that the financial leasing has
to be registered as intangible assets if the asset is going to be bought through the purchase
option. On the contrary, the French General Accounting Plan does not contemplate the activa-
tion of the leased asset. To guarantee the comparison of the data in this study, Banco de España has
removed the leasing from the assets of the balance sheet and the debt generated by these assets has
been estimated and removed from the liabilities.
5.2. Way of registering discounted bills
The Spanish General Accounting Plan establishes that companies that decide to discount
a commercial bill in a bank, have to register the operation in the asset of the balance sheet
through the account “Clients, trade bills” when accepting the bills. In relation to the financing
obtained through the discount of this bill, in the liabilities we should register a debt with the
financial institutions. The French General Accounting Plan does not include this information in
the balance sheet but this type of information is available in one of the annexes. In order to
being able to compare the balance sheets of industrial companies in both countries, the Banque
de France has included the information of discounted bills under customers in assets and under
short term debts with banks in the liabilities.
5.3. Way of registering terms according to expiry date
The criteria of the Spanish General Accounting Plan (according to international rules) in
relation to the classification between short and long term is the one that attends to the maturi-
ty date of assets/liabilities. This means that a financial investment, a right or a obligation of pay-
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ment that expires in term higher than one year, will be classified in the long term when it is
originated, but it will be reclassified as short term the year before it is going to expire. In the
case of France, the analysis of bank debt according to its maturity is based on the nature of the
term either long or short when it is originated. Under these conditions borrowing with a term
of less than one year is included in medium and long –term debt in France even the year before
it is going to expire if at the origin this loan was extended for more than a year whereas it is
included in short-term debt in Spain.
This different way to register between the two countries is not able to correct in this
document, what must be known by the reader.
5.4. Transition tables
5.4.1. Balance Sheet
The following table presents the variables of the Balance Sheet used in this study and the
codes of the French tax form and the Spanish questionnaires which allow calculating them.
French tax form is presented next to the table with the description of the codes. In the case of
Spanish questionnaires, they can be consulted in the web page of the Banco de España
(www.bde.es).
5.4.2. Profit and Loss Account
Next table presents the variables of the Profit and Loss account used in this study and
the codes of the French tax form and the Spanish questionnaires which allow calculating them.
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SCHEME II.1
TRANSITION TABLE OF THE BALANCE SHEET ITEMS
FRANCE (1) SPAIN (2)
CBA database CBB database
BALANCE SHEET FORMAT
 FOR THIS STUDY








ASSETS ITEMS I+II I+II I+II I+II
I. Fixed assets I.1 to I.3 I.1 to I.3 I.1 to I.3 I.1 to I.3














     3.  Financial fixed assets CS-CT+CU-CV+BB-BC
+BD-BE+BF-BG+BH-BI
131+141-187 131+141 124000+125000
II. Current assets II.1 to II.4 II.1 to II.4 II.1 to II.4 II.1 to II.4
     1. Stocks BL-BM+BN-BO+BP-
BQ+BR-BS+BT-BU
153 153 142000
     2. Trade debtors BV-BW+BX-BY 142+158-162 142+983+129+
(158-983-129)*k637














LIABILITIES ITEMS III + IV +V III + IV +V III + IV +V III + IV +VI















IV. Provisions for risks and charges DR 779+874+875+876
+1321+1328
317+332 230000+260000
 V. External sources of funds V.1 to V.3 V.1 to V.3 V.1 to V.3 V.1 to V.3









     2. Trade creditors DW+DX 338+337+339+346
+991+992+993
(600*k323)+999




PRO-MEMO: Loans from group and
associated companies





Loans to group and associated
companies (on assets side)
6219.4+6117+VC
(1): See French tax form next to this table
(2): See Spanish questionnaires in the web page of Banco de España ( www.bde.es)




Assets N° Liabilities N°
Uncalled capital AA Subscribed capital DA
Formation expenses AB-AC Share premium account DB
Research and development cost AD-AE Revaluation reserve DC
Patents and licences AF-AG Legal reserves DD
Goodwill AH-AI Statutory or contractual reserves DE
Other intangible fixed assets AJ-AK Special tax-based reserves DF
Advance payments relating to intangibles AL-AM Other reserves DG
Land AN-AO Profit or loss brought forward DH
Buildings AP-AQ Profit or loss of the financial year) DI
Industrial fixtures and equipment AR-AS Grants and subsidies DJ
Other tangible fixed assets AT-AU Special tax-based provisions DK
Tangible fixed assets in progress AV-AW Total (I) DL
Advance payments on fixed assets AX-AY Profits from the issuance of subordinated equity DM
Participations CS+CU-CT-CV Conditional advances DN
 Loans to groups and associated companies BB-BC Total (II) DO
Other holdings BD-BE Provisions for risks DP
Loans BF-BG Provisions for charges DQ
Other financial fixed assets BH-BI Total (III) DR
Total (I) BJ-BK Convertible debenture loans DS
Raw material and supplies BL-BM Other debenture loans DT
Goods in progress BN-BO Borrowings from credit institutions DU
Services in progress BP-BQ Other borrowings and loans DV
By -products and finished goods BR-BS Advances and deposits received on orders DW
Merchandise BT-BU Trade creditors and related liabilities DX
Advances to suppliers BV-BW Fiscal and social security charges DY
Trade debtors BX-BY Fixed assets creditors DZ
Other debtors BZ-CA Other liabilities EA
Subscribed capital called but unpaid CB-CC Accruals and deferred income EB
Current investment CD-CE Total (IV) EC
Cash in hand, at banks CF-CG Exchange rate differences (liabilities) (V) ED
Prepayments and accrued income CH-CI General Total (I to V) EE
Total (II) CJ-CK
Deferred charges (III) CL
Premiums on redemption (IV) CM
Exchange rate differences ( assets ) (V) CN
Total (I to V) CO
Loans and advances granted to groups and
associated companies
VC Loans raised from groups and associated
companies
VI
Loans raised from groups and associated companies
(F.: 6324.4 + 6118 + 6312.4 + VI)
VI is an extract from EA
The item 6324.4 is an extract of the item DN of the balance
sheet
The item 6118 is an extract of the item DX of the balance
sheet
The item 6312.4 is an extract of the item DV of the balance
sheet
Loans to group and related entities (62194 1+61171+VC)
1The item 6219.4 is an extract from the items BB, BF and BH of the balance
sheet
The item 6117 is an extract from the items BX the balance sheet VC is an
extract from BZ
Leasing: items of additional information forms in the French Central Balance
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SCHEME II.3
TRANSITION TABLE OF THE PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT ITEMS
FRANCE SPAIN
CBA database CBB database
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
FORMAT FOR THIS STUDY
























S.1. Gross Added Value 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2
3. Personnel expenses FY+FZ+HJ 505-511 505 303000
S.2. Gross Operating Profit S.1-3 S.1-3 S.1-3 S.1-3
4. Net Financial Income 4.1-4.2 4.1-4.2 4.1-4.2 4.1-4.2
     1. Financial Income GJ+GK+GL 712+728-717-787-560 712 402009-402040










S.3. Ordinary Cash Flow S.2+4 S.2+4 S.2+4 S.2+4
5. Net Extraordinary Income HA-HE 725-557+511-1097 725-557 412000-314000
6. Corporate income tax HK 563 563 315000+316000
S.4. Cash Flow S.3-5-6 S.3-5-6 S.3-5-6 S.3-5-6
7. Operating depreciation and provision GA + GB + GC +GD-
64.19 - UF + [66.11.1 x
(66.03.1- 66.06.1-
66.09.1)] / (66.07.1 +
66.10.1) + [66.11.2 x
(66.03.2 – 66.06.2 –
66.09.2)] / (66.07.2 +
66.10.2)
513+535-873+525 513+535-873+525 304000+305000
S.5. Net Ordinary Result S.3-7 S.3-7 S.3-7 S.3-7
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SCHEME II.4
FRENCH PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT (LIST FORMAT)
OPERATING INCOME
Sales of bought-in goods* FC





Change in inventories of own production of goods and services* FM
Own production of goods and services capitalized* FN
Operating subsidies FO






Purchases of bought-in goods (including customs duties)* FS
Change in inventories of bought-in goods FT
Purchases of raw materials and other supplies (including customs duties)* FU
Change in inventories of raw materials and supplies* FV
Other purchases and external charges (3)* FW
Duties and taxes other than income tax FX
Wages and salaries* FY
Employee welfare contributions and similar charges FZ
DEPRECIATION, AMORTISATION AND CHARGES TO PROVISIONS (OPERATING)




On curent assets: charges to provisions GC





1 -NET INCOME (Loss) from operations (I-II) GG
Joint venture operations
Profits transferred in or losses transferred out* (III) GH
Profits transferred out or losses transferred in* (IV) GI
FINANCIAL INCOME
Financial income from participating interests GJ
Income from other transferable securities and long-term loans GK
Other interest and similar income GL
Write-back of provisions and expense reclassifications GM
Positive foreign exchange differences GN
Net proceeds from sale of short-term investments




Amortization and charges to provisions for financial items* GQ
Interest and similar charges GR
Negative foreign exchange differences GS
Net charges on sales of short-term investments
Total financial expenses (VI)
GT
GU
2 – NET INCOME/(LOSS) FROM FINANCIAL ITEMS (V – VI) GV
3 – NET INCOME BEFORE EXCEPTIONAL ITEMS/INCOME TAX (I – II + III – IV + V – VI) GW
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SCHEME II.4
FRENCH PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT (LIST FORMAT) (continuación)
EXCEPTIONAL INCOME
Exceptional income from non-capital transactions HA
Exceptional income from capital transactions* HB
Write-back of provisions and expense reclassifications




Exceptional charges on non-capital transactions HE
Exceptional charges on capital transactions* HF
Exceptional depreciation, amortisation and charges to provisions
Total exceptional charges  (VIII)
HG
HH
4 - NET EXCEPTIONAL ITEMS (VII – VIII) HI
Statutory employee profit-sharing scheme (IX) HJ
Corporate income taxes* (X) HK
TOTAL EXPENSES (II + IV + VI + VIII + IX + X) HM
5 – NET INCOME/(LOSS) FOR THE PERIOD (total income less total expenses) HN
Notes
(3) Of which Capital leases on equipment
Capital leases on real estate
HP
HQ
All the items with a number codification are supplementary information supplied by the Central balance sheet office. All the
items in 66 concern the restatement of leasing.
CHAPTER III
FRENCH AND SPANISH INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
USING ACCOUNTING DATA (*)
(*) The authors of this chapter are Ana Esteban (Banco de España) and Alain Tournier (Banque de France).
All the tables and graphs in this work are part of a statistical annex disseminated
separately on the Internet at www.bde.es. This chapter includes only those that
are most relevant, but retains the same numbering as for the statistical annex.
That explains any gaps in the numbering used in this chapter.
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1. FRENCH AND SPANISH INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS:
ANALYSIS OF THE BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURES 1991-1999
This chapter examines the way in which French and Spanish companies’ balance sheets
are structured and how this structure changed during the nineties. Our analysis concerned in-
dustry (including agri-food) and used samples that were held constant over two consecutive
years (1). We broke down the findings by size and sector in order to refine our comments on
the aggregate population.
1.1. Assets
Companies’ behaviour in terms of financing is heavily influenced by the borrowing re-
quirements arising from their portfolio of assets.
If we classify assets according to their maturity, we see that corporate behaviour patterns
change according to company size in both countries. Whereas the weighted mean shows that
the breakdown between fixed assets and current assets in the aggregate population is 40/60 in
France and 45/55 in Spain, the median gives a breakdown of 20/80 in France and 30/70 in Spain.
(See graph III.1.1.1 for weighted mean)
This difference arises because unlike the weighted mean, the median shows the central
distribution value. Each firm has the same weighting and as a result, the median reflects the in-
fluence of the largest group in the business community, namely the smallest companies. Mean-
while, large companies have a major impact on the weighted mean in both countries: conse-
quently, the aggregate figures mainly reflect their behaviour.
Bearing these points in mind, an examination of the weighted means of the different as-
sets making up fixed assets reveals the following:
(1) By holding samples constant over two years, it is obtained far more data than if we had used a sample
that was held constant over nine years, i.e. between 1991 and 1999. This allowed us to improve the coverage rate
and gain a better insight into company behaviour. That said, comparisons between years are made trickier because
differences may appear in the values of certain ratios as samples change with the inclusion or exclusion of compa-
nies. Accordingly, for a given year, each ratio has two values, which may be different because of changes to the
samples. However, for simplicity’s sake, the charts appearing in this paper show only one of these values. We made
sure that this simplification did not alter our observations regarding the level of, and changes in, the various ratios
analysed.
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   Sources: Banco de España and Banque de France.
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• The structure of assets changed between 1991 and 1999. Notably, financial fixed assets
gained in importance as a result of the increasing dematerialisation of investments, the
accelerated pace of globalisation and the greater use of external growth strategies by
industrial firms.
• In parallel, the weight of tangible fixed assets declined gradually, while that of intangibles
increased. This reflected businesses’ increased focus on innovation and strategic organi-
sation in response to market competition.
Our analysis of current assets in France and Spain found the following:
• On aggregate, current assets remained stable over the study period. The weighted
mean for the population as a whole came to around 55% of total assets in Spain and
about 60% in France.
• The structure of current assets (stocks and trade debtors) (2) was fairly heavily depend-
ent on the size of the company and its sector of activity. Some French and Spanish in-
dustrial firms used current assets as a means of adjusting their working capital require-
ments, especially in response to changes in the business cycle.
• Cash management was closely linked to the financial strategies adopted by companies to
preserve their financial autonomy. Again, size appeared to be a determining factor, with
large companies enjoying greater flexibility in their cash management than smaller outfits.
(2) It should be noted that creditors relate to the liabilities side (payables) while debtors to the assets side
(receivables) of the balance sheet.
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1.1.1. Fixed assets
Throughout the nineties, French and Spanish industrial firms maintained a stable propor-
tion of fixed assets, which can be divided into tangible, intangible and financial fixed assets. The
weighted mean for the aggregate population was around 45% of total assets in Spain and about
40% in France. Large industrial firms exerted a strong influence in this regard. Fixed assets ac-
counted for 45% of the total assets of large industrial firms in France and 48% in Spain. By con-
trast, the proportion was much lower in the case of small companies employing less than
50 people, at around 25% in France and 33% in Spain (see graphs III.1.1.2 to III.1.1.4 in the sta-
tistical annex). A sectoral analysis reveals that between 1991 and 1999, the proportion of fixed
assets was higher in the intermediate goods sector than in other sectors, at over 50% in Spain
and around 41% in France, compared with around 39% in France and 42% in Spain in the con-
sumer goods sector, and 35% in France and 40% in Spain in the capital goods sector (graphs
III.1.1.5 to III.1.1.7 of the statistical annex)
However, this overall stability in the fixed assets of French and Spanish industrial compa-
nies masked contrasting trends in the underlying components. In fact, between 1991 and 1999,
there was a gradual reduction in the proportion of tangible fixed assets, coupled with an in-
crease in financial fixed assets and intangible fixed assets.
A large difference was observed in the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets be-
tween the two countries, even though the gap tended to narrow towards the end of the period,
reducing to 11.6 percentage points in 1999 from 13.4 percentage points in 1991 (see graph
III.1.1.8). In the following box, several factors may explain why Spanish companies have a higher
proportion of tangible fixed assets.
An analysis by size (see graph III.1.9 in the statistical annex) reveals that large compa-
nies (employing more than 250 people) in France and Spain scaled back the proportion of tangi-
ble fixed assets in their total assets more than smaller companies. Over the 1990s, large firms
concentrated on acquiring financial assets, focussing especially on equity interests between
1995 and 1999. This illustrates the way in which inter-company relations intensified, notably
through the creation of corporate groups. The weighted mean of tangible fixed assets to total
assets among large industrial firms came to 15.6% in 1999 in France compared with 19.4% in
1991, i.e. a fall of 3.8 points. In Spain, the ratio fell by 4.3 points from 33.5% in 1991 to 29.2%
in 1999. Smaller businesses less concerned by external growth stuck closer to the business
cycle as they adjusted plant and equipment to meet demand. In France, the ratio of tangible
fixed assets to total assets in this category was 17.9% in 1999 compared with 16.4% in 1991,
i.e. a gain of 1.5 points. In Spain, the ratio for small companies fell mainly between 1991-1994.
By 1999, it was practically back to its 1991 level (26.7% in 1999 compared with 26.9% in
1991).
On a sectoral level (see graph III.1.10 in the statistical annex), the intermediate goods
sector consistently reported the highest proportion of tangible fixed assets in both France and
Spain, despite the downtrend seen over the period. This was due to the nature of the goods
produced in this area: the intermediate sector processes raw materials and so is active at an
early stage in the manufacturing process. In 1999, tangible fixed assets accounted for 31.8% of
total assets in the Spanish intermediate goods sector, compared with 20.6% in France.
Related to the assets acquired under finance leasing, this technique enables companies to avoid
having to purchase plant and equipment, instead allowing them to access the equipment they need
in return for rental payments. Companies in France made greater use of this type of financing than
those in Spain, offering one explanation why the proportion of tangible fixed assets (which does not
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count assets acquired under finance leases) in total assets is lower in France. Annex 3 “Financial
leasing in France and Spain” offers more information about this issue.
As the information on finance leasing is available in Banco de España database and thanks
to complementary information of the central balance sheet of Banque de France, the weight of
finance leasing can be measured using the “net fixed assets acquired under finance leases / total
assets” ratio. On aggregate (see graph III.1.1.11), fixed assets acquired under finance leases ac-
counted for around 2% (3) of total assets in France in the 1990s. However, there were con-
trasting trends within this aggregate. While one-quarter of industrial firms made no use of fi-
nance leases over the period, another quarter acquired fixed assets under finance leases
amounting more than 5% of total assets between 1991 and 1999. Spanish companies resorted
to this practice less than French ones: fixed assets acquired under finance leases accounted for
under 1% of their total assets throughout the period. While this statement holds true for the
overall population, the actual situation varied according to company size (see graph III.1.1.12 in
the statistical annex). In both France and Spain, small companies employing fewer than 50 peo-
ple and medium-sized companies made more use than larger companies of finance leases to
finance their operating investment. In 1999, fixed assets acquired under finance leases account-
ed for 4.8% of the total assets of small companies in France compared with 1.2% in Spain. For
medium-sized firms, the ratio was 3.4% in France and 1.5% in Spain, while in the case of large
companies, the ratio stood at 1.2% in France and 0.5% in Spain.
If we analyse these figures by economic segment (see graph III.1.1.13 in the statistical an-
nex), we find that the situation is broadly similar in the consumer and intermediate goods sec-
tors in both countries, with fixed assets acquired under finance leases accounting for around
2% of total assets over the study period in France and around 1% in Spain. In the capital goods
sector, fixed assets acquired under finance leases accounted for a slightly smaller proportion of
total assets: 1.8% in France and 0.4% in Spain in 1999.
Analysing intangible fixed assets (4) is still awkward insofar as their definition is unclear.
The OECD gives the following definition for intangible investment (source: Petites Affiches – 16
July 2001 – No. 140: “The term ‘Intangible fixed assets’ covers all long-term outlays by firms
aimed at increasing future performance other than by the purchase of fixed assets. As well as
technology investment (R&D), it also encompasses investment in training, labour relations, man-
agement structures, the organisation of production, the development of commercial and tech-
nological ties with other firms, suppliers and consumers, the exploration of markets and the
acquisition and operation of software” (original quote in French). Over the 1990s, intangible
fixed assets came to form one of the lynchpins of corporate competitiveness and the outlays
that they necessitated were seen as strategic investments for the company’s future develop-
ment. This trend has become more deep-rooted in France and Spain, where investments are
becoming increasingly dematerialised.
Bearing this in mind, our analysis of balance sheet structures in France and Spain shows
an increase in the average “Intangible fixed assets / total assets” ratio (see graph III.1.1.14), even
though intangible fixed assets still account for only a small fraction of the balance sheets of the
companies in these two countries. Companies may either book formation and share issuance
expenses on their balance sheet and amortise them over a maximum of five years, or book
them immediately on the profit and loss account. The fourth EU Directive states that R&D ex-
penses in respect of a specific project that can be clearly identified and that has a serious
(3) Fixed assets acquired under finance leases accounted for 10.5% of total fixed assets in France and 2.5%
in Spain in 1999.
(4) Definitions for the items comprising the intangible fixed assets analysed in this paper are given in chapter II.
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EXPLANATORY FACTORS OF THE DIFFERENT WEIGHT IN TANGIBLE ASSETS
It appears that the share of net tangible fixed assets (gross amount minus total amortisation/deprecia-
tion) in the balance sheet structure is greater in Spain than in France.There are several possible explanations
for this difference:
1. The most important factor is the weight of financial assets recorded in the balance sheet of French companies.
French firms hold more financial fixed assets than Spanish companies, partly due to the faster pace of
globalisation and the organisation in corporate grouping in France. This could be a symptom of higher maturi-
ty of French companies which are gradually followed by Spanish ones. This may also be due to the method
used for booking equity holdings. Both, in France and Spain, the “equity holdings” item, which is included in
financial fixed assets, combines the concepts of “subsidiaries”, whose definitions are similar in France and in
Spain, that is to say holdings exceeding 50% of the capital in another company (-legal definition -in France), or
whose management is appointed by the parent company (Spain), and “participating interests” (holdings be-
tween 10% and 50% in France, and with a “significant influence in the management” in Spain). If these equity
holdings are below 10%, they are booked as a portfolio investment in France. In the case of direct investment
in foreign companies, these financial fixed assets recorded in the balance sheet of French companies swell the
fixed assets booked in the balance sheet of foreign companies. As the internationalisation process is more
developed in France, this movement from tangible assets to financial assets is more explicit in this country;
the catching up process followed by Spain, also is taken part in this domain: from 1998 Spanish corporations
privatised has pursued the same pattern than the French ones.
2. Moreover, due to the economic catch-up process under way in Spain mentioned, resulting in a substantial
increase in investment, the fixed assets recorded on the assets side of the balance sheet in Spain may be more
recent than those in France. It means that the fixed assets booked in French companies balance sheets are
older; since they are booked at their historical costs, their value is lower than at current prices.The phenom-
enon can also be due to different expansion of production capacity in the two countries.As an illustration in
the study between 1985 and 1990, Spanish firms stepped up their investment in order to boost production
capacity and meet growing demand. In France, the investment drive between 1980-1990 was smaller insofar
as significant production capacity was already in place. The economy slowed in the early 1990s and went into
recession in 1993, which hit profits hard. This had a negative impact on the investment decisions of business
managers in France and Spain, leading to a fall in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in French and Spanish
industrial firms. The decline in GFCF showed up in the accounts, reflecting the uncertainty that overshad-
owed investors’ expectations until the mid-1990s. Thus, the weighted mean of tangible fixed assets to total
assets fell from 32.6% in 1991 to 29.5% in 1995 in Spain, and from 19.2% in 1991 to 17% in 1995 in France.
Subsequently, the accelerated pace of external growth operations by industrial firms put a damper on the
acquisition of new tangible fixed assets through to the end of the period under review. In France however,
the brighter economic picture in 1999 gave renewed impetus to investment, causing the proportion of tangi-
ble fixed assets in total assets to rise. Overall, in both countries, the share of net tangible fixed assets in total
assets trended downwards in industry throughout the 1990s. In France in particular, among half of all indus-
trial firms, the ratio of tangible fixed assets accounted for less than 16.5% of total assets in 1991, less than
15.1% in 1995 and less than 14.6% in 1999.
3. The depreciation method used for calculation expenses (i.e. Straight-line depreciation or declining balance depreci-
ation) may affect the calculation of net fixed assets
In fact the declining balance depreciation method (1) was more favourable in France than in Spain at
the end of the period for goods to be depreciated over a period of seven years, thus being the average peri-
od of depreciation of industrial investments
(1) The use of four possible amortisation methods is accepted in Spain:
a)  Sixth fiscal index accepted by Treasury Ministry
b) Constant percentage method, or straight line rate (may not be used in Building, furniture and others); this
is the one referred in this box
c) Addition in digit numbers
d) Amortisation plans presented to the Treasury administration and duly accepted.
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Declining balance depreciation regime
4. Equipment operating time (operational capital) has increased over the past few years to contend with the growth of activity.
According to a Banque de France survey, equipment operating time stood 53.2 hours in 1999. Such a
level had not been seen since 1963 (52.9 hours), the figure having reached a low value in 1981 and around
48 hours in 1993 to increase then till the end of the period.The sharp rise in equipment operating time testi-
fies both to manufacturers’ efforts to use fixed capital as efficiently as possible, as well as to their attempts to
adjust, in the short term, their factors of production to pressures on supply.This historically high level is likely
to be the consequence of the steady increase in equipment operating time since the mid-1990s, following the
sharp fall during the business cycle trough of 1993. In the long run, this substantial rise may indicate that
equipment operating time will return to levels close to those observed before the first oil price shock.From
the end of the 1980s, an increase was seen in equipment operating time in all economic sectors and in all
company size brackets. This was due to the increased recourse to shift work, and, in particular, continuous
work. Since the end of the nineties, this increase has been attributable to the fact that previously unused
equipment was brought into service to meet the rise in demand.The data available for Spain (use of installed
capacity, accordingly to Ministry of Science and Technology Survey), reflects a huge increase from 1993 to
the end of the decade, showing the same behaviour in Spanish corporations related to the French previous
mentioned. It is difficult to know to what extent the differences that could exist between two countries in
this indicator would affect the level of tangible fixed assets found.
5. Different levels of leasing between the two countries
Some plant and equipment is not purchased by companies but simply leased, and therefore is not
recorded as fixed assets on the assets side of the balance sheet in France, However, thanks to the informa-
tion available in the balance sheet in Spain, and through the French Centrale de Bilans questionnaire) it was
possible to calculate the amount of leased assets compared with total assets in this study, and give an idea of
the importance of this phenomenon in each country. As it can be found in the main text, the use of this
financing system is more extensive in France, where the tangible assets acquired with leasing contracts repre-
sent in average over the decade, 1 p.p. more than in Spain, in relation to the total assets. Likewise, most
business premises are leased rather than purchased outright. Leasing offers companies greater flexibility, es-
pecially for recently established firms. Indeed, finance leasing enables the lessee to purchase the property out-
right, and offers the possibility of sub-letting, during the lease period, the good he has ordered. Listed compa-
nies prefer to lease as they receive low returns on real estate investment. In order to remove real estate
from their core business, major companies entrust property management to real estate companies. Real es-
tate companies are set up with little capital and borrow the amounts necessary to purchase premises. They
then let these premises to companies
6. Finally, another cause for the different level founded in tangible fixed assets to total assets, arise from the
year in which the restatements laws in both countries were approved (1983 and 1996 in Spain; 1978 in France).
These restatements laws enable the corporations to level their balance sheets, eliminating, at least partially,
the impact of the inflation rates in the balances (because of the historical cost principles of valuation). Any-
way, this has a limited impact on the comparison between both countries.
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Industrial moveable capital goods,
industrial buildings whose UL (*)




UL 3-4 yrs: 1.5 × straight-line rate
UL 5-6 yrs: 2 × straight-line rate
UL > 6 yrs: 2.5 × straight-line rate
UL < 5 yrs: 1.5 × straight-line rate
UL 5-8 yrs: 2 × straight-line rate
UL > 8 yrs: 2.5 × straight-line rate
 (*) Useful life = depreciation period
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chance of yielding commercial profit, may be capitalised and written off over a maximum of five
years. Therefore, the real level of investment cannot be totally shown in the balances. Anyway,
between 1991 and 1999, the aggregate ratio of intangibles to total assets went from 1.4% to
2.1% in France and from 2% to 3% in Spain.
In France, this uptrend concerned companies of all sizes (see graph III.1.1.15 in the statis-
tical annex). Moreover, the scale of the increase was identical across the board. This is because
the French accounting code gives broad latitude in terms of recognising intangible fixed assets,
thereby allowing smaller companies to book the same proportion of intangibles as larger out-
fits. In Spain, the ratio of intangibles to total assets appeared to rise more sharply among small-
er companies (from 1.7 % in 1991 to 4.6% in 1999) than among larger firms (2.1% in 1991, 2.9%
in 1999).
On a sectoral level (see graph III.1.1.16 in the statistical annex), in France, the average
“Intangible fixed assets / total assets” ratio was higher in the consumer goods sector than in the
capital goods and intermediate goods sectors. The importance of research and development
cost, patents and licences and increased biotech spending were two of the main reasons for
this. In 1999, intangible fixed assets amounted to 3.4% of total assets in the consumer goods
sector, compared with just 1.8% in intermediate goods and 1.2% in capital goods. In Spain, the
proportion of intangible fixed assets in total assets was the same as in France in the consumer
goods sector. By contrast, in capital goods, the level was higher in Spain throughout the period.
Responding to the development of capital markets in the nineties, French and Spanish com-
panies used more of their cash to purchase financial assets instead of investing in new tangible
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came particularly evident from 1996 onwards. This strategy partly explains the symmetrical trends
in the weight of tangible fixed assets and financial fixed assets in the total assets of French and
Spanish industrial firms. The increase in the proportion of financial assets was greater in France
than in Spain over the period under review, probably as a consequence of the different stage in
globalisation of both countries (Spain follows the pattern of France, with a gap of several years).
Between 1991 and 1999, the average “financial fixed assets / total assets” ratio rose from 17.6% to
22.8% (see graph III.1.1.17), reflecting the quickening pace of globalisation and the growing role of
outsourcing. In Spain, the ratio went from 10.8% in 1991 to 15.4% in 1999.
However, large companies employing a workforce of over 250, which enjoy easier access
to the capital markets, made the biggest contribution to this trend (see graph III.1.1.18 in the
statistical annex). The strong rise in the value of shares and equity interests pushed the “finan-
cial fixed assets / total assets” ratio up almost 8 points in France to 28.2% in 1999. In Spain, the
ratio put on almost 5 points, climbing to 16.9% in 1999. If we look at the share of financial fixed
assets in total assets in different company categories in France, we see how the uptrend in fi-
nancial assets was concentrated in large companies: the median of the ratio varied in France
and Spain between 2.5% and 3% between 1991 and 1999 (between 3% and 5.5% for companies
employing more than 500 people), whereas it never exceeded 1% in small and medium-sized
businesses over the same period. Companies employing 50 to 250 employees in both countries
saw this ratio increase, albeit to a lesser degree (2.2 p.p. in France, 2.6 p.p. in Spain), with finan-
cial fixed assets still accounting for a fairly small share of total assets at the end of the period
(7.9% in France and 7.2% in Spain). Small-sized businesses made little attempt to acquire this
type of asset: financial fixed assets accounted for 6.3% of their total assets in 1991 and 5.1% in
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From a sectoral perspective (see graph III.1.1.19 in the statistical annex), while the up-
trend was prevalent in all areas of activity and in both countries, the scale of the increase dif-
fered across sectors. Thus, in France, the proportion of financial fixed assets in total assets in-
creased sharply in the capital goods sector, partly due to the fact that companies seemed to
take advantage of growth opportunities. Another reason was the faster pace of globalisation in
order to build up their holdings of financial assets. Note that between 1995 and 1997, however,
the proportion of financial fixed assets contracted sharply, as and at the same time an increase
of the share of trade debtors was observed. This resulted in an erratic pattern for the study
period as a whole. In Spain, the biggest increase was seen in the intermediate goods sector,
mainly towards the end of the period.
1.1.2. Current assets (5)
Our analysis of current assets in France and Spain shows that they remained stable over-
all during the period under review and that their structure was fairly heavily conditioned by
company size and sector. Furthermore, the financial strategies adopted by companies are shown
to have a marked impact on businesses’ cash management, with large companies enjoying great-
er flexibility in this area than smaller ones.
Analysing stocks, the 1990s saw companies in both countries implement rationalisation
measures and restructure their production processes, for example by introducing just-in-time
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management techniques. As a result, stocks are used by companies as a mean of responding to
cyclical developments. For example, during the economic slowdown and recession that took
place in France and Spain between 1991 and 1993, the proportion of inventories in total assets
went down in both countries, across all company sizes and sectors.
Furthermore, industrial firms are prevented by capacity constraints from building up their
inventories during periods of strong growth. From 1991 in France, the downturn in production,
falling industrial producer prices, and the ongoing shift to “zero stock” policies prompted com-
panies to scale back their inventories in order to clean up their balance sheets and alleviate
financial constraints. In Spain, the need for improved inventory management in a context of
heightened competition led to better control in this area. In this respect, for Spanish businesses,
the nineties represented a period of consolidation in their integration into the free market
process. In both countries, there was a temporary phase of stock building in the middle of the
period, at a time when inventory levels were deemed too low and demand expectations were
becoming clearer.
Overall (see graph III.1.1.22), the average proportion of stocks in total assets fell from
20.3% in 1991 to 16.7% in 1999 in France and from 16.5% to 13.7% in Spain over the same
period.
An analysis by size reveals that the ratio of stocks to total assets fell markedly among large
companies, especially in France (see graph III.1.1.23 in the statistical annex). In both countries, the
largest businesses slashed their inventories of goods, to the detriment of their main suppliers. In
addition, French and Spanish companies with a dominant market position successfully shifted all or
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In all, the share of stocks in the total assets of small companies shrank by 2.5 percentage
points in France and 2 percentage points in Spain, to 23.1% and 18.9% respectively in 1999. For
large companies, the ratio fell by 4.6 p.p. in France and 3.4 p.p. in Spain, to 14.6% and 12.4%
respectively in 1999. The results for medium-sized companies were between these two ex-
tremes.
A sectoral analysis reveals that in both countries, the proportion of inventories in total
assets was lower in the intermediate goods sector than in other sectors (see graph III.1.1.24 in
the statistical annex). In France, the capital-intensive capital goods sector reported higher stocks
than the other two segments until 1997, although the gap narrowed towards the end of the
period. In Spain, inventory levels were higher in the consumer goods sector than in the other
sectors throughout the period under review.
Trade debtors comprise the other main component of current assets. As in the case of
stocks, the share of trade debtors (including advances paid on contracts but excluding loans to
group companies and related entities) in total assets declined in both countries over the 1991-
1999 period. The weighted mean for the aggregate population fell by 1.4 percentage points in
France to 25.4% in 1999 (see graph III.1.1.25). Unlike in the case of stocks, however, the share
of trade debtors in the total assets of Spanish companies, while also on a downtrend, remained
above the proportion seen among French companies throughout the period, except towards
the end, when the ratios converged at 25.4%.
Here again, the ratio of trade debtors to total assets was conditioned by the size of
the firm in question enjoyed a dominant market position (see graph III.1.1.26 in the statistical
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than for companies employing fewer than 50 people (the ratio was down 0.2 of a point in
France and 2.6 points in Spain). Moreover, in both countries, the ratio of trade debtors to total
assets was much higher in small and medium-sized companies than in large companies. It
therefore appears that small companies were more often forced to sell on credit, rather than
demand that their customers pay cash. This finding is backed up by indicators of average
trade debtor collection period (see graph III.1.1.28), which were far higher for small Spanish
companies (82.5 days in 1999) than large firms (47.9 days in 1999). In France, average pay-
ment period of trade debtors in 1999 were 77 days for small companies and around 59 days
for large industrial firms. Small Spanish firms are worst placed than French ones in relation to
this indicator, while large Spanish companies are better placed than their French counter-
parts (graph III.1.1.29).
A sectoral analysis reveals that from 1994 onwards, French consumer goods companies
were more successful in managing trade debtors than companies in the capital goods and inter-
mediate goods sectors. This was made possible, inter alia, by the nature of activities undertaken
in this sector. In Spain, the lowest trade debtors were to be found in the intermediate goods
sector (see graph III.1.1.27 in the statistical annex).
The approach to cash management taken by companies is closely linked to the financial
strategy that they adopt. Thus, a company may use its liquidities as a means to react swiftly to
unforeseen events in the course of the business cycle, and thereby preserve its financial auton-
omy. On aggregate, the liquidity ratio (securities and cash) increased slightly more in France
than in Spain. On average (see graph III.1.1.30), liquidities accounted for 7.2% of total assets in
1999 compared with 5.9% at the beginning of the period in France, and 5.7% in 1999 compared
with 5.2% at the beginning of the period in Spain.
GRAPH III.1.1.28
AVERAGE TRADE DEBTORS COLLECTION PERIOD
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In terms of size, small companies in France and Spain had higher levels of cash than large
firms in the 1990s (see graph III.1.1.31 in the statistical annex). This reflected the fact that they
did not have access to permanent credit and so were obliged to keep a relatively large stock of
cash to maintain the necessary financial flexibility. Smaller companies are forced to adopt this
type of strategy because they find it hard to obtain liquidity from banks. At the end of the peri-
od, liquidities accounted for 11.7% of the total assets of small industrial firms in France and
12.1% in Spain, compared with 6.3% of the total assets of large French companies and 4.2% of
large Spanish companies.
A sectoral analysis shows that cash accounted for relatively similar proportions of the total
assets of French and Spanish companies in the consumer goods and capital goods sectors. Cash
levels were far lower in the intermediate goods sector throughout the period, probably because
financial pressures and cyclical constraints were less intense (see graph III.1.1.32 in the statistical
annex).
To sum up, our analysis of the balance sheet structures of French and Spanish industrial
firms shows that their assets were relatively similarly structured in terms of maturity and
that the components of current assets developed along comparable lines. That said, tangible
fixed assets accounted for fairly different shares of total assets in the two countries. This
would appear to be linked in part to the different approaches to organisation taken by cor-
porate groups in France and Spain. In this respect, we observed that asset structures were
closely linked to company size and business area (the sector factor). Larger firms have more
room for manoeuvre than smaller companies in the management of their financial assets
(they enjoy broader access to capital markets that avoid to maintain a high level of cash), in
terms of external growth (they are able to outsource part of their activity to subsidiaries)
and in cash management (they benefit from more flexible banking conditions). The sector fac-
tor is more noticeable in inventory management and in the use that companies make of tan-
gible fixed assets.
LOANS TO GROUP AND RELATED ENTITIES
These loans include long term and short term financing. In France, the cross-shareholdings and grow-
ing concentration seen in the industrial sector led to an increase in the proportion of loans to group compa-
nies and related entities in total assets. This ratio increased from 10.6% at the beginning of the period to 13%
in 1999, peaking at 14.7% in 1998. In Spain, this ratio is only available for large companies, and they also in-
creased more than 6 points the weight of loans to group and related companies over total assets between
1991 (2.4%) and 1999 (9.0%).
Large industrial firms, whose lending to subsidiaries was particularly robust were mainly concerned by
this trend: in 1999, the proportion of loans to group companies and related entities came to 14.9% of total
assets in this size category, compared with 11.9% in 1991. In the case of smaller firms, the ratio was lower
than half the level observed for large companies, and stood at 5.8% in 1999 (4.5% in 1991). This type of finan-
cial strategy therefore appears to be closely linked to company size (see graph III.1.1.21 in the statistical an-
nex).
On a sectoral level, in France, the proportion of loans to group companies and related entities in
total assets remained fairly similar in the consumer and intermediate goods sectors, at 12.4% and 11.6% re-
spectively in 1999 after 10.3% in 1991. Companies in the capital goods sector, however, in particular the
major automotive groups, stepped up their lending to subsidiaries.
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1.2. Liabilities
The sources of funds of French and Spanish industrial firms can be divided into own
funds, financial debt, trade creditors, other creditors and provisions for risks and charges (see
graphs III.1.2.1 to III.1.2.7 in the statistical annex).
By analysing the weighted means of these different components, we find the following ba-
sic trends:
• French businesses greatly improved their financial structures during the 1990s, espe-
cially between 1991 and 1994, by increasing the level of their own funds. In parallel,
the share of financial debt in French companies’ total liabilities decreased in similar
proportions between 1991 and 1999. The behaviour of Spanish firms in terms of own
funds was closely linked to the economic cycle although this behaviour was only fol-
lowed by large corporations. Small firms kept a trend totally different to the total
population and to the French small firms; thus defining a special pattern for Spain.
Accordingly, there was a significant decline in the proportion of own funds during the
1991-1993 recession, followed by an uptrend from 1994 onwards, leading to a peak
in 1999.
• The weight of financial debt was reduced in the two countries in the same proportion as
the increase observed in the level of own funds. The structure of financial debt shows
in France and Spain a fall of the proportion of bank debt between 1991 and 1998
whatever the size and the sector and a larger proportion of financing through loans
from group companies and related entities.
GRAPH III.1.1.20
LOANS TO GROUP AND ASSOCIATED COMPANIES
TOTAL ASSETS
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• The proportion of provisions for risks and charges shows that French and Spanish companies
made marginal use of this source of funds throughout the period, compared with own funds
and loans. In the case of French companies, one reason for this is that extremely precise tax
and accounting rules specify how much companies have to set aside as provisions. This leaves
firms with little discretionary power in terms of provisioning. In Spain, the shift towards out-
sourcing pension provisions was partly responsible for the decline in the ratio.
• An analysis by size reveals a number of differences between France and Spain. These are
mainly due to the different practices in the two countries in terms of recourse to ex-
ternal financing.
• At a sectoral level, in both countries, the intermediate goods and consumer goods sec-
tors appear to adopt fairly similar approaches in terms of own funds, provisioning and
debt, while the capital goods sector stands out as being somewhat different.
The following analysis seeks to identify the shares of different sources of funds in the
total liabilities of French and Spanish companies and to reveal how these shares changed over
the 1991-1999 period.
1.2.1. Own funds
Own funds (6) are a key source of funds for industrial firms in France and Spain. The weighted































(6) Own funds main items: equity capital + reserves + profit or loss of the financial year + grants and subsidies. See
for precise definition for the two countries chapter II "transition table of the balance sheet items and French tax form".
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period in France, increasing from 33.6% in 1991 to 38.3% in 1999. At the same time the median of
this ratio amounted from 29.1% in 1991 to 34.1% in 1999, confirming the upward trend. In Spain,
changes in the proportion of own funds in total liabilities were closely linked to the domestic
business cycle, with the ratio fluctuating between 33% in 1993 and 44% in 1999. Between 1991
and 1994, there was a marked fall in the ratio because of an accumulation of negative earnings by
Spanish firms: this was reflected in the individual components of own funds. The “other reserves”
item recorded large-scale losses during the recession years and its share of total liabilities hit a
low of 12.9% in 1993 (as compared with 28.5% in 1999). From 1994 onwards, the ratio of own
funds to total liabilities began trending upwards again until it peaked in 1999.
In France, the overall increase in own funds can be traced back to two factors:
— The build-up of reserves by companies. Their twofold aim in doing this was to achieve
the strategic objective of improving their financial structures (essentially in the sec-
ond half of the decade) and to take advantage of tax incentives for retained earnings.
This measure, which lasted until 1993, offered lower rates for retained earnings than
distributed earnings. In 1999, on average, reserves accounted for around 30% of the
own funds of companies and 11.2% of the total liabilities of industrial firms;
— The increase in equity capital throughout the 1990s in step with the growth of capital
markets (see annex IV on French and Spanish Financial Systems). By 1999, equity capi-
tal accounted for an average of 12.2% of the total liabilities of companies, compared
with 9.3% in 1991, and almost one-third of their own funds.
In Spain, the increase in own funds in the last six years of our study can be ascribed to
the increase in reserves, which resulted mainly from the build-up of retained earnings. The pro-
portion of reserves in total liabilities soared from 13% in 1993 to 31% in 1999. Over the same
period, the ratio of equity capital to total liabilities declined by around 6 p.p.
An examination of the “own funds / total liabilities” ratio reveals that in France own
funds increased in all size categories, regardless of the statistical indicator used (weighted
mean or median). If we consider the median, we see that the proportion of own funds in
total liabilities increased with the number of employees over the 1991-1999 period. However,
the gap separating small companies employing fewer than 50 people and very large firms with
over 500 employees narrowed considerably from the mid-1990s, from 6.2 p.p. in 1991 to
1.5 p.p. in 1999. Thus, a marked trend towards uniform levels of own funds has emerged, re-
flecting the fact that all French industrial firms are adopting the same approach, irrespective
of their size. In 1999, the weighted mean of own funds to total liabilities came to 38.3% in
small companies, 37.6% in medium-sized businesses and 38.4% in large companies (see graph
III.1.2.9 in the statistical annex).
In Spain, behaviour patterns changed more significantly according to company size. In
the second half of the decade, the ratio of own funds to total liabilities was lower in smaller
firms than among the aggregate population. In addition, the ratio for small companies was rel-
atively unaffected by the business cycle: in the case of companies employing fewer than 50
people, it reached a low of 34.9% in 1995, before registering a small 3 p.p. increase by the end
of the period. Similarly, the ratio for medium-sized companies was not correlated with cycli-
cal fluctuations. However, it was considerably higher than the ratio for small companies. It
bottomed out at 42.5% in 1994, but was up four points on this by the end of the period. By
contrast, in the case of large companies, the ratio of own funds to total liabilities was strongly
influenced by the business cycle and it was in this category that the largest fluctuations were
seen, with the ratio going from 32.8% in 1993 to 44.7% in 1999. This trend was more preva-
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lent among large companies employing more than 500 people (see graph III.1.2.9 in the sta-
tistical annex).
An analysis by sector of activity (see graph III.1.2.10 in the statistical annex) shows that in
France, own funds stood at fairly similar levels in the intermediate and consumer goods sectors
between 1991 and 1999, while levels were far lower in the capital goods sector throughout the
period under review. This gap was due to two factors: first, the greater emphasis placed on eq-
uity capital in the intermediate goods sector, which would seem to indicate that companies in
this segment had greater access to the capital markets; second, the higher level of reserves in
the intermediate and consumer goods sectors compared with the capital goods sector. Overall,
at the end of the period under review, the ratio of own funds to total liabilities averaged out at
44% in the intermediate goods sector, 40.8% in the consumer goods sector, and 29.6% in the
capital goods sector. In Spain, the ratio was stable and highest in the consumer goods sector.
This contrasted with the other two sectors, which recorded large increases: in intermediate
goods, the ratio climbed from 33% in 1993 to 49% in 1999, while it rose from 22% in 1993 to
35% in 1999 in the capital goods sector.
1.2.2. Provisions for risks and charges
Both the weighted mean (see graph III.1.2.11) and the median of the ratio of provisions
to total liabilities show that provisions for risks and charges play a minor role as a source of fi-
nancing for French and Spanish businesses. In France, this notably reflects the fact that strict
accounting rules are in place for valuing provisions. Since pension provisions are not tax-de-
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nisms, such as pension funds managed by an entity outside the company, are most common.
French businesses prefer employee profit-sharing plans as a way of providing an incentive to
enhance performances.
In Spain, too, this source of funds has limited importance: provisions for risks and charges
varied between 4% and 5% of total liabilities over the period under review. One of the main
reasons for this low level was that pension provisions declined as a result of the requirement
for companies to outsource this type of commitment. This process began in 1995 and will be
completed in 2002 (see annex VI on the legal treatment of pension funds in Spain).
An analysis by size shows that provisions for risks and charges account for a small share
of the total liabilities of small companies in both countries: in France, half of all small companies
(employing 0 to 49 people) do not set aside provisions for risks and charges, and the weighted
mean stood at 1.8% in 1999. In Spain, the weighted mean of the ratio is around 0.4%, owing to
the very small pension provisions set aside by small Spanish firms, first because they do not
tend to set up such schemes for their employees, and second because it is now mandatory for
them to outsource the management of such funds. In addition, in both countries, the propor-
tion of provisions for risks and charges increased in line with the number of employees: in 1999,
the weighted mean ratio came to 6.5% of total liabilities among very large French companies
employing more than 500 people, 6.1% for large French firms employing a staff of over 250, and
5.8% for large Spanish companies (see graph III.1.2.12 in the statistical annex).
In both countries, the level of provisions was much higher in the capital goods sector
than in the other two sectors (see graph III.1.2.13 in the statistical annex). This was particularly
noticeable in France.
GRAPH III.1.2.11
PROVISIONS FOR RISK AND CHARGES
TOTAL LIABILITIES
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1.2.3. Financial debt (7)
Since practices for booking bank financing according to maturity differ in France and
Spain (8), it was decided that for the purposes of comparison, it would be best to analyse
sources of funds according to their nature.
1.2.3.1. EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DEBT BETWEEN 1991 AND 1999
An examination of the debt structure of French industrial firms reveals that the propor-
tion of financial debt declined markedly between 1991 and 1999, irrespective of the statistical
indicator used (i.e. weighted mean or median). Moreover, until 1998, cyclical fluctuations (eco-
nomic slowdown between 1990 and 1992, recession from 1992 to 1993, then growth from the
mid-1990s onwards) had little impact on this proportion. Thus, between 1991 and 1998 (see
graph III.1.2.14), industrial firms reduced the share of financial debt in their total liabilities by
6 p.p. on a weighted mean (5.3 p.p. according to the median).
Notably, this took place via a process of disintermediation, illustrated by an ongoing
reduction in the share of bank debt in total liabilities from 12.1% in 1991 to 7.6% in 1998 on
a weighted mean. Disintermediation also took place in Spain as of 1992. The impact was
greater than in France: the “bank debt to total liabilities” ratio tumbled by 11 points, from
21.2% in 1992 to 10.2% in 1998 (see graph III.1.2.17). In parallel with the movement of disin-
termediation experienced by corporations the reasons for the similar approach taken by
Spanish and French banks to business lending can also be attributed to domestic bankruptcy
laws, which share common features (see annex V on bankruptcy law in France and Spain).
These laws caused credit institutions to adopt a relatively cautious tack during this period,
contrasting with the seemingly less wary attitude of banks in other European countries, such
as Germany. This difference can be explained largely by the creditor-friendly provisions con-
tained in German bankruptcy law. German banks are well-protected against loan losses
caused by bankruptcy. Also, a credit guarantee system in place. This explains why German
firms’ debt levels remained relatively constant over the study period (9).
Since 1998, however, there has been a shift back towards banking intermediation in
French companies. In particular, this resulted in an increase in the proportion of bank debt in
total liabilities at the end of the period analysed. Between 1998 and 1999, in fact, the ratio rose
from 7.6% to 8.6% on a weighted mean, after remaining stable between 1997 and 1998. This
shift also appeared to take place in Spain, albeit on a smaller scale, with the ratio rising from
10.2% in 1998 to 10.7% in 1999.
In terms of size, French companies, whatever their size, take a more uniform approach to
debt than Spanish ones. In France, this approach reflects the greater financial autonomy of large
French industrial firms compared to smaller French companies. In Spain, the relative share of
financial debt on the balance sheets of small companies remained high and stable (29.6% in
1992 and 1999), meanwhile in large companies the weight reduced significantly passing from
33% in 1992 to 18.2% in 1999. (See graph III.1.2.15 in the statistical annex)
(7) Financial debt = long term bank borrowing + short term bank borrowing + securities other than shares
+ loans from group and associated companies + other financial debts.
(8) The French Balance Sheet Data Office books debts according to their original maturity. In Spain, in
accordance with the Fourth European Directive, debts are booked according to their residual maturity.
(9) See Study on “Corporate finance in Germany and France” (September 1999)
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An examination of the sources of financing used reveals:
• There was a large difference between small and large companies in France in terms of
the share of bank loans in total liabilities, even though this gap tended to narrow to-
wards the end of the period: the weighted mean went from 17.7% in 1991 to 12.2% in
1999 for small companies (0-49 employees), while it fell from 9.8% to 6.7% for compa-
nies with over 500 employees over the same period; in other words, the gap narrowed
from almost 8 points at the beginning of the period to 5.5 points in 1999. TThe gap
separating small companies (0-49 employees) and companies with a staff of over 250
went from 7.3 points in 1991 to 5 points in 1999. In Spain, the share of bank loans in
total liabilities increased from 19.9 % in 1991 to 24.6% in 1999 in small companies and
fell from 19.2% in 1991 to 9.6% in 1999 among larger companies, indicating that size
had great effect on behaviour. (See graphs III.1.2.18 in the statistical annex).
• A bigger substitution effect was seen in the sources of funds of large French compa-
nies, which have less difficulty in tapping the financial markets for funds. Bonds and par-
ticipating interests accounted for around 2% of total liabilities among large companies,
compared with virtually nil in smaller businesses. The substitution effect was negligible
in Spain. Irrespective of their size, Spanish companies made little use of this source of
funds during the period under review.
In the analysis by sector, the share of financial debt in the total liabilities of French and
Spanish companies declined over the 1991-1999 period across all sectors (see graph III.1.2.16
in the statistical annex). The downtrend was similar in the consumer goods sectors of both
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ward trend was observed in Spain during the recession period (1992-1993) followed by a signif-
icant fall. Furthermore, at the end of the period, the ratio of financial debt to total liabilities
remained perceptibly lower in the capital goods sector than in the other two sectors. It came
to 15.8% in 1999 in Spain and 16.5% in France, following a steeper fall in Spain (10.3 p.p.) than
in France (3.5 p.p.) over the period. In France, this situation can be explained by the fact that
this sector makes less use of bank debt and is more oriented towards loans from group compa-
nies and related entities (see the analysis of debt structures).
1.2.3.2. STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL DEBT
The analysis of the external sources of funds (see next graph III.1.3.1) used in France and
Spain reveals the following key trends:
— Loans from group companies and related entities comprised a large proportion of
the external funds used by French and Spanish companies.
 
In 1999, their share came
to 40.0% in France, up 9.7 p.p. on 1991 and roughly equal to that of bank debt. Com-
panies raised more financial resources by directly tapping national and international
money and capital markets. In Spain, the proportion of intragroup financing in financial
debt increased from 18.6% in 1991 to 30.2% in 1999. In particular, this enabled Span-
ish companies to cut back on short-term financing from credit institutions.
— Bank debt became increasingly oriented towards long-term loans, whose share in fi-
nancial debt came to 23.2% in 1999 in France after 24.0% en 1991. The share of
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5.4 p.p. This was due to two factors: first, the determination of companies to reduce
their vulnerability as they built up their financial autonomy; second, greater selectivity
in credit allocation, which affected short-term lending in the 1990s. Indeed, it seems
that the relatively high rates applied to short-term loans at the end of 1992 and in
early 1993 in response to the recession and bleak economic outlook prompted firms
to adopt bank debt structures geared more towards long-term loans. The overall
share of bank debt in financial debt, taking all maturities into consideration, declined
regularly until 1996, when it reached 39.1%, compared with 50.7% in 1991. It then
began to rise from 1997, climbing to 44.5% in 1999, as firms took on more debt in a
bid to keep in step with the renewed growth of the economy. The same situation was
seen in Spain: the proportion of bank debt in financial debt fell from 68.9% in 1991 to
56.1% in 1999. The proportion of short-term loans in financial debt fell by 13 p.p. be-
tween the beginning and end of the period. However, the widespread practice among
Spanish companies, especially smaller ones, of discounting bills of exchange, is one of
the reasons for the high level of short-term loans compared to the level observed in
France. Under this technique, the monies paid by the bank in return for the sale of
claims by the company are booked under loans falling due in under one year. This
practice is particularly prevalent among smaller companies because of the long pay-
ment times they have to contend with. The proportion of long-term bank debt was
stable at around 23% throughout the period under review. In this regard, the role
played by the Spanish savings banks, which granted 40% of all loans from credit insti-
tutions should be noted (see annex IV entitled “French and Spanish Financial Sys-
tems”)
— The weight of other components of financial debt is less significant and their shares
did not change much between 1991 and 1999.
Analysis by size: debt structures varied with company size. However, the differences were
more pronounced in France than in Spain (see graph III.1.3.2 in the statistical annex).
Short-term bank loans represented the main source of external funds for medium-sized
French companies employing between 50 and 250 people. They accounted for 34.9% of exter-
nal funds for companies of this size in 1999, compared with 31.4% for small businesses with
fewer than 50 employees and 16.4% for large companies. Conversely, in Spain, since 1995, small
businesses have made more use of short-term loans than medium-sized ones. In 1999, short-
term loans accounted for 51.1% of the financial debt of small companies with a workforce of
under 50, compared with 48.9% for firms employing between 50 and 250 people, and 27.3% for
large companies.
Furthermore, we found that in France the ratio of long-term bank loans to total financial
debt was inversely proportional to company size. In small companies employing fewer than
50 people, this ratio stood at 31.4% in 1999, whereas among larger companies with a staff of
over 250, it came to 20.8%. Corporate groups set up specialised structures to handle relations
with banks and investors, which cut the transactions costs involved in obtaining external funds.
In addition, large groups have market clout that enables them to secure more favourable financ-
ing conditions from the banks. The lower costs of intragroup financing compared with external
funds may go some way to explaining why companies make little use of bank loans when financ-
ing their subsidiaries.
The same is true in Spain. Long-term bank loans accounted for 31.5% of the financial
debt of small companies in 1999, compared with 24% for medium-sized companies and 22.8%
for large companies.
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Loans from group companies and related entities are widely used by large French companies,
most of which belong to a group. This type of financing accounted for 44.3% of the financial
debt of large French companies in 1999 and 35.9% of the debt of large Spanish companies. For
medium-sized firms, the ratio was 27.5% in France (17.1% in 1991) and 15.3% in Spain in 1999.
By contrast, while intragroup financing accounted for 31.4% of the debt of small French compa-
nies (21.5% in 1991), it represented less than 1% of that of small Spanish companies.
Large French firms also made more use of bond financing than smaller companies because
they enjoy easier access to the capital markets and also because issuance costs are too high for
small businesses. Spanish firms, irrespective of size, made virtually no use of bond financing.
An examination by sector reveals differences in debt structures in France and Spain (see
graph III.1.3.3 in the statistical annex).
GROUP FINANCING: AN INCREASING SHARE IN THE TOTAL LIABILITIES
In all industrialised countries there has been an acceleration in the processes of corporate consolida-
tion and corporate group creation. The fact that a company belongs to a group influences the level of financ-
ing of its activity and the structure of this financing. It may also be a factor in the reducing of asymmetric
information between companies and lenders.
Groups can centralise their cash management in specialised structures in order to optimise the man-
agement of their loans and investments. The cash function is in charge of centralising liquidity flows from
subsidiaries, bilateral or multilateral netting of reciprocal credit and debit positions in an international group,
allocating flows between companies in the group through current account advances or intra-group lending
and borrowing, and making decisions concerning group borrowing and investment on the markets. This man-
agement method is based on internal financing of subsidiaries showing a deficit using cash from subsidiaries
registering a surplus. The lending company invoices at a normal rate, i.e. close to the money market rate.
As internal cash surpluses are used to cover the requirements of subsidiaries showing deficits, the
overall debt level is lower than that which would have been recorded if the loss-making companies had taken
out individual loans. Moreover, centralising the cash-flow management of the different entities in the group
enables the central cash management function to negotiate the overall bank conditions, which reduces the
transaction costs involved in obtaining external funds.
Funds borrowed from companies within the same group must be considered as one of the sources of
financing for business, especially in France, where the size effect looks to be fairly pronounced. And indeed,
while large French and Spanish industrial firms considerably reduced their proportion of bank debt over the
period under review, they replaced it to a large extent with intragroup financing, even though, for the aggre-
gate French population, the ratio of intragroup financing to total liabilities (see graph III.1.2.20) increased only
slightly, from 11.7% in 1991 to 12.1% in 1999. In Spain, the proportion increased by much more, rising from
10.8% in 1991 to 13.3% in 1999. From 1994, the evolutions are similar in both countries but the financial part
of debts with group and associated companies is higher in France (around 9% of total balance sheet) than in
Spain (around 7% of total balance sheet).
In the sectors under review, the ratio did not change much in France, except in the capital goods
sector, where the proportion of loans from group companies and related entities increased by 2.1 p.p. be-
tween 1991 and 1999. Overall, in all sectors, the ratio varied between 10% and 14% between 1991 and 1999.
In Spain, the ratio increased in all the sectors over the 1991-1999 period. (See graph III.1.2.22 in the statistical
annex)
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(10) The total amount “financial debt + finance leases”.
The capital goods sector stands out from the other two because of the predominance of
loans from group companies and related entities, which accounted for 47.9% of the financial debt
of companies in the sector in France and 40.3% in Spain in 1999. In addition, French companies
in this sector made considerable use of bond financing (15.4% in 1999). This source of funds is
especially widely used in the automotive sector. Accordingly, bank debt (long-term + short-term
loans) accounted for just 29.6% of total financial debt in this sector in France in 1999, com-
pared with 35.0% in Spain.
The consumer and intermediate goods sectors have comparable debt structures in France:
intragroup financing predominates, followed by long-term and then short-term bank loans, al-
though the breakdown varies slightly between the sectors. The proportion of negotiable debt
securities was relatively high in the consumer goods sector, at 2.3% in 1999, mainly because the
large firms in this sector were major issuers of commercial paper. In Spain, the debt structure
of these two sectors make more use of short-term bank loans, which accounted for 41.4% of
financial debt in the consumer goods sector in 1999 and 33.5% in the intermediate goods sec-
tor. Also, loans from group companies and related entities accounted for a high proportion of
financial debt in the consumer goods sector (32.8% in 1999), while long-term bank loans made
up a relatively large share of financial debt in the intermediate goods sector (32.1% in 1999).
It would also appear that large French companies made less use of finance leases. In 1999,
finance leases accounted for 5.5% of the financial debt (10) of large industrials, compared with 7.3%
for medium-sized companies and 16.2% in the smallest businesses. Small businesses face the biggest
constraints in terms of financing their fixed assets, hence their greater use of finance leasing.
GRAPH III.1.2.20
TOTAL AND FINANCIAL DEBTS WITH GROUP AND ASSOCIATED COMPANIES
TOTAL LIABILITIES
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Another way of evaluating the importance of “group financing” is to analyse its weight in
the total balance sheet.
1.2.4. Trade creditors
Trade creditors constitute another important source of funds for French and Spanish compa-
nies. Indeed, if we analyse the weighted mean, we see that trade creditors were a key source of
short-term financing for industrial firms of both countries. The proportion of trade creditors to
total liabilities in French companies exceeded 24% in 1999 (see graph III.1.2.23), i.e. three times
greater than the share of bank debt (8.6% in 1999), even though the weighted mean points to a
long-term trend towards reducing slightly creditors. The difference between the two ratios “trade
creditors/total liabilities” and “bank debt/total liabilities” was particularly marked between 1991
and 1993, doubtless in response to the economic slowdown and recession that took place during
that period. During such periods in the business cycle, businesses are pressured by their suppliers
to cut payment times, while at the same time they are trying to obtain quicker payment of debts
owing to them. In 1993, France introduced a policy aimed at reducing trade creditors. This policy
was kept in place until the end of the period, even though the upturns in activity in 1994-1995 and
in 1999 twice interrupted the long-term trend described above.
Thus, in 1999, average payment period of trade creditors were equal to 72 sales days in
France. Spanish companies also made considerable use of this type of financing, whose share in
total liabilities fluctuated between 20% and 25% throughout the period. An analysis of the aver-
age payment period of trade creditors confirms this: they were equivalent to 77 sales days in
1999 (see graph III.1.2.26), i.e. higher than in France, although the gap between the two coun-
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An examination by size reveals that the proportion of trade creditors in total liabilities
was higher among small companies (0-49 employees) than among larger firms. In France, the
average ratio of trade creditors to total liabilities was 23.4% for large firms in 1999 compared
with 26.6% for small ones. In Spain, the ratio was 24.7% for small firms, compared with 24.4%
for large companies. But in the rest of the years, the difference between these two populations
is greater in Spain than in France. (See graph III.1.2.24 in the statistical annex)
It emerges that in Spain, small companies are overall lenders of intercompany credit, with
average payment period of trade debtors equal to around 82 days in 1999 compared with
78 days for creditors. Large Spanish firms, on the other hand, are heavy borrowers of intercom-
pany credit, with trade debtors standing at around 48 days in 1999, compared with 76 days for
trade creditors. In France, large companies are also borrowers of intercompany credit, with
trade creditors reaching around 71 days in 1999 compared with 59 days for debtors, while
small companies are lenders, with trade creditors coming out at around 74 days in 1999 com-
pared with 77 days for debtors. (Graph III.1.2.27 of the statistical annex)
Use of trade credit seems to be more frequent in the capital goods sector, and especially
in the automotive sector, compared with the consumer and intermediate goods sectors. This is
true in both countries and throughout the period (see graph III.1.2.25 in the statistical annex).
1.2.5. Tax liabilities and other debt
The share of tax liabilities and other debt in total liabilities did not vary much in either
country during the period under review. This component thus had little impact on the debt
structures of French and Spanish firms.
GRAPH III.1.2.26
AVERAGE TRADE CREDITORS PAYMENT PERIOD
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In France, the average ratio came to around 12%. In the annual accounts, this item com-
prises miscellaneous taxes, participating interests, payments and other deductions to be paid by
the company as well as monies due to various welfare organisations. Since 1996, the share of
tax liabilities and other debt in total liabilities has increased slightly, mainly as a result of meas-
ures such as the 2 p.p. increase in the standard VAT rate and the introduction of a special levy
of 10%, later increased to 15%, added to the amount of corporate income tax (see annex VIII
about the different taxes which burden Spanish and French corporations). In Spain, the weight-
ed mean fluctuated at around 7% during the period under review.
2. FRENCH AND SPANISH INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS:
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 1991-1999
2.1. Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to analyse and compare the behaviour of French
and Spanish industrial corporations from 1991 to 1999 in respect of activity, employment and
personnel costs, results, margins and rates of return, and finally investment. The analysis is to be
performed for total industrial corporations from both countries, and also inside the total, by
size (small, medium and large corporations) and sub-sector (consumer goods, intermediate
goods and capital goods).
The information available confirms the connection between the production activity of
French and Spanish industrial corporations and the economic cycle of each country, as can be
seen analysing the rates of change of sales and GVA at factor cost. However, the Spanish econo-
my and the production activity of its industrial corporations have generally shown more volatile
data than the French economy and corporations, in that in Spain, during years of crisis, slumps
have been deeper, but, on the other hand, during years of prosperity, growth has been stronger.
The convergence process for the Spanish economy and corporations has thus not been even,
because catching-up occurs only in bullish periods. In the analysis by size, in the French data it is
possible to perceive a connection between corporate activity and economic growth, but the
effect is appreciably lower in smaller corporations. On the other hand, in Spain the changes in
the cycle can be seen to affect large corporations especially and, specifically, corporations with
more than 500 employees. Across the sectors in both countries, a significant cyclical connection
can be observed in the capital goods industry and, to a lesser extent, in the intermediate goods
industry. The corporations operating in the consumer goods industry behave in a much more
stable manner not connected to the cycle.
NOTE:  The rates of change of sales, Gross Value Added (GVA) and Gross Operat-
ing Profit (GOP) of the industry as a whole to be analysed in this chapter have been
adjusted for inflation, i.e. they are rates of constant prices enabling direct comparison
between the two countries. However, it has been possible to ascertain that the general
conclusions would not change if the rates had not been inflation-adjusted. The other
rates (including the first three rates by size and sector) have not been adjusted. Readers
should bear this in mind in interpreting the data.
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In relation to employment, French and Spanish corporations have developed in step with
activity, but at a different level of intensity. During the recession years (1992 to 1994), there
were net falls in employment in both countries, but somewhat more strongly so in Spain. Since
1995, periods of modest growth have combined with some years of moderate falls in France.
But from 1995 in Spain, Spanish corporations embarked on a period of net job creation, initially
with very mild growth, and subsequently with greater intensity. The explanation for this differing
behaviour between France and Spain is that in Spain the initial situation was particularly bad,
with an unemployment rate of 24%. For this reason the Spanish authorities decided to pursue
special policies for the stimulation of employment and the adaptation of the job market, and
from 1997 to 2000, 500,000 net jobs were created. By size, France and Spain coincided in that it
was large corporations that had to make more employment adjustments in the years prior to
economic recovery; that said, small corporations absorbed part of the employment that the
larger ones destroyed. By sector, the intermediate goods industry destroyed most employment
during the recession years, while employment in the consumer goods industry remained mod-
erately stable. In France, the phenomenon involving the creation of groups of corporations has
been important for employment developments.
The fall in interest rates has meant that corporations in both countries have reduced the
influence of financial expenses in their income statements, which has been conducive to an im-
provement in funds generated. This positive effect of lower financial costs has been reflected in
the rates of return on equity of both countries. While French corporations have been stable
(except in 1993) and have posted high levels of rates of return on assets in the whole historical
series analysed, Spanish corporations have shown two clearly differentiated periods: the first,
running to 1993, with very low rates of return; and the second as from 1994, at the same time
as the fall in interest rates and the pick-up in activity, with much more similar rates of return on
assets to French corporations. By size, small French and medium Spanish corporations have had
the best rate of return data in the sequence analysed. By sector, the consumer goods industry
of both countries has been most stable and had the highest rates of return.
Finally, the evolution of investment showed different behaviours in the two countries. The
level of investment in tangible assets of Spanish companies was much more intense than the
French one in growth phases. This difference of behaviour between French and Spanish firms
was particularly noticeable over the period 1998-1999 in terms of financial investment when
French companies preferred to invest on the financial markets by acquiring shares of other
companies.
2.2. Activity
The rate of change of GVA at factor cost is the best economic concept for ascertaining
corporations’ activity. Graph III.2.1 shows that in the whole group of French and Spanish indus-
trial corporations, there has been a substantial connection over the past ten years between
their activity and the cycle of their respective economies. Chapter I described the cycle fol-
lowed by the French and Spanish economies and, as can be seen, there is a coincidence be-
tween these cycles and the course of activity of French and Spanish industrial corporations, re-
spectively. Another coincidence between the behaviour of the economies and industry is that,
as discussed in chapter I, the Spanish economic recession (1992-1993) was deeper than that in
France, while Spanish periods of prosperity have also been more intense and it is in these peri-
ods that the Spanish economy has seen the catching-up process in train. In French and Spanish
industrial corporations the behaviour has been the same. During the recession years in both
countries (1991, 1992 and, especially, 1993) industrial corporations registered negative rates of
change for both sales and gross value added. There was a recovery during 1994 and 1995, at the
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same time as the expansionary phase and as the improvement in the international context.
However, as was the case in the economy as a whole, the pick-up manifested itself to differing
degrees of intensity in the two countries: while in France the real growth of industrial corpora-
tions’ sales and GVA in 1994 was 7% and 7.6%, respectively, in Spain the related two values
were 15.5% and 15.9%. In 1996, coinciding with a turning point in Spanish and French GDP
growth and a cooling of world trade, the industrial corporations in both countries reduced
their activity again. But as from 1997 they resumed positive rates, albeit on a gradually slowing
path. The slowdown observed from 1997 to 1999 must be matched in both countries with the
sales slowdown, with growth dipping in France from 6.1% to 3.5%, and in Spain from 10.3% to
6.9%, and specifically with the negative trend of exports. French corporations in particular felt
the impact of the crisis in the emerging countries, because the industrial sectors were those
most exposed to foreign markets and, at the same time, those most affected by declining exter-
nal demand. That said, it was these same corporations which most benefited from periods in
which external activity was expanding.
The graphs in the statistical annex (III.2.2.a) for France, and (III.2.2.b) for Spain show in-
formation by corporation size. In France a connection can be seen between evolution of GVA
of the companies and economic cycle, irrespective of the size of the company. On the other
hand, in Spain the changes in cycle affect especially large corporations, and specifically corpora-
tions with more than 500 employees, although SME also had some influence, showing their
worst data in 1992 and 1993. The slowdown in the last three years analysed (1997,1998 and
1999) hardly affected SME, and was stronger in large corporations, especially in Spain, where
the growth rate of GVA fell by 10 percentage points from 1997 to 1999, and stood this last
year at -0.1%. In SME, meantime, the data have been stable, with the nominal growth rate of
GVA close to 9% throughout the period. In France, large corporations posted nominal growth
of GVA of 2.6% in 1999, compared with 5.8% in 1997, while SME were more stable over these
three years, with modest reduction of less than 2 percentage points. This phenomenon could be
explained by the different sectoral composition of each size aggregate, but is due mainly to the
fact that corporations with less export activity are involved, whereby sales were not affected by
the adverse course of foreign activity.
Graphs III.2.3 in the statistical annex shows information by sector of activity. In France
the consumer goods industry has been less affected than the capital and intermediate goods
industries by the unfavourable effects of the phases of slowing activity, mainly because of the
food and agricultural industries, which are structurally able to support the external influence.
On the other hand, the intermediate and capital goods industries seem to perform better dur-
ing periods of prosperity, thanks to the strong growth of industrial demand. In Spain it is also
possible to observe a significant cyclical connection, depending on the sector of activity. This
connection is especially intense in the capital goods industry, and modestly so in the intermedi-
ate goods industry. In both industries, fluctuations are very marked. Similarly to than French
companies, Spanish corporations that make consumer goods are much more stable, but it is
also possible to discern the connection with the economic cycle.
Tables III.2.1 shows the number of corporations distributed according to the rate of
change of GVA, irrespective of their size and their weight in relation to the whole. These distri-
butions are influenced by the different structures of the sample in France and in Spain (see
chapter II). This has to be born in mind when observing these data. So it is more relevant to
analyse the evolution rather than the level. In both countries 1993 was the only year of the
series in which the number of corporations with negative rates exceeded corporations with
positive rates. In France, corporations with more than 500 employees and the intermediate and
capital goods industries were the most affected by the 1993 recession; in these three aggre-
gates and during that year, more than 60% of the corporations presented negatives rates of
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change of GVA. In Spain, since that point, more than 60% of corporations have always had posi-
tive rates, and in this group, more than 30% have grown with intensity (with increases in GVA
of more than 20%). Since 1993, the proportion of companies with positive rates of change of
GVA has been increasing in line in both countries. At the end of the period under review, this
percentage was similar or even slightly higher than in 1991. Capital goods corporations and
very large corporations were the most affected in 1993 by the crisis, so that 58% of the corpo-
rations of both Spanish aggregates had negative rates in the concept under analysis.
2.3. Employment and personnel costs
Employment in both countries has developed in step with activity, as can be seen in graph
III.2.4. Until 1994 there had been net falls in employment in France and Spain. 1993 was the
worst year, with rates of –5.1% and –6.8%, respectively. Since 1995, both countries have moved
on slightly different courses. French corporations have alternated periods of light growth
(1995,1997,1998 and 1999) with a moderate fall (in the year 1996). As from 1995, Spanish cor-
porations embarked on a period of net employment creation, initially with very mild growth,
but later with greater intensity, posting the highest growth of the series in 1998 (3.4%).
Tables III.2.2 provides for an analysis that distinguishes between corporations creating
employment and those shedding jobs. In both countries it was the case that until the years in
which the employment adjustment was harshest, the proportion of corporations maintaining or
creating employment exceeded corporations destroying jobs (with the exception of 1993 in
France). Since 1995 in France, corporations creating employment have clearly exceeded corpo-
rations destroying employment, with a high in 1998 of 66.8%. In Spain these data are even high-
er because, as discussed in chapter I, the initial situation was very poor in respect of the unem-
ployment rate in Spain in 1994, after the recession, of about 24%. That is why the Spanish au-
thorities decided to initiate special plans to promote employment and open up the job market
(see annex II for the labour measures adopted to promote employment), creating on average
TABLE III.2.1
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL INDUSTRY CORPORATIONS ACCORDING TO RATE
OF CHANGE OF GVA AT FACTOR COST
France Table III.2.1.a
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
20% or higher 14.8 13.4 10.6 17.2 18.4 13.3 16.1 17.6 16.0 
From 0 to 20% 42.2 38.7 31.7 40.7 42.0 37.6 42.9 45.2 42.1 
From -20 to 0% 33.4 36.1 42.5 33.0 31.7 38.6 33.4 30.3 33.6 
-20% or less 9.6 11.8 15.2 9.1 7.9 10.5 7.6 6.9 8.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Spain Table III.2.1.b
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
20% or higher 27.3 23.0 20.9 34.9 34.7 31.4 33.7 34.5 30.3 
From 0 to 20% 38.9 36.4 27.7 31.2 32.0 31.7 34.7 35.2 36.1 
From -20 to 0% 22.3 28.6 29.7 21.9 21.2 23.1 20.6 19.9 23.7 
-20% or less 11.5 12.0 21.6 12.0 12.0 13.8 11.0 10.4 10.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   Sources: Banque de France / Banco de España
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500,000 jobs in net terms each year from 1997 to 2000. Spanish industrial corporations
reached a high in 1998 with 79.6% of the corporations creating employment.
By size, graphs III.2.5 of the statistical annex show that, as is the case with activity, in Spain
it was large corporations which had to make most staff adjustments in the years prior to the
recovery, with falls close to 8% in 1993. This was compared with SME, in which falls were softer
at between 3% and 4%. In France, medium-sized corporations made the most forceful person-
nel adjustments in 1993, with a fall of –7.5%. Notwithstanding, since 1995 French SME have
shown net employment creation, but with very moderate rates which have in no year exceeded
2%. In Spain, just as SME have served to sustain employment during recession periods, during
years of plenty these corporations have been the principal source of net employment creation,
with rates reaching 6% in some cases, compared with 1% at large corporations.
In the tables III.2.3 to III.2.5 of the statistical annex, it can be appreciated clearly how
French and Spanish large corporations adopted a policy of personnel adjustments in 1993,
when 70% and 82%, respectively, destroyed jobs, and close to 74% and 90% in corporations
with more than 500 employees. Conversely, small corporations creating employment have al-
ways exceeded in number those corporations destroying jobs; in France this was the case as
from 1995, with figures close to 70%, and in Spain from 1996 to 1998, when nearly 80% of cor-
porations created net employment. As has been explained and can be observed in the tables,
during periods of crisis small corporations act as a “buffer”, absorbing part of the employment
that the larger corporations destroy. In addition to this, downsizing and the incorporation of
advanced techniques for production management and stock organisation lead to a reduction in
the size of some large industries, through the outsourcing of a portion of their secondary activ-
ities to small-size corporations. In France the way a company is organised (independent corpo-
rations, that belong to a group or a net of corporations) has a direct influence on employment.
By sector, as can be seen in the statistical annex (graphs III.2.6), during the years in which
there was a reduction in employment, it coincides in both countries that the capital and inter-
mediate goods industries were the sectors that destroyed most employment, in line with the
poorer performance of productive activity. In Spain, while it was when the recovery began that
the most favourable employment creation rates were seen, in France rates remained marginally
positive, and in 1999 intermediate goods corporations showed a minor fall in employment of
about –0.4%. Employment in the consumer goods industry has held relatively stable. In Spain
the capital goods industry presented worse results than the other industries in 1993 and 1994,
but it has posted positive data in the last five years. This recent positive trend in employment
has been supported by the recent growth of output and also by the modernisation of and add-
ed flexibility given to the Spanish labour market. Annex II also offers information about the key
features of the labour markets in France and Spain and the regulatory changes in recent years
affecting employment.
 As can be seen in graph III.2.4, the rate of change of personnel costs per employee in nom-
inal terms in French industrial corporations outgrew the Consumer Price Index (CPI) through-
out the whole period except in 1995. This latter year and 1998 were the two years that
showed the most restrained wage growth, while they were also the years with the largest em-
ployment growth. This explains the lower wage growth because, generally, the compensation of
new employees is lower. The course of average compensation has contributed to the achieve-
ment of France’s intended aim relating to the competitive disinflation policy, which has entailed
wage moderation combined with relatively sustained increases in productivity in industry. In
Spain, average compensation in nominal terms outgrew the CPI by about 1.6 p.p., 2.5 p.p. and
1.1 p.p., in 1991, 1992 and 1993, respectively. Thereafter, a downward trend initiated, with com-
pensation growing at below inflation in some of the years (1995, 1996 and 1999). This differenti-
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ation between the two periods is closely matched by the trend of employment: the economic
crisis and the above-inflation increase in average compensation in 1992 and 1993 were ab-
sorbed by corporations in terms of employment, through severe staff cuts. From 1995, wage
containment and the increase in productive activity allowed for a recovery in gross operating
profit, as will be analysed, and for the onset of the process of investment and employment crea-
tion; additionally the economic recovery entailed the incorporation of new employment (paying
lower wages), providing for the continuation of wage containment. Annex VII “Contribution to
social security by French and Spanish companies” offer institutional information about one of
the components of personnel costs paid by the companies.
Table III.2.2 gives information about the proportion of corporations in which average
personnel costs grew above or below inflation. Considering the evolution during the whole pe-
riod, it can be seen that in France, 1998 and 1999 were the years in which most corporations
(66% and 62%) increased their average compensation at an above-inflation rate, this coinciding
with the fact that the inflation rate was at its most moderate in these years (0.8% and 0.5%,
respectively). In Spain, this occurred in 1991 and 1992, when wages outgrew inflation in nearly
63% of corporations. From that point a new period ensued in which a percentage close to 50%
was maintained for both groups of Spanish corporations, because of the more recent perform-
ance of small corporations.
By size (graphs III.2.5 of the statistical annex), all the French corporations displayed in-
creases in their average compensation similar to 1991 and 1992, at nearly 4%, irrespective of
their size. But since 1993, SME have behaved in a more stable manner compared with large cor-
porations. In Spain, large corporations and SME exhibited very high rates of change in average
TABLE III.2.2
TOTAL INDUSTRY. WORKERS AND PERSONNEL COSTS PER WORKER RELATIVE TO INFLATION
PERCENTAGE OF CORPORATIONS IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
France Table III.2.2.a
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Average number of employees 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Falling 42.1 47.8 50.5 40.9 32.3 37.3 35.3 33.2 35.1 
Constant or rising 57.9 54.2 49.5 59.1 67.7 62.7 64.7 66.8 64.9 
Average compensation 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(relative to inflation)
Lower growth 45.2 47.6 58.6 46.9 39.2 47.9 43.2 34.1 38.0 
Higher or same growth 54.8 52.4 41.4 53.1 60.8 52.1 56.8 65.9 62.0 
Spain Table III.2.2.b
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Average number of employees 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Falling 42.6 44.8 46.9 33.9 25.5 22.7 21.2 20.4 23.1 
Constant or rising 57.4 55.2 53.1 66.1 74.5 77.3 78.8 79.6 76.9 
Average compensation 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(relative to inflation)
Lower growth 37.8 37.2 49.5 52.9 49.0 50.7 46.7 44.5 48.7 
Higher or same growth 62.2 62.8 50.5 47.1 51.0 49.3 53.3 55.5 51.3 
   Sources: Banque de France / Banco de España
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compensation in 1991 and 1992, especially in the latter year, in which close to double-figures
were recorded. As from 1993, it was small-sized corporations which strongly reduced the rise
in salaries and wages per employee. In medium and large corporations, the numbers that in-
creased wages above inflation was always higher than those that did not. In the case of large
corporations, this proportion was 70/30 in 1997 (see tables III.2.3 to III.2.5 of the statistical
annex).
By sector, (graphs III.2.6 of the statistical annex), the consumer goods and intermediate
goods industries in France showed a very similar and moderate trend in terms of the change in
average compensation of their employees, but in all the years analysed, this outgrew the CPI.
The capital goods industry exhibited erratic ups and downs, moving the rate of change of per-
sonnel costs per employee from 4.8% to –5.9% in 1994 and 1999, respectively. In Spain the ini-
tial position of the consumer goods industry was one of increases in average compensation
higher than in other industries. But as from 1994, containment took hold and held them stable,
with more moderate growth than the intermediate and capital goods industries.
As a consequence of the course of employment and average compensation, personnel
costs for industry as a whole in France showed two different phases. The first ran from 1991 to
1993, with a –2.7% decline in personnel costs in 1993, explained by the destruction of employ-
ment in that year. Thereafter, a restrained rise began, reaching high of 2.7% in 1999. From 1994
to 1999, it was average compensation that was most reflected in this increase. Analysing the
weight of personnel costs relative to total net turnover (graph III.2.13), substantial stability is
observed in the series from 1991 to 1997, with figures close to 19%. But in the last two years
personnel costs have accounted for nearly two points less relative to total sales, contributing to
a bigger business margin. In Spain, the rate of change in personnel costs has been more erratic,
with a low of –1.5% in 1993, similar to France. This figure must be connected with the destruc-
tion of employment. From that moment on, personnel costs posted positive rates, with a high
of 6.2% in 1998. But in this second period, contrary to France, the trend was more associated
with employment creation, because average remuneration behaved more moderately. As re-
gards the weight of personnel costs relative to net turnover, Spanish corporations have seen a
move from 20.8% in the initial years of the series to 13.9% in 1999.
2.4. Results, margins and rates of return
The graphic representation of the rate of change of GOP in France and Spain (graph
III.2.7) reveals a more erratic evolution of this parameter at the beginning of the period in Spain
than in France with a fall of 21.8% and 18.2% in 1993 respectively and an increase in 1994 of
72.0% in Spain and 21.3% in France. From 1996, there has been a similar pattern of this parame-
ter in the two countries. As a consequence of the trend in activity and personnel costs, the
GOP of the corporations of both countries was small and decreased regularly in 1991, 1992
and 1993. From 1994 to 1998, rates remained positive (with the exception of 1996); in 1999,
the GOP moved onto a stagnating trend, strongly so in Spain
Financial costs in both countries posted positive growth rates during the early years of
the study, but since 1993 in France and 1994 in Spain, and as a consequence of the fall in inter-
est rates (graph I.11 of chapter I) and Spanish convergence with the other European countries,
negative rates of change have arisen. Probably, this is one of the effects of convergence with
Europe and the creation of a single market, which has meant bigger profits for non-financial
corporations not only in terms of nominal stability but also in the reduction of costs. The re-
duction in financial costs can also be appreciated in their less relative significance in the profit
and loss account in terms of structure (see graph III.2.13); in Spanish industrial corporations,
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compared with 4.6% for the financial costs/sales proportion in 1993, the same structure was
1.0% in 1999. In French industrial corporations, the related proportion in terms of the profit
and loss account has also been reduced, dipping from 2.5% in 1993 to 0.9% in 1999. The detect-
ed reduction in financial costs contributed to the strong increase in funds generated (graph
III.2.7) by Spanish industrial corporations, as can be seen in the fact that rates of change were
positive as from 1994 (with the exception of 1996). Nevertheless, in 1999 signs of backtracking
were evident, in line with the course of output. This improvement has also been observed in
relative terms (graph III.2.13); while in 1993 resources generated accounted for 1% of sales, in
1999 they reached 7.6%. In France the funds generated by industrial corporations followed a
similar trend to their Spanish counterparts, with negative rates between 1991 and 1993 and
positive rates as from 1994 (with the exception of 1996), and also with signs of backsliding in
1999. Unlike with the Spanish corporations, there were scarcely no effects in relative terms,
moving from 5.2% of sales in 1993 to 6.7% in 1999.
The change in income tax is highly correlated with the profits obtained by corporations,
but also affects tax regulations and the amendments to such regulations recently (annex VIII
shows the different taxes affecting Spanish and French corporations). The ratio “income tax/ net
turnover “ (see graph III.2.13) allows a comparison between the two countries and the contri-
bution to the Treasury. Throughout the series analysed, except in 1995, French corporations set
aside a bigger percentage of their total sales to income tax than Spanish companies. In both
countries, it can be seen that, during the economic recession period (1992 to 1994) and be-
cause of the high correlation with the results of the corporations, income tax remained below
1% of sales. In the last three years, this proportion rose until reaching 1.7% in France and 1.5%
in Spain in 1999.
As for ordinary rates of return (11) (both on net assets (R.1) and on equity (R.3)), graph
III.2.10 shows that French corporations behaved in a stable manner in the series analysed, while
Spanish corporations presented two differentiated periods, behaving very differently in the first
(1991 to 1993) from French corporations. French companies showed a moderate fall in the lev-
els of their rates of return, making 1993 the worst year of the series with an R.1 of 7.9% and an
R.3 of 7.5%. For their part, Spanish corporations also presented in the same year the worst
data of the whole of the series analysed, with 2.1% for R.1 and –7.3% for R.3. In the second
period (1994 to 1999), and in relation to productive activity developments, French corporations
have continued offering high rates of return and a certain stability, reaching their high in 1999
with an R.1 of about 12.0% and an R.3 of 18%. In Spanish corporations, an up trend was set in
train as from 1994, obtaining rates of return of 11.2% for R.1 and 14.9% for R.3 in 1999 (this
figure represents the best ordinary return on equity in the whole of the series analysed). On
the other hand, the cost of borrowing -or R.2- has followed a downward path caused by the fall
in interest rates in both countries; in French corporations the related figure fell from 9.7% to
4.5%, and in Spanish corporations from 11.5% to 4.0%. Along the same lines of this reduction,
Spanish industrial corporations started from 1995 to show positive leverage (12), with the max-
imum to date being reached in 1999, at 7.2%. In France, the best figure was also reached in
1999 (7.5%).
By size, the trends coincide in general with the behaviour of the total, although differenc-
es in the levels are appreciable. In French and Spanish corporations, the rate of change of GOP
in the three sizes turned around in 1994 from negative to positive values (see graphs III.2.8 of
the statistical annex). In 1996, negative rates of change again appeared in the three sizes in
(11) For the numerator of these ratios the Ordinary Net Profit is used, which is defined as Gross Operat-
ing Profit plus financial revenue, minus financial costs, minus depreciation and operating provisions.
(12) In this study leverage is defined as: return on assets (R1) less cost of borrowing (R2).
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France, while in Spain large corporations were the only group that reverted to negative values.
From that year onwards positive but increasingly moderate rates have been maintained in
France, while in Spain corporations with more than 250 employees returned to negative rates
in 1999 with a –4.2% fall. In both countries a close connection between large corporations’ re-
sults and the economic cycle can be appreciated; in periods of prosperity these companies ex-
hibited the best figures, but during recession years large corporations were also the most af-
fected. In relation to financial costs, and again in the three sizes, significant reductions were ob-
served at Spanish corporations as from 1994, but large corporations showed stronger falls in
rates between 1997 and 1999 because of their lesser need for external financing, as has been
seen in the previous analysis of the financing structure. In French corporations the reductions
are stronger for all sizes. As for funds generated, while Spanish SME continued to post positive
rates of growth as from 1994, large corporations were more unstable, reaching a negative rate
of change of close to –2% in 1999.
In the analysis of rates of return by size (see graphs III.2.11 in the statistical annex),
French small corporations were the most profitable (R.1 and R.3) between 1991 and 1995, de-
spite the cost of borrowing -or R.2- also being the highest. Since 1997, large corporations have
shown an economic rate of return similar to small companies, and only in 1999 did large cor-
porations exhibit a higher economic and financial rate of return (12.4% and 18.6%, respectively).
In Spain, medium-sized corporations (between 50 and 250 employees) were those with the
best ordinary return on net assets and equity in the series analysed. The cost of borrowing was
lower for large corporations because of their greater bargaining power. As a consequence of
this, financial leverage was positive from 1994 in medium and large corporations and from 1995
in small corporations, standing in 1999 at 9.6 points in the case of medium-sized companies,
followed by 7.1 and 1.8 in large and small corporations, respectively.
By sector of activity (graphs III.2.9 of the statistical annex) the same trends in GOP are
observed for the total of corporations, but with some qualifying differences. In both countries
behaviour was the same in terms of the sectors and of the link to the cycle. The consumer
goods industry developed in a stable way, so, non-matched with the cycle, while the rates of
change of GOP in the intermediate and capital goods industry were very erratic and influenced
by economic developments in both countries. As regards financial costs, in Spain the tendency
has been very similar across the three industries, with more drastic reductions in the capital
goods industry, while in France behaviour was more erratic and uneven, depending on the in-
dustry. The behaviour of funds generated was, like the GOP, volatile in the sectors of the two
countries. The exception was the consumer goods industry, which showed a more stable series.
This sector is precisely that with the best ordinary return data (on net assets and equity), both
in France and Spain (see graphs III.2.12 of the statistical annex), but the other two sectors, have
obtained good figures in the last three years, also combined with moderate costs of borrowing
and positive financial leverage data.
2.5. Investment
To analyse the investment, the rate of change of investment in tangible assets in the in-
dustrial corporations of both countries and the rate of change of investment in financial assets
for the industrial corporations in France (13) (see graph III.2.14) have been calculated. In
France, three different periods can be differentiated. In an initial period from 1991 to 1994,
there were falls in the rate of change of investment, of particular significance in 1993, the year
(13) In Spain, it is not possible to calculate this rate of change with the Central Balance Sheet database.
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in which capital expenditures decreased by 21.3%. The weakness of demand during these years
and the over-utilisation of productive capacity through the lengthening of the duration of use of
its productive potential (14), contributed to explaining these data. A second period can be ob-
served, from 1995 to 1996, with positive rates of change of investment, especially in the initial
years in which investment grew by 9.2%. In this case, the increase in sales was what drove en-
trepreneurs to more dynamic investment, although in 1996 the climate of uncertainty that pre-
vailed in 1996 regarding industrial products forced some industrial companies to act prudently,
this consisting of a check on the renovation of tangible assets. Finally, a third period between
1997 and 1999 should be distinguished in which rates of change of investment turned negative
again, due to companies having preferred to invest on the financial markets, acquiring shares of
other companies, as attested to by the rates of financial investment, which posted “record” fig-
ures with an increase of 45.2% and 57.7% in 1998 and 1999, respectively.
In the case of Spanish industrial corporations, the rate of change of investment is availa-
ble in the Central de Balances sample from 1993. In 1994, the worst figure in all the series ana-
lysed –a –23.5% decline- was recorded for industrial corporations as a whole. The recession
period immediately before this forced companies to be conservative with their investment de-
cisions. In 1995 and 1996, the previous tendency was reversed, with investment growth rates
reaching 38.2% and 34.2%, respectively. Against a background of recovering activity and a gradu-
al reduction in interest rates, companies were encouraged to renew their productive equip-
ment. In 1997, another fall in investment came about, again motivated by the fall in activity in
1996, but 1998 and 1999 saw a resumption of the upward trend, with growth rates of 10% and
19%, respectively. Without any doubt the investment decisions in this period were safeguarded
by the positive financial leverage figures attained in 1998 and 1999 (6.0 and 7.2, respectively, the
highest for the whole of the series analysed.
Since a study on the investment behaviour of companies would remain incomplete by
referring only to the descriptive analysis we propose in chapter IV to try in addition to isolate
the specific effect of a factor (e.g.: the cash flow effect) “other things being equal” by a dynamic
based econometric method.
(14) Article of the monthly Bulletin of the Banque de France, no. 94 (October 2001) entitled: “La durée
d’utilisation des équipements: principaux résultats 1989-2000”

CHAPTER IV
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND INVESTMENT
IN FRANCE AND SPAIN: A COMPARISON
USING FIRM LEVEL DATA (*)
(*) The authors of this chapter are Ignacio Hernando (Banco de España) and André Tiomo (Banque de
France).
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1. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the determinants of investment behaviour has long been a key research
field in macroeconomics. On one hand, investment spending by firms determines the future
productive power of the economy. On the other, fluctuations in investment spending, which is
far more volatile than consumption spending, are a driving force of the business cycle. In this
respect, the sizeable volatility of investment as an important contributor to aggregate economic
fluctuations has often been used to motivate studies on investment behaviour. In particular,
within the empirical literature on company investment, the role of financial factors in explaining
business fluctuations is a topic that has merited substantial research (1). The recent economet-
ric research on the relevance of liquidity constraints for investment spending has relied on a
growing body of theoretical work studying informational imperfections in credit markets. At the
same time, this literature has helped explain large fluctuations in investment as a response to
small shocks. In this sense, some recent models have highlighted the role of financial market
conditions in propagating relatively small shocks (2).
The increasing availability of panel data sets has been an essential element for the devel-
opment of microeconometric research on the links between real and financial decisions. In par-
ticular, panel data allow a researcher to adequately test the cross-sectional implications of the
models assuming problems of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Moreo-
ver, the use of micro data has several additional advantages: more adequate measures of the
variables of interest can be obtained; cross-sectional variation improves the precision of the es-
timates; and the potential biases arising from aggregation across firms, simultaneity or omitted
variables may be better addressed (3). Nevertheless, the use of individual data also entails some
problems: the most common of these are the implicit biases in the composition of the samples
and the usually short time dimension of the panels.
Within this strand of the literature dealing with the microeconometric modelling of in-
vestment, several recent papers have addressed the challenge of establishing cross-country
(1) See Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998) for recent surveys of this literature.
(2) See, for instance, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
(3) See Hsiao (1986) for the potential advantages of the use of panel data, Blundell, Bond and Meghir
(1996) and Bond and van Reenen (2002) for excellent surveys of the microeconometric literature on company in-
vestment, and Deutsche Bundesbank (2001) for a collection of papers on investment behaviour based on the use of
panel data sets. Finally, within the Monetary Transmission Network of the Eurosystem, several papers have focused
on the link between monetary policy and investment using microeconomic data sets: Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen
(2001), Chatelain et al. (2001), Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), Gaiotti and Generale (2001), von Kalckreuth (2001),
Lünnemann and Mathä (2001) and Valderrama (2001).
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comparisons in the analysis of the role of financial factors in company investment decisions (4).
The aim of these papers is to identify cross-country differences in the impact of financial con-
straints on investment and to link these differences to specific characteristics of the countries
(in particular, on the financial systems). But cross-country studies face the difficulty of harmonis-
ing information drawn from national sources which, in most cases, follow different accounting
rules (5).
In this chapter, we analyse corporate investment decisions in France and Spain, focusing
on the role of financial constraints in explaining investment behaviour. For this purpose, we take
advantage of very carefully harmonised data sets (see Chapter 2 for details) that allow for the
use of variables homogeneously defined in both countries. More precisely, the information used
consists of two panel data sets of industry firms selected from those reporting information to
the Central Balance Sheet Offices of the Banque de France and of the Banco de España over
the period 1991-1999. Harmonisation of databases is a key issue in cross-country comparative
studies, since the removal of differences in accounting practices is a necessary condition to in-
terpret differences in results as real differences in behaviour.
So as to test for the existence of liquidity constraints, we conduct a test of excess sensi-
tivity of investment to cash flow using a standard Euler equation model. The choice of this
methodological approach is justified by the fact that this model, by implicitly controlling for all
expectational influences, is less affected by the usual criticism to the excess sensitivity to cash
flow tests (cash flow proxies demand shocks rather than indicating the existence of liquidity
constraints). More precisely, both the theoretical model and the testing strategy used in this
chapter closely follow Bond and Meghir (1994). These authors present an empirical model of
investment based on the Euler equation of an extended version of the standard neoclassical
model of investment. This model assumes that the firm faces a hierarchy of costs for the alter-
native sources of finance and leads to different characterisations of investment behaviour for
firms pursuing different financial policies.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on investment with
financing constraints. Section 3 describes the main features of the structural model of firm in-
vestment, derived in Bond and Meghir (1994), which is based on the Euler equation methodolo-
gy. Section 4 presents the definitions and the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
analysis. Section 5 provides the main results on the testing of the empirical implications of the
hierarchy of finance model. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2. INVESTMENT,  FINANCING AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION:
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
2.1. The relevance of financial conditions for investment decisions
The perfect capital market assumption, on which empirical investment models have tradi-
tionally been based, implies that in a world without taxes it is irrelevant for firms to decide
between internal and external resources when financing their investment projects. The exist-
ence of asymmetric information between fund suppliers and borrowers implies the break-up of
(4) See Bond et al. (1997), Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay (1999), Bond, Harhoff and van Reenen (1999),
Chatelain et al. (2001), Laeven (2001) and Love (2001) for cross-country microeconometric studies on company
investment.
(5) CECB (2000) illustrates the difficulties inherent to the task of harmonising accounting data from differ-
ent countries.
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the irrelevance of the decision between internal and external financing. There are alternative
microfoundations for the link between firms’ financial structure and their investment spending.
Among the most important are distortionary taxation, transaction costs and the costs of finan-
cial distress. Building information asymmetries and/or distortionary taxation into credit-market
modelling has yielded two kinds of results, which complement each other, with a direct impact
on firms’ investment behaviour. First, the most widespread conclusion of these models is that
the cost of external funds faced by each firm depends on its financial condition. Second, some
of these models conclude that, under certain circumstances, the existence of incomplete infor-
mation on the quality of firms’ investment projects translates into lenders failing to adjust inter-
est rates to the particular situation faced by each firm while imposing, instead, quantitative con-
straints on the volume of credit granted. These results warrant the relevance of financial struc-
ture as a determinant of firm investment.
The first of the above results, namely the dependence of external financing costs on the
firm’s financial condition, is the most widespread forecast in the vast literature (6) incorporating
the existence of asymmetric information in credit market modelling. According to these works,
information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers warrant the existence of a spread or
premium between the costs of external and internal resources. This premium may be capturing,
among other factors, the monitoring costs –associated with the existence of a risk of failure–
that investment projects entail for lenders. Moreover, the above-mentioned literature suggests
that this external finance premium depends on the borrower’s financial condition. Thus, Bernan-
ke and Gertler (1989) present a model where such a premium depends conversely on the net
wealth that can be provided as collateral. The larger the collateral in relation to the volume of
credit, the fewer the incentives for the borrower to embark on risky investment projects. Alter-
natively, in other works, including Bond and Meghir (1994), and Alonso-Borrego (1994), the ex-
ternal financing cost is shown as a function of the level of indebtedness by capital unit. Besides,
Estrada and Vallés (1998) test, for Spain, a model that considers the net indebtedness level as a
determinant of the external financing cost.
As regards the second result –the existence of credit rationing – its rationale is founded
on the incapacity of credit suppliers to observe the returns on investment projects. The likeli-
hood of the credit not being repaid makes lenders’ expected returns depend not only on the
interest rate set, but also on the risk associated with the projects they finance. As noted by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), changes in the interest rate set by lenders may have a dual effect on
the average risk of their credits as a whole. First, the adverse selection effect (whereby firms
taking higher risks and considering the likelihood of repaying their credits rather low are the
most willing to accept higher interest rates) leads to a situation where lenders, if they decide
to raise the interest rate, end up financing firms that take higher risks. On the other hand,
there is an incentive effect, whereby increases in interest rates may induce firms to embark on
projects with fewer possibilities of success but more potential returns. For all these reasons, it
can be accepted that the interest rate maximising the credit suppliers’ expected returns (r*) is
such that credit demand exceeds credit supply (i.e. they set up a lower interest rate than the
rate that would balance the demand for and the supply of lending funds). In other words, if
lenders raise the rates they set above r*, the increase in induced average risk is such that their
expected returns decrease. Thus, equilibrium in the market for credit can be characterised by
rationing.
This kind of model is observationally equivalent to those suggesting that the spread be-
tween the costs of internal and external financing depends on the firm’s financial condition, in-
(6) Two frequently mentioned examples of such literature include Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).
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sofar as they forecast that funds availability for each company will depend on observable char-
acteristics reflecting such condition. Therefore, in a group of firms having investment projects
with similar expected returns, constraints will apply to those with weaker financial conditions
(according to certain observable characteristics). Thus, Gertler (1988), and Calomiris and Hub-
bard (1990) note that access to external financing will depend on agents’ net wealth.
In sum, models incorporating the existence of asymmetric information between fund
suppliers and borrowers (or alternatively, the existence of distortionary taxes on the different
sources of funds) reveal the influence of agents’ financial condition on the terms of access to
external financing (cost and availability). Consequently, firms’ investment behaviour will be sub-
ject to their financial conditions. In particular, when information asymmetries exist, the neoclas-
sical investment model provides a partial view of agents’ behaviour, since the investment level
will depend not only on the capital path that the firm wants, but also on its financing possibili-
ties (7). Thus, this theoretical approach allows for the introduction of financial variables into the
investment equations. The two variables most frequently used in empirical studies are the level
of indebtedness and, above all, internal resource generation capacity. Indebtedness has been
used as an indicator of the firm’s financial soundness which, as mentioned above, can condition
the cost of its external resources or access thereto. Along these lines, the seminal work of
Bond and Meghir (1994) considers the cost of external resources as an increasing function of
the debt ratio. However, empirical studies have not always confirmed this relationship. Thus,
Mato (1989), for instance, finds a negative influence of the indebtedness ratio on the cost of
external resources and mentions, among other possible reasons, that this ratio is not exoge-
nous but is, in turn, a decreasing function of their cost.
2.2. Sensitivity of investment to the internal generation of resources
Undoubtedly, the financial variable most used in investment equations based on the exist-
ence of asymmetric information has been cash flow, i.e. self-financing capacity. This variable, inso-
far as it reflects the funds available to the firm, is expected to be positively correlated to the
investment level. Besides, it is expected that this positive effect on investment of variables meas-
uring the capacity to generate own resources will reveal itself more clearly in those firms
where asymmetric information problems are more pronounced. Moreover, this positive corre-
lation is reinforced, as Fazzari and Athey (1987) show, due to the self-financing capacity acting as
an indicator of the financial soundness of the firm. Therefore, lenders use it to discriminate be-
tween credit borrowers, since they are not able to see accurately the quality of investment
projects owing to the existence of asymmetric information.
This basic hypothesis about the sensitivity of investment to variables which proxy the ca-
pacity to generate resources internally being higher for those firms subject to credit constraints
has been recently tested in a wide range of works. The strategy followed has been to estimate
investment equations for different sub-samples of firms, sorted according to a priori criteria
that seek to identify financially constrained firms (or with relevant asymmetric information
problems). In this vast literature, the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988) should be mentioned.
It identifies as potentially constrained firms those not paying dividends in recent years. This type
of approach has been used with alternative criteria by other authors: links to industrial group-
ing (Hoshi et al., 1989), age and size (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, and Estrada and Vallés,
(7) Building information asymmetries into a perfect competition framework means that firms face an inter-
temporal problem of profit maximisation, subject in each period not only to technology availability, but also to a
maximum debt level or to a function of the cost of external resources, increasing in some indicators of their sound-
ness.
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1998), firms’ credit rating (Whited, 1992) and dispersion in the firm’s share ownership (Schaller,
1993). In general, the division criterion par excellence in this literature is size, since there are
several reasons suggesting that the consequences of asymmetric information problems are
more noticeable in the case of small firms. Among these reasons, Caminal (1995) highlights that
there are economies of scale in supervision and control tasks, and therefore it is more costly
for borrowers to monitor small firms, and for firms to provide information to their lenders.
Nevertheless, as argued in Chatelain et al. (2001), size might not be a sufficient or even correct
indicator of informational asymmetries for some countries.
In the recent literature, the hypothesis of the sensitivity of investment to the internal
generation of resources has been tested using a wide range of econometric models of invest-
ment: from reduced-form models to the estimation of Euler equations. In all cases, the models
are augmented with a variable measuring the self-financing capacity. The use of a reduced-form
investment equation augmented with cash flow presents a basic limitation: it does not allow the
sensitivity of investment to the internal generation of resources to be unequivocally associated
with the prevalence of finance constraints or, more generally, with the existence of asymmetric
information between borrowers and lenders. Under this approach the positive and significant
coefficient of variables that approximate the self-financing capacity in investment equations may
be explained by alternative hypothesis. Specifically, the most usual critique of these approaches
is that the cash flow variable may, instead of giving evidence on liquidity constraints, be approxi-
mating future investment opportunities. Moreover, Giner and Salas (1997) show that the result
of the sensitivity of investment to financial variables may be due not only to the existence of
finance constraints but also to the imperfections in the control mechanism on capital which
make possible the channelling of monetary flows towards investment projects that reduce the
value of total assets. These authors indicate that when there are information asymmetries be-
tween shareholders and managers and the latter pursue a growth target, the firm will invest to
excess. Moreover, they point out that the investment rate of the firm that invest to excess
shows a greater sensitivity to the generation of resources than that of the firm which does not
over-invest, for three reasons. First, because the external capital market will not provide mone-
tary resources for the financing of projects that reduce the firm’s market value. Second, firms’
managers do not want to turn to debt financing because it would increase the probability of
failure. Third, because the firm is less profitable, the internal generation of funds will also be
lower and, thus, the finance constraint will be present in a greater number of cases.
In the context of the excess sensitivity tests, the structural investment models, like the Q
model or the Euler equation, display an undeniable advantage with respect to reduced-form in-
vestment equations. Structural models explicitly control for expectational influences on the in-
vestment decision. That implies that if the model turns out to be mis-specified because a finan-
cial variable is significant, this should not be attributed to an expectational influence.
Nevertheless, the use of structural models for testing for the presence of financial con-
straints can be criticised. On one hand, the existence of serious measurement problems of
some variables included in the structural models cast some doubt on the validity of the empiri-
cal implementation of these models. On the other, it has been claimed that adding financial vari-
ables to the structural models is a joint test of all the assumptions of the model and not only of
the assumption of no financial constraints. Consequently, results from the empirical literature
testing the excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow and other financial variables are con-
sistent with the existence of significant financial constraints, but these tests could also be de-
tecting other sources of mis-specification in the investment models used.
Some recent papers have tried to discriminate between alternative hypotheses that ex-
plain the significance in investment equations of the coefficient of variables measuring self-fi-
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nancing capacity. First, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) propose the additional inclusion of working
capital (8), along with the above-mentioned variables, in a Q-model of investment. The rationale
behind this proposal is as follows: if cash flow is measuring future investment opportunities,
working capital – also positively correlated to sales and profits – should have a positive coeffi-
cient in the investment equation; conversely, if cash flow is evidencing finance constraints, work-
ing capital – which would be entering into competition with investment for a limited volume of
resources – should have a negative coefficient in the investment equation. Second, Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995) use a structural model to overcome the identification problem associated
with distinguishing the role of cash flow as a proxy for future investment opportunities and as a
means of alleviating credit constraints. The distinctive feature of their approach is the inclusion,
among the determinants of investment, of a predictor of future investment opportunities –
called Fundamental-Q – built from a set of relevant variables, including cash flow. Gilchrist and
Himmelberg estimate, for different sub-samples, a specification that includes simultaneously the
Fundamental-Q variable and cash flow, obtaining as a result that the latter only has an additional
explanatory power for the sub-sample of firms identified a priori as financially constrained.
Third, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) construct and estimate a structural model which incor-
porates financial frictions and which is used to identify the “fundamental” versus the “financial”
determinants of investment. They find that investment is responsive to both fundamental and
financial factors and that small firms and firms without bond ratings show the strongest re-
sponse to financial factors (9).
Overall, although the interpretation of the findings of the literature linking financial varia-
bles and investment is controversial, the empirical evidence available tends to favour the hy-
pothesis of the existence of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (10).
Firms with relevant asymmetric information problems will face high external financing costs or
constraints on the amount of credit demanded.
3. THE MODEL OF INVESTMENT
In this section we first present the main features of the theoretical model of investment
derived in Bond and Meghir (1994) and we then describe their testing strategy to study the
validity of the empirical implications of the model. The Bond and Meghir (1994) model (BM
model in what follows) is based on the hierarchy of finance approach to corporate finance and
provides a theoretical basis to justify the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal
funds usually found in the empirical literature. Basically, the BM model assumes a hierarchy of
cost for the alternative sources of financing (i.e, internal funds have a lower cost than external
funds) and implies a different characterisation of investment for firms facing different financial
situations. More precisely, from the first-order conditions of the optimisation process of a
standard neoclassical model of investment with quadratic costs of adjustment, they derive a Eul-
(8) They define working capital as liquid assets and stock less liquid assets and short-term debt.
(9) Laeven (2001) and Love (2001) estimate structural models based on the Euler equation for investment
using firm-level data from large sets of countries, following the approach in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998).
(10) See Kaplan and Zingales (1995) for an exception to this result. These authors focus on the sample of
firms that Fazzari et al. (1988) consider as financially constrained and, using off-balance-sheet information, analyse
whether firms are not effectively constrained. Paradoxically, they found that firms effectively constrained are few
and, moreover, for these firms, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is lower. Kaplan and Zingales point out
three possible explanations to these results: first, firms effectively constrained may be conditioned by creditors to
reducing debt; second, the consideration of an intertemporal constraints framework may vary the allocation of re-
sources generated between saving and investment; and, third, the existence of adjustment costs in the investment
planned may condition the investment response to shocks on generated resources.
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er equation that relates investment rates in successive periods. They show that for the firms
which are liquidity-constrained, the standard Euler equation is not a valid model to describe
investment behaviour. In the model, a firm is liquidity-constrained if it generates insufficient net
revenue to finance all the investment it would be optimal at the cost of retained earnings and it
does not find optimal to issue new shares. However, for those firms that are not liquidity-con-
strained, investment behaviour is described by the standard Euler equation, even if those firms
face a hierarchy of financial costs.
To test the empirical implications of their hierarchy of finance model, Bond and Meghir
follow a threefold testing strategy. First, they estimate the standard Euler equation for the
whole sample of firms. A rejection of the model is expected due to the presence of liquidity-
constrained firms in the sample that would lead to an excess sensitivity of investment to meas-
ures of internal finance. Second, they estimate the basic Euler equation augmented with divi-
dends or new share issues. Again, the presence of liquidity-constrained firms would justify the
significance of these variables in the investment equation. Third, they estimate the Euler equa-
tion model allowing all coefficients to vary depending on their allocation to the different finan-
cial regimes.
3.1. The theoretical model
As earlier mentioned, in this section we present the main features of the hierarchy of
finance model derived in Bond and Meghir (1994).
The firm’s managers are assumed to maximise the present value of net distributions to
shareholders, subject to the flow of funds identity, to the equation of motion of the stock of
capital and to non-negativity constraints on dividend payments and new share issues. Thus, the
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t r1β  is the s-period discount factor, which discounts period t + s to t, and r
t
 is
the firm’s nominal required rate of return between periods, Dit are dividends, γ is the tax dis-
crimination parameter that determines the relative tax benefit of dividends against capital gains,
f is a transaction charge that has to be paid per unit of new share issues, F(.) is the firm’s pro-
duction function gross of adjustment costs, G(.) is a convex adjustment cost function, Lit is the




 is the stock of physical capital, w
it
 is the price of labour, B
it
 is the firm’s total
debt, it is the interest payable on debt, Nit is the value of new shares issued, p
I
it is the price of
investment goods and pit is the price of output.
The main elements of the BM model may be summarised as follows:
• Two sources of discrimination between retained earnings and new share issues are in-
troduced: a differential personal taxation on both sources of funds and transactions
costs associated with new share issues. Thus, the cost of internal finance is lower than
the cost of new share issues.
• The introduction of debt displays three main features: a) there is a probability of bank-
ruptcy; b) both this probability of bankruptcy and the interest rate on debt depend
positively on the amount borrowed; and c) there is a tax advantage to borrowing. Thus,
depending on the amount borrowed, the cost of debt may be: 1) lower than the cost of
internal finance; 2) between the cost of internal finance and the cost of new shares; and
3) higher than the cost of issuing new shares.





=0), firms generate enough cash flow to finance investment and pay
dividends. They use debt to finance investment up to the point where the cost of bor-
rowing equals the cost of internal funds. In Regime 2 (Dt=0, Nt=0), firms exhaust all
their net revenue to finance investment and issuing shares is too costly for them. They
can finance a higher level of investment only by borrowing. In regime 3 (Dt=0, Nt>0),
firms exhaust their net revenue to finance investment but they have sufficiently attrac-
tive investment opportunities to finance part of their investment by issuing new
shares (11).
In this set-up, firms in Regime 2 are liquidity-constrained in the sense that a windfall in-
crease in revenue would lead to a higher level of investment. However, firms in Regimes 1 or 3
would not change their optimal levels of investment when receiving extra revenue. In the first
case, they would pay higher dividends. In the second case, they would reduce the volume of
share issues and, thus, they would face a lower cost of financing but they would not change the
level of investment.
3.2. The empirical model and the testing strategy
Bond and Meghir show that for firms in Regimes 1 and 3 a standard Euler equation mod-
el (without financial regimes) should describe their investment behaviour. To implement the
above-mentioned empirical strategy, an empirical investment specification is needed. For this
purpose, some additional assumptions are introduced:
• F(.) is constant returns to scale, so that the marginal product of capital can be substi-
tuted without assuming a parametric form for the production function. We assume that
the required time to build and install one unit of capital is one period.
• Imperfect competition in the product market is allowed for.
(11) According to the BM model, firms should not simultaneously issue new shares and pay positive divi-
dends. Bond and Meghir (1994) provide several explanations to justify this type of behaviour: cross-sectional hetero-
geneity of γ, transaction costs of trading shares and signaling role for dividends.
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where the parameter b reflects the importance of adjustment costs (b > 0).
• The assumption of rational expectations implies that Et (Xit) = Xit + εit, where εit is a
forecast error orthogonal to information available in period t.

































































gross operating profit. The fixed firm-specific effect ηi can be interpreted as accounting for firms
characteristics, as well as the time-invariant components of differences in, e.g., product demand,
capital intensity, and growth opportunities, whereas the time-specific effect d
t+1
 can be inter-
preted as capturing aggregate business cycles. Under the null of no financial constraints, it can
be shown that β1≥1, β2≤-1, β3>0 (if imperfect competition), β4<0 and β5<0. Under the alterna-
tive of liquidity constraints, equation [3.6] is mis-specified because investment is related to fi-
nancial conditions. More precisely, in the presence of liquidity constraints, investment spending
should be positively influenced by revenue or cash flow. Thus, the expected negative sign for β4
should not be obtained under liquidity constraints. This fact is the basic idea behind the testing
strategy of the BM model. As has already been mentioned, the strategy is threefold and may be
summarised as follows.
1. Estimation of the standard Euler equation for the whole sample of firms. A rejection
of the model is expected due to the presence of liquidity-constrained firms in the
sample that would lead to an excess sensitivity of investment to measures of internal
finance. The usual criticism of the excess sensitivity tests (i.e. cash flow proxies future
investment opportunities) is less relevant for the Euler equation approach since all
relevant expectational influences should be captured by the one-step-ahead invest-
ment forecast.
2. Estimation of the basic Euler equation augmented with dividends or new share is-
sues. Under the null of no liquidity constraints, the coefficient of the added variables
should not be significant. Again, the presence of liquidity-constrained firms would jus-
tify the rejection of the null.
3. Estimation of the Euler equation model allowing all coefficients to vary depending on
their allocation to the different financial regimes. For those firms that are not a priori
liquidity-constrained, the coefficients should be in accordance with the predictions of
the standard Euler equations.
To control for unobserved individual effects, endogeneity of explanatory variables and
the introduction of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors, we estimate model
[3.6] by transforming all variables in the model using the orthogonal deviations transformation
(see Arellano and Bover, 1995) and using a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) (see Arel-
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lano and Bond, 1991). If the error term e
it
 is serially uncorrelated, lagged values of the right-
hand variables dated t-2 and earlier would be valid instruments. However, if εit is MA(1), instru-
ments dated t-2 are no longer valid.
4. THE SAMPLES: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The empirical analysis is conducted on two panel data sets constructed from the harmo-
nised balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of French and Spanish industrial firms. The
French sample comprises 45,111 observations (corresponding to 6,965 firms) obtained from a
database compiled by the Banque de France. The Spanish sample includes 13,631 observations
(corresponding to 2,208 firms) obtained from a database compiled by the Banco de España.
Note that in the Spanish case, given the variables required for the analysis of this chapter, those
firms forming part of the database of annual accounts filed with the Mercantile Registries
(CBBE/RM or CBB) are excluded from the sample. In both countries, the period considered is
1991-1999.
Table IV.1 displays the size composition in both samples. In general, taking the whole
population of enterprises in both countries as a benchmark, large firms are over-represented
in our samples. Nevertheless, although skewed towards larger firms, these samples may be
considered as representative of the industry sector of each economy. In fact, they contain high-
er shares of small and unlisted companies than the standard databases used in the empirical
literature. The median number of employees is 48 in France and 49 in Spain, and in both cases
the fraction of listed companies is below 3%. Therefore, our samples seem to be well suited for
addressing an empirical investigation of the relevance of financial frictions on investment deci-
sions, since they contain a significant share of firms that are potential candidates to be liquidity-
constrained.
The definitions and acronyms for the variables used in our analysis are presented in table
IV.2. Table IV.3 reports the descriptive statistics for these variables. Overall, although samples
were cleaned of outliers by removing extreme percentiles from the variables used in the re-
gression, there is still a wide dispersion in most of the variables. It is worth noting that the
Spanish sample, despite being slightly more homogeneous in terms of size, displays a higher dis-
persion in some variables. Thus, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean value is higher
in the Spanish sample in almost all the variables. The exceptions are the number of employees,
the external finance cost and the ratio of the gross operating profit to the stock of capital. The
dispersion is significantly larger in the return on assets and in the cash stock.
Table IV.4 displays the median values for the main variables for the sub-samples of firms
defined according to the splitting criteria that is used in the following section: payment of divi-
dends in two consecutive periods. This descriptive evidence seems to suggest that those firms
that do not pay dividends are potentially liquidity-constrained. First, this table is consistent with
the existence of an external finance premium that reflects the monitoring costs that investment
projects entail for lenders. The more pronounced the asymmetric information problems be-
tween a firm and their fund suppliers are, the larger this external finance premium should be. In
our case, we have found that, in both countries, the median cost of debt is significantly higher
for firms that do not pay positive dividends. In the French case, the difference in the median
cost of debt between those firms that do not and those that do pay positive dividends is 0.5
p.p., whereas in the Spanish sample this difference is almost 2 p.p. Second, in both countries
firms that do not pay positive dividends display a higher level of indebtedness. Again, this differ-
ence is larger in the Spanish sample. Third, in both countries firms that pay positive dividends
have, in relative terms to their capital stock, a higher level of liquid assets and generate, again in
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relative terms to their capital stock, higher flows of internal funds (considering both gross oper-
ating profits or the cash-flow variable). Fourth, in both countries the median size of the firms
paying positive dividends is larger. Finally, the ratio of investment to the stock of capital is again
higher in both countries for firms paying positive dividends.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As mentioned in section 3, Bond and Meghir (1994) present a direct test of the empirical
implications of the hierarchy of finance model. Their model predicts that the same firm may be
financially constrained in some periods but not in others; and that the firm’s current dividend
and new share issuing behaviour should signal which financial regime the firm is currently in.
Thus, they claim that firms in the financially-constrained regime should be paying zero dividends
and issuing no new shares in two consecutive periods, while firms in the unconstrained regimes
should either be paying positive dividends or issuing new shares. In order to implement their
testing strategy, we simplify the taxonomy of final regimes. We distinguish only two financial re-
gimes (12). Firms paying zero dividends in two consecutive periods are in the constrained re-
TABLE IV.1
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS AND OBSERVATIONS BY MEAN EMPLOYMENT
n < 20 20<n≤100 100<n≤250 250<n<500 n>500 Total
No. of firms 1,083     3,894     1,141     450     397     6,965     
15.5%    55.9%    16.4%    6.5%    5.7%    100.0%    
No. of obs. 6,611     25,319     7,581     2,984     2,616     45,111     
14.7%    56.1%    16.8%    6.6%    5.8%    100.0%    
n < 20 20<n≤100 100< n≤250 250<n<500 n>500 Total
No. of firms 368     1,180     353     168     139     2,208     
16.7%    53.4%    16.0%    7.6%    6.3%    100.0%    
No. of obs. 2,190     7,260     2,259     1,078     844     13,631     
16.1%    53.3%    16.6%    7.9%    6.2%    100.0%    
Listed Total Listed Total
No. of firms 117     6,965     64     2,208     
1.7%    100.0%    2.9%    100.0%    
No. of obs. 773     45,111     359     13,631     
1.7%    100.0%    2.6%    100.0%    
France
Spain
Percentage of Listed Companies (Firms and Observations)
France Spain
(12) In fact, Bond and Meghir (1994) also use this simplification since the number of observations in their
sample in Regime 3 is very low.
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gime; otherwise firms are classified as being in the unconstrained regime. We obviate the con-
sideration of new shares issues, the main reason being that in both samples the proportion of
firms issuing new shares is very small.
Table IV.5 displays the estimates for the basic Euler equations using the complete sample
in both countries. As already mentioned in section 3, we use GMM, include a complete set of
time dummies and, in order to solve the estimation problem stemming from the potential pres-
ence of unobserved individual effects, estimate the model using the orthogonal deviations
transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). All the reported GMM estimates corre-
spond to one-step estimates with asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We
present two columns for each country. In the first (column (1) for France and column (3) for
Spain), the instrument set includes all the regressors dated from t-2 to t-4. In the second (col-
umn (2) for France and column (4) for Spain), we assume an MA (1) error and exclude instru-
ments dated t-2. In both countries, there are important differences between the estimates in
both columns. This is especially the case for the coefficients of the lagged investment terms
(which, as Bond and Meghir argue, are more likely to be biased if the error term is serially cor-
related). Comparing both sets of estimates, we find that the exclusion of the most recent lags
(those dated t-2) reduces the precision of the estimates. Nevertheless, in spite of this fact, given
the tests of the validity of the instruments (13) and since the coefficients on the lagged invest-
ment terms, although correctly signed, are much smaller in absolute values than the predictions
of the theoretical model in the absence of financial constraints, we rule out instruments dated
t-2 and, in what follows, focus on the second set of results.
Focusing on the results in columns (2) and (4), we find that the coefficients of the
lagged investment terms, although larger than in the estimates with instruments dated t-2,
are still below the predictions of the theoretical model (14). The coefficient of production
is positive, indicating the existence of imperfect competition. The debt coefficient, although
correctly signed, is far from being significant. Nevertheless, the major departure from the
predictions of the theoretical model under the null of absence of financial frictions is the
TABLE IV.2
VARIABLE ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS
Description of Variable
Gross Investment / Capital = I(t) / K(t-1)
Sales / Capital = S(t) / K(t-1)
Production / Capital = Y(t) / K(t-1)
Cash Flow / Capital = CF(t) / K(t-1)
Cash Stock / Capital = CS(t) / K(t-1)
Gross Operating Profit / Capital = GP(t) / K(t-1)
Total Debt / Capital = B(t) / K(t-1)
Number of Employees
Ordinary Return on Net Assets (R1)












(13) In the French case, both the Sargan test in column (1) and the Sargan difference test support the re-
jection of the t-2 instruments. In the Spanish case, instruments dated t-2 cannot be rejected. Nevertheless, for the
sake of comparability with the French results and given that the point estimates – reported in column (4) – for the
lagged investment terms are closer to their theoretical values we also focus, for the Spanish sample, on results ex-
cluding instruments dated t-2. The pattern of results does not substantially differ when including them.
(14) Under the null of no financial constraints, the theoretical model predicts β1≥1 and β2≤-1.
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positive coefficient of the gross operating profit term (15). The expected sign for this coef-
ficient is a negative one because the gross operating profit is proxying the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital. However, if the null hypothesis is incorrect, the availability of internal
funds would positively affect the level of investment. Thus, a positive sign for the coefficient




Variable Mean St. dev.
Min 25% 50% 75% Max
I/K 0.139   0.144   0.002   0.048   0.094   0.174   1.026   
S/K 4.123   3.771   0.717   2.001   3.001   4.779   79.800   
Y/K 3.718   3.488   -0.737   1.818   2.727   4.287   79.800   
CF/K 0.332   0.312   -0.652   0.161   0.262   0.411   4.219   
CS/K 0.284   0.634   0.000   0.017   0.086   0.302   26.500   
GP/K 0.196   0.302   -2.637   0.047   0.122   0.256   5.920   
B/K 0.592   0.651   0.013   0.219   0.402   0.709   9.780   
YP 169   933   1   27   48   120   63,258   
ROA 0.116   0.422   -33.090   0.045   0.105   0.179   69.200   
EFC 0.084   0.527   0.000   0.046   0.064   0.089   73.000   
SPAIN
Variable Mean St. dev.
Min 25% 50% 75% Max
I/K 0.148   0.184   -0.156   0.035   0.092   0.193   1.285   
S/K 4.477   4.673   0.370   1.808   3.032   5.362   64.359   
Y/K 4.538   4.676   0.348   1.841   3.094   5.362   64.359   
CF/K 0.339   0.444   -1.081   0.114   0.228   0.424   4.154   
CS/K 0.370   0.895   -0.071   0.024   0.103   0.332   19.870   
GP/K 0.409   0.441   -1.142   0.169   0.296   0.504   4.737   
B/K 0.711   0.926   0.000   0.140   0.447   0.918   9.858   
YP 199   769   1   26   49   131   15,665   
ROA 0.130   0.782   -29.727   0.056   0.111   0.188   79.500   
EFC 0.178   0.610   0.000   0.064   0.105   0.161   40.000   
Percentiles
Percentiles
(15) This result is also obtained when using cash flow instead of gross operating profit to estimate the
standard Euler equation model.
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all, the results in table IV.5 provide evidence suggesting that the Euler equation model
without financial regimes is mis-specified.
The second step in the BM testing strategy is to estimate the standard Euler equation
augmented with the dividends to capital ratio. Under the null of no financial regimes this varia-
ble should not display any significant information content for the investment decision. As table
IV.6 shows the coefficient of the dividends to capital ratio is significant (although it is only mar-
ginally significant in the Spanish sample), while the remaining coefficients of the model do not
significantly differ from those reported in columns (2) and (4) of table IV.5. Thus, this table pro-
vides some additional evidence (albeit somewhat weak) favourable to the rejection of the basic
Euler equation model without financial regimes.
Finally, under the hypothesis of existence of financial regimes we should expect non-line-
ar behaviour of investment in the sense that estimated coefficients in accordance with the pre-
dictions of the standard Euler equation model without financial regimes should be found only
for those firms that are not liquidity-constrained. However, for liquidity-constrained firms esti-
mates should reflect some degree of excess sensitivity of investment to financial variables. Thus,
in the third step of their testing strategy, BM define a dummy variable S
it
 that takes the value 1
when the firm is liquidity-constrained and interact this variable with all the regressors. The co-
efficients for the unconstrained sample are those corresponding to the non-interacted terms.
Analogously, for the constrained sample the parameters are the results of the sum of the non-
interacted terms with the corresponding interaction terms.
To implement this test, in this chapter we define a dummy variable Sit that is zero when




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (MEDIAN BY SUB-SAMPLES)
Number of observations 30,532      14,579      10,771      2,860      
S/K 2.938       3.138       3.016       3.100       
Y/K 2.653       2.874       3.076       3.137       
CF/K 0.222       0.351       0.194       0.377       
CS/K 0.058       0.192       0.090       0.177       
GP/K 0.134       0.216       0.273       0.396       
B/K 0.444       0.323       0.515       0.223       
YP 46      56      44      86      
ROA 0.081       0.154       0.099       0.168       
EFC 0.066       0.061       0.108       0.090       
(16) To allow for a signaling role for dividends, Bond and Meghir (1994) use two alternative criteria to
classify a firm as being constrained: first, if current dividends are low relative to the firm’s average payout; and sec-
ond, if the firm cuts dividends.
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endogenous and, consequently, we instrument it. Finally, we only add the interaction of this vari-
able with the gross operating profit to capital, since this is the most direct test for the absence
of financial constraints. Moreover, the introduction of the complete set of interaction terms
substantially reduces the precision of the estimates. The results are reported in table IV.7. When
a different coefficient across observations in the two sub-samples is allowed for, we find that, in
the Spanish sample, the point estimate for gross operating profit is zero for the unconstrained
sub-sample and positive and significant for the constrained observations. In the French sample,
the point estimate for gross operating profit is still positive and significant (although its size is
smaller than in the model without the interaction term) for the unconstrained sub-sample,
whereas the point estimate for the interaction term is also positive and significant suggesting
that, as expected, the investment behaviour of firms in the constrained regime display a higher
sensitivity to the internal generation of resources. Therefore, our results suggest that the rejec-
tion of a standard Euler equation model of investment without financial regimes comes from
the presence in both samples of a sub-set of companies that are liquidity-constrained, in the
sense that their investment is positively linked to the availability of internal finance.
The main findings of the study broadly reproduce those obtained by Bond and Meghir
(1994) using a sample of quoted U.K. manufacturing firms over the period 1974-1986. Moreo-
ver, our results are consistent with those found in Alonso-Borrego (1994). He estimates a simi-
TABLE IV.5
THE BASIC EULER EQUATION MODEL
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
0.132        0.529        0.211        0.456        
(0.020)       (0.211)       (0.042)       (0.236)       
-0.170        -0.777        -0.190        -0.444        
(0.025)       (0.346)       (0.044)       (0.325)       
0.079        0.093        0.015        0.042        
(0.012)       (0.031)       (0.019)       (0.044)       
0.014        0.008        0.014        0.018        
(0.002)       (0.004)       (0.004)       (0.007)       
-0.004       -0.001       -0.002       -0.003       
(0.001)      (0.003)      (0.001)      (0.003)      
m1 -32.96         -6.17         -16.54         -4.37         
m2 -0.28         -0.33         0.18         -0.44         
Sargan 92.80         39.30         74.60         35.50         
(p-value) (0.04)        (0.50)        (0.33)        (0.67)        
Difference-Sargan
(p-value)







   Notes: The estimation method is orthogonal deviations GMM. Time dummies are included. mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in 
first differences (asymptotically, this test follows a standard normal distribution). Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions (asymptotically X 2, 
degrees of freedom). Difference-Sargan is a test of the validity of the additional instruments (asymptotically X2, degrees of freedom). See Table IV.2. 
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lar model for a sample of Spanish firms over the period 1987-1990. The standard Euler equa-
tion model is rejected for the sample containing both dividend-paying observations and non-
dividend-paying ones. Furthermore, when the coefficients are allowed to vary depending on the
dividend policy, a higher degree of excess sensitivity to cash flow is found for those firms paying
zero dividends. In addition, using a two-stage procedure to correct the potential sample selec-
tion bias, he estimates the standard Euler equation model for the sub-sample of firms paying
positive dividends and confirms that the model is not rejected for that sub-sample.
Finally, it is worth noting that Chatelain et al. (2001), estimating a neoclassical model of
investment for two samples of firms – French and Spanish – very similar to the ones used in
this study, rejects that small firms display a higher degree of excess sensitivity of investment to
cash flow relative to large firms. Our results seem to confirm, as was suggested in that paper,
that size might not be a sufficient indicator, for some countries, of informational asymmetries.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has analysed the role of financial constraints in explaining investment behav-
iour using two unbalanced samples of French and Spanish industry firms over the period 1991-
1999. For this purpose, this chapter has closely followed the methodological approach imple-
TABLE IV.6
TESTS FOR THE ABSENCE OF FINANCIAL EFFECTS
(i) (ii)
0.517                    0.491                    
(0.211)                   (0.221)                   
-0.717                    -0.558                    
(0.344)                   (0.267)                   
0.109                    0.070                    
(0.032)                   (0.045)                   
0.008                    0.016                    
(0.004)                   (0.007)                   
-0.002                    -0.003                    
(0.003)                   (0.003)                   
-0.232                    -0.305                    
(0.101)                   (0.170)                   
m1 -6.59                      -5.20                      
m2 -0.11                      0.10                      
Sargan 45.80                      43.10                      
(p-value) (0.56)                     (0.67)                     
Instruments  t-3, t-4  t-3, t-4
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mented by Bond and Meghir (1994). These authors present an extended version of the stand-
ard Euler equation model of investment. This extended model assumes that the firm faces a
hierarchy of costs for the alternative sources of finance and leads to different characterisations
of investment behaviour for firms pursuing different financial policies.
Overall, our results suggest that there are significant differences in investment behaviour
which are closely linked to the financial situation of firms. More precisely, our results corrobo-
rate the empirical finding that investment displays excess sensitivity to measures of internal fi-
nance for a sub-set of firms; in particular, the evidence found is consistent with the investment
expenditure of firms paying zero dividends being constrained by the availability of internally
generated funds.
Although our results display some slight departures from the theoretical predictions of
the extended model, they provide an empirical basis for the excess sensitivity of investment to
financial variables. Therefore, the evidence presented contributes to explaining the rejection of
the standard Euler equation model of investment. This model is rejected on several grounds.
First, in the estimates of the standard Euler equation for the whole sample of firms, a positive
and significant coefficient is found for the internal funds variable that can be explained by the
presence of liquidity-constrained firms in the sample that would lead to an excess sensitivity of
TABLE IV.7
TEST FOR THE ABSENCE OF FINANCIAL REGIMES
(i) (ii)
0.490                    0.449                    
(0.199)                   (0.223)                   
-0.681                    -0.413                    
(0.313)                   (0.285)                   
0.069                    -0.001                    
(0.031)                   (0.044)                   
0.008                    0.017                    
(0.004)                   (0.007)                   
-0.002                    -0.004                    
(0.003)                   (0.003)                   
0.041                    0.106                    
(0.024)                   (0.044)                   
m1 -6.71                      -5.21                      
m2 -0.06                      0.60                      
Sargan 40.80                      43.20                      
(p-value) (0.76)                     (0.67)                     
Proportion of observations
     with Sit =0 0.32                      0.21                      
Instruments  t-3, t-4  t-3, t-4
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investment to measures of internal finance. Second, in the estimation of the basic Euler equa-
tion augmented with dividends, this variable turns out to be significant. We argue again that the
presence of liquidity-constrained firms in the sample justifies this result. Finally, in the estimation
of the Euler equation model allowing all coefficients to vary depending on their allocation to
the different financial regimes, a higher excess sensitivity to internal funds is found for the a
priori liquidity-constrained firms. Nevertheless, the negative and significant coefficient for the
internal funds variable for those firms that are not a priori liquidity-constrained is not found. A
possible explanation for the latter result, as argued by Bond and Meghir (1994), is that the sam-
ple selection criteria used to identify the existence of liquidity constraints might be somewhat
weak in the sense that firms could have incentives to pay positive dividends. Thus, firms could
decide to pay positive dividends even if liquidity-constrained.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the patterns of results in both countries do not seem
to display significant differences (although a formal statistical test of the differences has not
been conducted since the databases have not been pooled). What is more telling, our results
broadly reproduce those obtained by Bond and Meghir (1994) for a very different sample,
namely quoted U.K. manufacturing firms over the period 1974-1986. Thus, these results confirm
that the analysis of the dividend policy of the firms is useful for identifying the potential pres-
ence of financial constraints on investment spending.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this annex there is an analysis of the evolution of the Spanish and French economies
from a long run perspective. The analysis will be centred around the variable which best summa-
rizes a country growth process; the GDP per person. It has been focused in the period 1960-
2000. Along the last forty years there have been deep changes in both economies, but the change
has been the more dramatic in Spain, which has been immersed in a catching up process for most
of the period. Along this annex there will be a comparison of the performance of the Spanish and
French economies in the framework of the European economy, i.e. whenever the data are availa-
ble, the relevant variables for both Spain and France and the aggregate of the 12 countries, which
constituted the Euro area in 1999 are offered. Section 2 presents the comparative evolution of the
two economies as shown by the level of GDP per person and outlines how the real convergence
of the Spanish economy towards the European levels has proceeded, distinguishing the periods of
faster convergence and others in which convergence has been slow or lacking. In section 3 it fo-
cuses on the main determinants of the relative performance of the two economies; labour pro-
ductivity and the employment/population ratio. In section 4 it goes a bit deeper in the analysis of
the determinants of productivity. The process of capitalization, and the technical progress (proxied
by Total factor productivity) are the two variables whose evolution is shown here. Finally, in sec-
tion 5 it looks at the forces, which have driven the observed evolution of total factor productivity:
investment rate (1), human capital, infrastructures, R & D expenditure etc.
2. EVOLUTION OF GDP PER PERSON
In graph 1.1, the evolution of GDP per person in France and Spain and the aggregate of
12 countries, which today constitute the euro area (2) is presented. The GDP per person
growth rate has been, on average, higher in Spain than both in France and the euro area (2.3%
in Spain, 2.0% in the euro area and 1.9% in France). This evolution reflects the catching-up proc-
ess of the Spanish economy, which started from a very backward relative position at the begin-
ning of the seventies (3). In fact, in 1970 the GDP per person was in Spain 73% of the Euro Area
(1) Although the most obvious effect of increases in the Investment rate is to increase the level of capitali-
zation of the economy, it must be noted that the capitalization process (i.e. the increase in the K/L ratio) has multi-
ple externalities which are associated to the technological progress
(2) No data for the Euro Area or any other European aggregate are available in ADB database for the sixties.
(3) Note the sixties was even a faster growth period in Spain, in fact, it was in the early sixties when a fast
growth process started. The data for France start in 1963. When comparing the growth process in the two coun-
tries in the sixties, an accumulative differential growth rate of 0.5% between Spain and France can be observed.
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level, having reached 80% of this level in 1997. The main features of the growth pattern of the
two countries are better observed in graph 1.2. Firstly, the cyclical evolution of the French
economy is much closer to the Euro area than the Spanish economy (4). The Spanish growth
pattern is far more volatile than the pattern observed both in France and in the European ag-
gregate. As a consequence, the convergence process of the Spanish economy has been unevenly
distributed along the last thirty years; in fact convergence has occurred only in the booming
periods (up to 1975, 1985-1991 and since 1995) while both in the seventies recession, which
was particularly deep and long, and in the much shorter but intense one which took place in
1992-1994, the Spanish economy diverged from the European average.
3. DETERMINANT FACTORS IN THE EVOLUTION OF GDP PER PERSON
In this section it’s decomposed GDP per person as the product of three terms: one de-
mographic variable; the fraction of the population within the age range 16 to 64 years old, and
two variables which capture essential aspects of the relative performance of any country; the
employment/ working–age population ratio and labour productivity. The aim in doing such de-
composition is to determine in which of these variables the differences between the two coun-
tries are higher. This is shown in graph 2. Both, France and Spain labour productivity increased
relative to the European countries. The positive differential is quite small for France (5) while it
is sizeable for Spain. In fact, while the level of labor productivity in Spain was below 75% of the
European average in 1970 (71% relative to France), the gap had reduced to 8 p.p. in 1996 with
respect to the Euro Area (14 p.p. with respect to France). The slow growth rate in the evolution
of productivity, which has been one of the features of the Spanish economic developments in
the late nineties, has resulted in a diverging path in labour productivity in the last few years (see
graph 2.2).
The ratio of employment to the total working-age population which both in Spain and
France was above the average European level before the first oil crisis, declined in both coun-
tries. While the fall of this ratio has been smooth in France, in Spain it reflected heavily the
decade of economic slowdown (1975-1984) and the short but deep 1992-1994 recession. In
Spain the sharp decline in the fraction of employed out of the working-age population up to
1985 was mainly a consequence of a dramatic drop in the employment level; between 1970 and
1985 the Spanish economy destroyed 1.2 million net jobs, which meant that in 1985 the em-
ployment level was a 10% lower than in 1970. In top of that, the growth of working age popula-
tion was higher in Spain than in France, trend that can be explained as a consequence of two
different factors; the end of the migration process, interrupted with the European economic
crisis (6) and the coming to age of the baby boomers. Overall, employment went down from
67% of the working-age population in 1970 (106% relative to the euro area) to 59% in 2000
(95% of the euro area), having experienced quite deep changes along the last thirty years; in
1985 it reached the minimum of 51% of the working-age population (89% in relative terms).
The recovery which took place in the last eighties increased the ratio of employment to work-
ing-age population up to 56% in 1990 (94% of the European average), falling down again as a
(4) The correlation between the French and European growth rates along the period 1970-1997 is 0.86,
while the correlation between the Spanish and the European growth is only 0.64. Standard deviation of the growth
rate differentials with respect to the Euro Area is 0.77 for France and 1.77 for Spain along 1979-1997.
(5) Labour productivity grew in the Euro area at an average accumulative rate of 1.9%, 2.0% in France and
2.6% in Spain along the thirty years 1970-2000.
(6) The flow of Spanish emigrants to European countries was very important along the sixties, the gross mi-
gration ratio was about 0.3% and net migration about half of this figure per year during that period. After 1973 gross
flows diminished dramatically and a net migration became positive up to 1980 reflecting the return of immigrants.
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GRAPH 2
FACTORS IN THE EVOLUTION OF GDP PER PERSON (EURO AREA = 100)
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consequence of the early nineties recession and experiencing a fast recovery along the last
years as a result of a strong job creation which overlapped with the increasing trend in women
labour participation rate.
The third explanatory factor behind the observed evolution of GDP per person is the
trend in working age-population as a fraction of the total population, which can be seen as a
broad measure of the potential human resources of a country. In France this variable has expe-
rienced a slow increase along the past thirty years; from 62% recorded in 1970, to 65% in 2000;
which represents a slight decline relative to the euro area (from 100% in 1970 to 97% in 2000).
In Spain the growth of working age population was much faster, going from 58% in 1970 to 65%
in 2000; which means that the 7 p.p. gap, which existed relative to the Euro area was almost
closed by 2000.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the growth process. The most relevant feature
being that, from the long run perspective of the last thirty years, it has involved net job destruc-
tion in all the three areas. Growth has relied in productivity gains; it is the well known process of
growth without jobs which has been characteristic of the European economy in the last decades. In
the case of Spain, these features are accentuated, both the labour productivity gains are higher
than in Europe, and the decline of employment as a fraction of working-age population has been
stronger than in the average of countries belonging to the Euro area. In other words, between
1970 and 2000, the Spanish economy has converged towards the average European level despite
the fact that its overall poor employment performance has translated in a reduction of 8 p.p. in its
employment/working-age population ratio (from 67% in 1970 to 59% in 2000 which implies going
from 106% of the European level to 95% a reduction of 11 p.p.). Convergence has mostly relied
on productivity. Going back to graph 2 to determine what are the variables which explain the still
existing gap between the GDP per person in Spain and in the euro area, it could be said that in
2000 the gap in terms of GDP per person was 18 p.p. relative to the euro area. Of these, 10 p.p.
were accounted by labour productivity, 5 p.p. by the ratio of employed to working-age population
and the remaining 3 p.p. by the fraction of the working-age population. Next section will look
more closely to the determinants of the evolution of labour productivity.
TABLE 1
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH AND ITS COMPONENTS
1970-1975 1976-1985 1986-2000 1970-2000
Per capita GDP 4.1       1.0       3.1       2.5       
Labour productivity 4.7       2.8       1.6       2.6       
Employment / Working-age population -0.5       -2.3       1.0       -0.4       
Working-age pop / Total Population -0.1       0.6       0.4       0.4       
1970-1975 1976-1985 1986-2000 1970-2000
Per capita GDP 2.7       1.8       1.8       2.0       
Labour productivity 2.9       2.2       1.6       2.0       
Employment / Working-age population -0.3       -0.8       0.3       -0.2       
Working-age pop / Total Population 0.1       0.5       -0.1       0.1       
1970-1975 1976-1985 1986-2000 1970-2000
Per capita GDP 2.5       2.0       1.9       2.1       
Labour productivity 2.9       2.2       1.3       1.9       
Employment / Working-age population -0.4       -0.7       0.6       -0.1       




   Source: OECD ADB database
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4. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND ITS DETERMINANTS
Given the central role played by labour productivity in explaining the growth process, it is
worthwhile to look deeper in the determinants of this variable. Labour productivity is just a proxy
of the level of efficiency attained by an economy, and its evolution is determined by the capital labour
ratio and a measure of technological progress synthesized by total factor productivity (TFP).
In table 2 it is presented a decomposition of the labour productivity growth rate into its
two determinants. In the first place it can be observed that the relative faster growth in the
Spanish labour productivity along the last thirty years is mostly explained by a higher contribu-
tion of the capital-labour ratio, in other words the process of capital-labour substitution has
been more intense in Spain than in France, while the growth rate in total factor productivity
has been quite similar in the two countries for the entire period. However, it is noteworthy to
observe that the evolution of total factor productivity has been more stable in France than in
Spain (graph 3); note that for the last five years technological progress has been quite slow in
Spain. Before analysing which are the factors that, according to the growth theory literature,
determine the evolution of TFP, it is interesting to look briefly at the main trends of the capital-
ization process in the two economies. In graph 4 the evolution of the business sector capital-
labour ratio in France and Spain is shown (7). In France this ratio almost triplicated between
1970 and 2000, while in Spain the capitalization was faster, multiplying by a factor close to four.
The convergence of the Spanish economy to the levels of capitalization prevalent in France was
particularly fast in the sixties and up to beginning of the eighties (graph 4.2). Overall the proc-
ess implied a sizeable closure of the capital-ratio gap; from levels below 60% at the late sixties
to 90% in 2000.
The reason behind the fast convergence in the capital–labour ratio observed up to the
early eighties was not the existence of a big difference in the investment rate between the two
countries (in fact, the private non-residential investment rate was lower in Spain than in France
until 1972, and only somehow higher in the period 1973-1982) but the fact that the Spanish
economy was in a relative backward position at the beginning of that period (8). From 1986 the
(7) No data were found for the capital stock in the euro area or any other aggregate of European countries.
(8) The explanation being that, assuming decreasing returns to capital, the same investment rate generates
a higher capital stock growth in the most retarded country.
TABLE 2
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY, TFP AND K/L SUBSTITUTION
1970-1975 1976-1985 1986-2000 1970-2000
Labour productivity 4.9       3.4       1.4       2.7       
K/L contribution 2.1       1.9       0.7       1.3       
Total factor productivity 2.8       1.6       0.7       1.4       
1970-1975 1976-1985 1986-2000 1970-2000
Labour productivity 3.3       2.4       1.8       2.3       
K/L contribution 1.5       1.0       0.6       0.9       
Total factor productivity 1.8       1.4       1.2       1.3       
SPAIN
FRANCE
   Sources: AMECO and own estimations.
   Capital-labour contribution is estimated using labour cost share in value added in 1995.
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private investment rate in Spain has been continuously above the French rate; the difference
being particularly high since 1996, period in which the average private non residential invest-
ment rate was 14.3 % of GDP in Spain as compared to 11.4% in France.
5. THE DETERMINANTS OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
As it was mentioned in section 4, TFP is superior to labour productivity as an indicator of an
economy growth potential, as its evolution abstracts from changes in factor inputs (labour and phys-
ical capital) focusing on the degree of efficiency with which these inputs are combined. In this sense,
the difference between labour productivity and the capital-labour ratio provides a measure of the
efficiency in the utilization of primary factors. According to the growth theory literature this differ-
ence should be explained by technological capital stock, human capital and infrastructures. Table 3
presents a set of indicators which proxy the level of these variables in the two countries.
One of the main determinants of the efficient use of the primary inputs is human capital.
The channel trough which human capital enhances growth is double, in the first place knowl-
edge and training of the workforce has a direct impact on labour productivity, but also, by im-
proving the returns of physical and technological capital, it has a indirect effect on labour pro-
ductivity. Table 3 has used the average years of schooling of the working age population as a

































































(9) Note that this variable is only a crude proxy of human capital, given that it only computes formal edu-
cation – without taking into account training- and it doesn’t consider education quality differences and other impor-
tant dimensions of human capital.
































































Graph 4.2. SPAIN. The capital labour ratio in the Business Economy.
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Graph 4.1. The capital labour ratio in the Business Economy.
 In $ using PPP (1995)
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(10) However there are many factors which influence the magnitude of this variable. E.g. a country may
show a low spending level because of enrolling low number of students or because of delivering educational services
in a particularly efficient manner.
old had received barely six years of education, three years less than the average French adult.
Along the almost thirty years elapsed between 1971 and 1998, the level of education increased
in France by an average of 0.7 years per decade while in Spain the growth was somehow faster;
1.1 year per decade. Note, however that despite the observed convergence, there remains a
substantial difference between the average years of schooling of the working force in the two
countries. There has been also included an indicator, which measures the amount of national
resources devoted to education (both private and public) as a proxy (10) to the effort devoted
to building-up human capital in the two societies. Total expenditure on education was in Spain
below the OECD average in 1998 (5.8%) and the gap was wider with respect to France (6.2%).
Expenditure on R & D is to be considered as an investment in knowledge that can translate
into new technologies and more efficient ways of using existing resources of physical and hu-
man capital. As shown in table 3, overall expenditure on R&D in Spain is estimated as 0.9% of
GDP in the nineties; which is very far away from the amount of resources devoted to R&D in
TABLE 3
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY DETERMINANTS
1971 1981 1991 1998
Human capital
Average years of education of the working age 5.8       6.4       7.5       8.7       
Expenditure on education (as a % of GDP) -- -- 4.7       5.3       
Technological capital
Expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) -- 0.4       0.8       0.9       
Business enterprises -- 0.2       0.4       0.4       
Government -- 0.2       0.4       0.4       
Other national sources + Abroad -- 0.0       0.1       0.1       
Infrastructures
1971 1981 1991 1998
Human capital
Average years of education of the working age 8.8       9.6       10.0       10.6       
Expenditure on education (as a % of GDP) -- -- 5.7       6.2       
Technological capital
Expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) -- 1.9       2.4       2.2       
Business enterprises -- 0.8       1.0       1.2       
Government -- 1.0       1.2       0.8       
Other national sources + Abroad -- 0.1       0.2       0.2       
Infrastructures
1971 1981 1991 1998
Human capital
Average years of education of the working age -- -- -- --
Expenditure on education (as a % of GDP) -- -- -- --
Technological capital
Expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) -- 1.7       1.9       1.8       
Business enterprises -- 0.8       1.0       1.0       
Government -- 0.8       0.8       0.7       





   Sources: Education at a glance. OECD (2001), OECD Science Technology and Industry Scoreboard
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most European countries and, in particular only represents 40% of the level attained in France
by this variable in 1999 (last available year). It is necessary to distinguish business sector R&D
expenditure from public sector expenditure on R&D because the two might have different ef-
fects on the evolution of TFP, if, for example, public R&D expenditures are directed at making
improvements in areas not directly related to growth (e.g. defence, medical research), any im-
pact on growth could be diffused and slow to come. Having this in mind, it can be observed that
not also the overall R&D intensity is much lower in Spain than in its European partners and in
particular well below the French level, but also it is distributed differently; while in Spain 49% of
R&D investment is performed by the business sector, In France business enterprise R&D ac-
counts for 54% of total R&D activity.
ANNEX II
LABOUR MARKET IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
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1. INTRODUCTION
This annex informs about the main aspects of the French and Spanish labour markets
with the aim to understand better the behaviour of the employment in the two countries in








• Temporary work companies
• Recent labour market measures: Outstanding named in France is the 35 hour working
week and in Spain, measures which contribute to make more flexible the labour market.



































































































Legal Aspects Other aspects
Minimum working age
• Children cannot be employed before they reach
the minimum school-leaving age of 16 years.
• Young people under the age of 18 are not allowed to work at tasks that are
dangerous or beyond their strength. They are not allowed to engage in immoral
activities or work in bars, nor are they allowed to work at night.
• The SMIC (salaire minimum interprofessionnel




40,72 F/ 6,21€ as of 1.07.1999
42,02 F/6,39 € as of 1/7/2000
Statutory minimum
wage (SMIC)
2001 43,72 F/6,67 € as of 1/7/2001
• The minimum wage increases automatically by ministerial order each time the
consumer price index rises by more than 2%.
 adjusted by decree once a year with effect as of 1 July





1) At the employer’s initiative
• personal grounds for termination
+ insubordination
+ breach of contract
+ serious misconduct
+ non-disciplinary grounds
• economic grounds for termination
+ elimination of job
– with elimination of employee’s tasks
– with redistribution of employee’s tasks
+ transformation of job
2) At the employee’s initiative
• resignation: this only concerns full-time and part-
time employment under permanent contract. It is the
counterpart to the employer’s right to terminate the
contract.
• voluntary retirement
• termination during probation period
3) Termination by mutual consent
Termination conditions and compensation
 No notice period is required in cases of:
– serious misconduct
– employees on probation
– force majeure
– termination of the contract by a court ruling
Employers may excuse employees from working out their notice period.
⇒ Notice period
• in case of termination by employer:
– seniority less than 6 months: period set by collective bargaining agreements
– seniority between 6 months and 2 years: minimum notice 1 month
– seniority over 2 years: minimum notice 2 months
• in case of resignation
– same notice periods as in cases of termination by employer
However, employees may be exempted from providing notice in certain cases.
⇒ Compensation
Termination by employer
 compensation for notice period when employee is not required to work out
the notice period
 statutory minimum termination payment when seniority is 2 years or more
 1/10 of a month’s pay per year of service for employees on monthly salaries
 holiday pay





























































Article L. 321-1 of the French Labour Code states that,
“redundancy involves dismissals by an employer for one or
more reasons not related to the individual employees as a
result of the elimination or transformation of their jobs or
substantial modifications in their contract of employment
following business problems or technological
developments.”
In view of this legal definition, a redundancy occurs if the
dismissal:
– is not related to the person of individual
employee;
– results from the elimination or transformation of
the employee’s job or substantial modification
of an element in the employee’s contract;
– is motivated by “business problems” or
“technological developments” or by
“restructuring”.
Social Plan
Social plans are intended to prevent redundancies or limit
the numbers of dismissals and facilitate the redeployment
of employees whose dismissal cannot be avoided (older
employees, etc.)
Mandatory Social Plan
 in case of dismissals of 10 or more employees in
companies with 50 or more employees
Employers’ obligations
Before making any employees redundant, employers must:
– seek opportunities for redeployment in other locations or in other companies
in the group
– offer a retraining contract
– inform and consult employee representatives
– notify the government (local labour director for the Département)
– serve a redundancy notice on the employee by registered letter
Supporting measures for redundancies
 retraining contracts
 early retirement/redundancy contracts for employees aged 57 or older
Progressive early retirement





























































There are four institutions providing employee
representation:
1. Employee delegates
– present claims relating to pay, jobs, working
conditions and labour code compliance
– can call in labour inspectors
– liase with the works committees and the
occupational health and safety committees
2. Works Committees must be consulted on working
hours and organisation, training, redundancies, etc.
3. Shop stewards
– may present all claims to the employer and not
only pay claims
– are the only valid counterparties for employers
in negotiating and concluding collective
bargaining agreements
4. Occupational Health and Safety Committees
– Advisory and supervisory role





























































A collective bargaining agreement is an agreement reached
between one or more unions representing employees and
one or more employers’ organisations (or one or more
employers acting individually). These agreements cover all
issues relating to working conditions, terms of employment
and social protection for employees.
 Industry or Company Agreements
– Agreements covering a whole industry (at
national, regional or local level)
– Agreements covering one company.
Industry-wide agreements must involve one or more
employers’ organisations, whereas company agreements
can be signed by one or more employers acting individually.
 Collective bargaining agreements and
accords
The collective bargaining agreement (for an industry or
a company) should cover all matters relating to working
conditions and social benefits, whereas a collective
bargaining accord only covers one aspect of these
issues.
 Industry and interindustry accords
 Industry and interindustry accords deal with a given
issue, but concern either the employees working in a
single industry or all employees in all industries, as their
names indicate.
 Negotiations within a company with the shop stewards
can deal with all matters relating to the employees’
status (working conditions and social benefits). The
choice of negotiation issues is up to the employer and
the shop stewards.
 Negotiations are mandatory in all companies where one
or more union shops have been constituted or, in other
words, in companies where one or more shop stewards
have been designated.
In the nineteen-sixties France’s collective bargaining policy meant that real wages rose in
direct correlation to productivity growth.
In the nineteen-eighties, collective bargaining policy has had to cope with the following
issues: improving business profits through moderate pay settlements while making sure to
promote new jobs.
The collective bargaining agreement policy should eventually replace the exchange rate as
the main parameter used for adjustment within the European Union.
Importance of collective bargaining in the current process to reduce working hours
In France, changes in working hours result from legislation, unlike other European
countries, where such changes stem from contract negotiations and collective bargaining
agreements covering a whole country or a given industry.
The Aubry Act on shortening the working week is designed to fit in with the various levels
at which collective bargaining takes place and create a link between law-making and
negotiations with both sides in industry, particularly employees’ representatives. The
mandate procedure makes it possible for a union that is representative at the national level
to give a mandate to an employee in a company with no union shop stewards to negotiate



























































The daily working hours for adult employees (aged 18 or
older) cannot exceed 10 (Labour Code, Article L-212-1) .
Act 96-502 of 11 June 1996 to promote employment by
shortening working hours by contract (Robien Act).
Implementing Decree: 14 August 1996
Objective: promoting experiments with shorter working hours to expand employment by
offering employers lasting cuts in payroll taxes and contributions.
The reductions in the employers’ contributions are 40% in the first year and 30% in the
following years when collective working hours are reduced by 10% or more.
The reductions in employers’ contributions are 50% in the first year and 40% in the
following years when collective working hours are reduced by 15% or more.
Act 98-461 of 13 June 1998, (1st Aubry Act), which repeals
Act 96-502 of 11 June 1996. This Act provides guidance
and incentives for shortening working hours. It transposes
into French law Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain
aspects of the organization of working time. The objective is
to shorten the statutory working week to 35 hours by 1
January 2000 for companies with more than 20 employees
and by 1 January 2002 for other companies. This Act
introduced a 1st paragraph to article L-212-4 of the Labour
Code that stipulates that effective working hours are “hours
when the employees are at the employer’s disposal and
must follow the employer’s instructions without being able to
occupy themselves with their own personal business.”
This Act institutes various measures to encourage employers to shorten working hours in
their company prior to the legal deadline through collective bargaining.
Financial support may be paid to companies that have signed agreements meeting the
following conditions:
– a reduction in working hours of 10% or more, with new hiring equivalent to
6% or more of the workforce (“offensive” measures).
– a reduction in working hours to prevent redundancies (“defensive” measures).




Act 2000-37 of 19 January 2000 came into force on 1
February 2000. It is called the 2nd Aubry Act on the 35-hour
working week and it deals with negotiated reductions in
working hours
The primary objective of the Act is to promote flexibility and thereby collective bargaining
agreements. In this manner the Act promotes action by management and labour
representatives.
The 2nd Aubry Act institutes its own support measures for companies that shorten their
working week. This support comes in the form of a lasting reduction in social security
contributions. To be eligible, companies must implement a collective bargaining agreement
with a 35-hour working week or 1,600-hour working year, along with an undertaken to
create new jobs or protect existing ones. This Act addresses all of the practical
consequences and repercussions of the changeover to a statutory 35-hour working week
and, in particular, the impact of this changeover on the calculation and payment of
overtime.
Incentives for small businesses that shorten working hours in 2001
(amount per employee per year)
Reductions in employers’ contributions on low and medium  wages
(amounts rounded up to the nearest French franc)
Amounts in French francs
1st year 2nd to 5th years 6th and following years
Gross monthly salary Monthly reductions
6,982 1,818
7,560 1,55010% reduction 6,000 5,000 4,000
8,260 1,275
8,940 1,050
9,620 85615% reduction 10,000 9,000 7,500
10,320 683
11,020 532Supplement * 1,000 1,000 -
11,700 403




























































Overtime is hours effectively worked in excess of the statutory working hours.
Overtime limit: 130 hours per employee per year (Decree 2000-82 of 31 January 2000)
Overtime between 35 and 39 hours
– Companies concerned in 2000 and 2001: Only companies with more than 20 employees are concerned in 2000 and 2001. The statutory working week for
these companies is 35 hours as of 1/1/2000.
– Time off in addition to overtime pay
a – Transitional rules: 10% extra pay. They apply pending implementation of the final rules:
• from 1 February to 31 December 2000 for companies with a statutory 35-hour working week as of 1 January 2000 (more than 20 employees);
• from 1 January to 31 December 2002 for companies with a statutory 35-hour working week as of 1 January 2002 (fewer than 20 employees).
During the transitional period, employees shall receive 10% extra pay for the 35th to 39th hours worked per week (Act 2000-37 of 19 January 2000, Art. 5, IV
and V)
b – Final rules: 25% extra pay. The final rules will come into force after the transitional period ends:
• on 1 January 2001 for companies with a statutory 35-hour working week as of 1 January 2000 (more than 20 employees);
• on 1 January 2003 for companies with a statutory 35-hour working week as of 1 January 2002 (fewer than 20 employees).
The final rules will apply as of these dates: employees shall receive 25% extra pay for the 35th to 39th hours worked per week (Labour Code, Art. L-212-5, I)
Overtime in excess of 39 hours
a– companies with a statutory 35-hour working week as of 2000
For overtime in excess of 39 hours per week:
• 25% extra pay for the 40th to 43rd hours worked
• 50% extra pay for the hours worked after the 43rd hour
b – former rules still apply for companies with a statutory 39-hour working week in 2000 and 2001:
• 25% extra pay for the 40th to 47th hours worked
• 50% extra pay for the hours worked after the 47th hour
Statutory time off in addition to overtime pay
Time off is calculated as a percentage of the overtime worked.
This time off is mandatory compensation that comes on top of overtime pay.
Overtime payAnnual overtime quota
36th to 39th hour 40th to 43rd hour 44th to 47th hour 48th hour and after
130 hours after the 39th hour per week 2001 - +25% +25% +50%
2003 130 hours after the 37th hour per week 2002 +10% +25% +50% +50%




























































– 3 January 1972: first act regulating temporary work,
– Licence required to open a temp agency,
– Temp agencies limited by law to providing temporary
employees (Act of 3 January 1972),
– Ban on temporary work in certain industries,
– Temp agencies required to constitute a guarantee fund
(Act of 2 January 1979). The fund is designed to ensure
payment of wages and social contributions if a temp
agency fails. Payments to the fund made through
accredited bodies,
– Temp agencies required to provide customer companies
with a certificate from social security bodies certifying the
payment of contributions,
– Secondment contract: business contract between the
customer company and the temp agency, which is not to
be confused with the assignment contract between the
temp agency and the temporary employee,
– Contract types:
• A written fixed-term contract is required,
otherwise the contract is automatically deemed to be a
permanent employment contract,
• Limit on successive temporary employment
contracts: the contracts can be renewed once, but the
renewal can cover a longer term than the initial term,
• Maximum term of temporary employment
assignments: 18 months, including renewals, 24 months in
certain cases,
– Use of temporary employees is limited to 9 cases,
including absence of an employee, temporary increase in
business, seasonal work, etc.
– Ban on the use of temporary employees to replace
striking employees.
Specific legal status of temporary employees
Ordinance of 5 February 1982 (“Auroux Ordinance”) amending the Act of 1972. The new
legislation aligns the temporary employees’ status on that of the customer company’s
employees, thus ensuring:
- equal pay,
- access to employee facilities
Requirements for temp agencies
June 1992: the agreement on occupational training extended to temporary employees



























































FORMS OF HIRING IN FRANCE
Term
Fixed-term Open-ended
1. Full-time permanent contract (contrat à durée indéterminé (CDI)): the standard legal
status for an employer/employee relationship
×
2. Fixed-term contract (contrat à durée déterminée (CDD)): designed to meet temporary
manpower needs, must correspond to the completion of a specific and temporary task
×
3. Temporary employment contract: Temporary employees can be hired under the same
conditions as fixed-term contract employees.The employer uses a temp agency
×
4. Part-time employment contracts: help make manpower management more flexible and
help meet the aspirations of employees who want to balance their working life with their
life away from work
× ×
5. Seasonal employment contracts: contracts that are signed to cover a season ×
6. Training and retraining contracts: principle of alternating periods of work and study ×
7. Intermittent employment contract (reintroduced by the 2nd Aubry Act) for permanent jobs
that by nature involve periods of work alternating with periods of no work.
×


































































































Legal aspects Other aspects
Minimum age • Labour market entry is prohibited to youths under 16. • Youths under 18 shall not work either at night or in jobs declared by the
Government to be unhealthy, laborious, harmful or hazardous to their health
and their vocational training.
EURO-PTAS/DAY EURO-PTAS/MONTH
2000 14.16€/ 2,356 ptas 424.8€/ 70,680 ptas
Minimum wage
2001
14.45€/ 2,404 ptas 433.45€/72,120 ptas
• Established annually by the Government and applicable to any activity,
irrespective of employee's sex and age.
• A certain amount of money is computed as payment in kind.







• Death, retirement or entrepreneurial incapacity
• Annulment of entrepreneur's legal status
Employee's wishes:
• Rejection without a justified reason
• Rejection with a justified reason
• Death, retirement or incapacity
Joint wishes (temporary contract termination included)
Severance payment, according to kind of dismissal:
• It will be declared from a legal viewpoint as:
1. Fair dismissal: there is no entitlement to severance pay.
2. Unfair dismissal: the worker must be reinstated or compensated with 45
days' wages per year with a maximum of 42 monthly payments.
3. Null and void: immediate reinstatement of the employee.
• Severance pay: 20 days' wages per year worked. Max. 12 months
• It will be declared from a legal viewpoint as fair, unfair or null and void.
• Severance pay: amount equivalent to one year's wages.
• Severance pay: 20 days' wages per year worked. Max. 12 months
• Employee must give prior notice.
• Severance pay: the amount corresponding to unfair dismissal.
• Severance pay of 15 days' wages in event of death.
• There is no entitlement to severance pay except in temporary contract
termination. In that case, severance pay of 8 days per year worked.
Collective dismissal
Termination of work contract due to economic, technical,
organisational or production reasons, when in a 90-day period this
affects at least:
 10 employees in companies with fewer than 100 employees
 10%in companies with 100 or more and fewer than 300 employ.
 30 workers in companies with 300 or more employees
• Admissible when it contributes to overcoming an adverse economic
situation or ensuring the future viability of the company.
• The entrepreneur must request authorisation in accordance with labour
force reduction proceedings.





























































 Personnel representatives in companies with 10-15 employees
 Works council in companies with over 50 employees.
Basic Principles:
− The legitimacy to bargain of unions and employers' organisations
− Statutory extensions whereunder any collective agreement of a
scope wider than company-level must be applied to all
companies and to all employees of the same regional and
sectoral field.
 The ultra-activity or the indefinite temporal extension of the collective
agreement provisions
Collective agreement:
 Agreement entered into between worker and entrepreneurial
representatives, for the regulation of work conditions.
 Types:
1. At company or lower level (in 1999, 11%)
2. At higher-than-company level: geographical, functional or personal (in 1999,
89%)
 No turnout: during the time it is in force, the collective agreement shall not
be subject to provisions made in agreements of a different scope unless
this is otherwise agreed or provided for in a Framework Agreement..
 Duration: unless otherwise agreed, they will run from year to year
 Adhesion: legitimate counterparts can adhere to a collective agreement in
force.
 Extension: the labour authority can extend provisions of an agreement to a
group of companies and workers in the event of absence of legitimate
counterparts to do so.
Characteristics of collective bargaining in Spain:
 Geographical centralisation and fragmentation: wide coverage of
wage-earners due to statutory extensions. Rare use of opt-out
clauses
 Wage increases very uniform across branches of activity and
linked to general price indices, due to nationwide nature of trade
unions.
 Rigidity of wage structures with great difficulty in individualising
wage levels through variable supplements. This means that
aggregate wages adjust with a great delay to the economy's
cyclical phase, and employment is the first variable to be
adjusted.
 Counter-cyclical behaviour of wage drift in comparison with other
countries where wage supplements are of greater importance,
giving a pro-cyclical character to wage drift and to wage
increases.
Types  Voluntary
 Compulsory: agreed in collective agreements, individual contracts, or under force majeure.
Compensation  Pay: minimum as an ordinary hour
 Compensate with paid holidays
Limits  Maximum of 80 hours per year
Overtime
Exceptions  Part-time workers, except force majeure





























































Requirements to perform this activity:
 To have an organisational structure: at least 12 permanent contract workers
per 1000 or fraction thereof.
 To engage exclusively in activity proper to the ETT.
 To have no tax or Social Security obligations pending.
 To post a financial guarantee for compliance with wage and Social Security
obligations.
Types of contracts:
 Employment contract between the ETT and the worker to render services in
user companies:
1. Fixed-term
2. Permanent:: worker given "service order"
 "As required" contract: entered into between the ETT and the user
company.
Worker rights :
 Workers assigned to user companies are entitled to receive at
least the total compensation established for the job according to
the agreement applicable to the user company (Law 29/1999).
 If the contract has been entered into for a fixed term, workers
are entitled to a severance payment at the end of the contract
equivalent to 12 days' wages per year of service.
Obligations of ETTs:
 ETTs are obliged to earmark 1% of the wage bill to worker
training for assignment to the user companies.
Recent labour measures
 May 1997. Labour Reform
 September 1997. Multi-year employment plan (in effect from 1997-2000)
 December 1997. Incentives for promoting permanent contracts
 September 1998
 November 1998. Reform of part-time hiring.
 December 1998. Incentives for promoting permanent contracts in 1999.
 December 1999. Incentives for promoting permanent contracts in 2000.
 March 2001. Labour reform
 Aim: to promote stability in employment.
 Most important measure: new contract to promote permanent
hiring
 Aims: training for the unemployed and equality between men,
women and the disabled.
 Allowances on employers' Social Security contributions in
permanent contracts to the unemployed facing difficulty entering
the labour market.
 100% rebates on contracts with the unemployed to stand in for
workers during maternity leave periods.
 Promotion of part-time hiring (working day of less than 77% of
what is considered habitual).
 For the first time, an allowance is offered on part-time permanent
contracts.
 Special incentives for permanent hiring of women.
 Modification of part-time contracts (working day less than
habitual without a limit of 77%).
 Severance payment for temporary contracts: 8 days per year.
 Penalty on Social Security contributions (36% increase in
common contingencies) in temporary contracts of less than 7
days.
 100% rebate on the Social Security contribution of the employee



























































FORMS OF HIRING IN SPAIN
DURATIÓN
TYPE OF CONTRACT Permanent Temporary
     1.   Regular permanent contract X
     2.   For a specific task or service X
     3.   Seasonal contracts due to production circumstances X
     4.   Substitution contracts X
     5.   Part-time
     1.   Ordinary X(1) X(1)
     2.   Permanent discontinuous jobs X
     3.   Stand-in and partial early retirement
     1.   Stand-in X
     2.   Partial early retirement X
     6.   Outworker X(1) X(1)
     7.   Pooled and group work
     1.   Pooled Not counted as employee(2)
     2.   Group Not counted as employee(3)
     3.   Support X(1) X(1)
     8.   Apprenticeship X
     9.   Training X
     10.  Permanent hiring-promoting contract X
     11.  Pre-retirement age X(1) X(1)
     12.  Disabled workers X
     13.  Employment of specific workers (only the disabled) X(1)
(1) Depending on agreement, this may be permanent or fixed-term.
(2) Since the employees are already employed (whether permanently or not) by virtue of a different contract.
(3) Since the contract is entered into with a group of people, with no independent links with each person.

ANNEX III
FINANCIAL LEASING IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
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1. FINANCIAL LEASING IN FRANCE
A business seeking to invest must decide not only what type of equipment or building it
wants to invest in, but also how it is going to finance the project, taking into account its financial
constraints. If the firm lacks sufficient own funds, it will try to borrow. However, if it is already
heavily indebted or if it wishes to make a large investment, the company will have to turn to a
rental or leasing arrangement.
Among the numerous types of rental and leasing contracts available, business managers
prefer finance leases and financial rentals. The finance lease (crédit-bail), a financing technique in-
troduced in the United States around 1950, made its début in France in the early 1960s. A fi-
nance lease is a contract under whose terms the use of an asset is granted to a third party (the
lessee) by its owner (the lessor) in return for rental payments of a specified amount spread
over a given period. In France, finance leases are governed by the Act of 2 July 1966. The Act of
6 January 1986 extended the scope of equipment leasing.
The main advantage of a finance lease for a company is that it allows the firm to invest
without having to make an initial outlay. Finance leases can be used to finance acquisitions of
movables and property, but companies use them mainly for investing in capital goods.
They are more popular with small manufacturing firms than with bigger companies. They
are widely used by small and medium-sized enterprises, which have to contend with major in-
vestment requirements and high capital costs, and do not always have adequate own funds. This
type of financing allows businesses to keep in step with technological innovation while minimis-
ing the financial risks of investment. The bigger the investment, the more often such arrange-
ments are used.
Of all the industrial sectors, the publishing, printing and reproduction sector continues to
make most use of this kind of financing.
Although finance leases are more expensive than bank loans, they have undeniable advan-
tages. First, they are easily obtained and can be used to cover the entire outlay without the firm
having to contribute any of its own funds. Second, they preserve the company’s ability to bor-
row, since the leased asset does not appear on the balance sheet until the purchase option is
exercised. In addition, they may be subject to advantageous tax treatment, as the rental cost is
recorded as a deductible expense from taxable profit. All this makes it easier for companies to
renew their plant and equipment.
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Finance leasing (crédit-bail) is a technique used by businesses for financing movable and
property investments. It consists of a lease with a unilateral sale option in favour of the lessee.
The lessee has three options: he can return the asset, renew the rental agreement or exercise
the purchase option, paying the residual value of the asset stipulated in the contract. The choice
of the equipment or building is incumbent upon the lessee. The lessor delegates authority to
the lessee to purchase the asset; further, the lessee is responsible for supervising the asset’s
installation and for guaranteeing compliance with specifications. The lessor performs a solely fi-
nancial function. The lessee undertakes to meet the rental payments. Failure to do so will result
in cancellation of the lease and application of the penalty clause contained in the agreement.
The lease always provides for an irrevocable period during which the asset is to be used: for
movables, it is usually three to seven years; for property, 15 to 20 years.
Finance leases differ from operating leases, which do not include a promise to sell, and
from hire purchase contracts, which come with reciprocal sale and purchase agreements. They
are also different from instalment credit agreements, where ownership is transferred immedi-
ately.
The asset-backed finance lease (crédit-bail adossé) is a specific kind of finance lease.
 Some companies manufacture or market capital goods that their customers prefer to
rent rather than purchase, for instance equipment using advanced, upgradeable technology, such
as IT hardware or public works machinery. A sizeable amount of capital is required for this, and
rental payments are not enough to allow the manufacturer to recoup the costs of production
sufficiently quickly. One solution is for the manufacturer to sell the equipment to a finance
company, which rents the equipment back to the manufacturer under a finance lease agree-
ment. The manufacturer then rents out the equipment to its own customers.
The leaseback (cession-bail) is a type of finance lease typically used for property. It enables
a company to sell one or more properties (e.g. head office, factory, etc.) to a leasing company,
which immediately rents the property back to the company under a property leasing agree-
ment. A property leaseback allows the company to obtain the proceeds from the sale of the
building while retaining the use of the building, safe in the knowledge that it will regain owner-
ship according to the terms of the lease. This type of arrangement has major ramifications for
the company’s financial structure and cash position:
— it improves the firm’s working capital by reducing its fixed assets;
— it improves the firm’s cash position;
— it increases its off-balance sheet commitments;
— the sale generates a return, usually a capital gain, which can be recorded under taxa-
ble earnings either over several years or in a single entry.
Financial rental (location financière) is a financing technique used for movable investments.
It is a rental agreement with an irrevocable duration. These two features distinguish it from an
operating lease. Furthermore, the agreement includes no unilateral sale option in favour of the
lessee, nor any indication of the residual value, which differentiate it from a finance lease. The
lessee has three options: he can return the asset, renew the rental agreement or negotiate a
price with the lessor in order to acquire the asset. The choice of the equipment is incumbent
upon the lessee. The lessor delegates authority to the lessee to buy the equipment. And it is the
lessee who must maintain and carry out repairs on the rented equipment. The lessor performs
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a solely financial function. Unlike in the case of finance leases, the duration of the agreement can
be very different from the duration of the asset’s economic life. Generally, such agreements run
somewhere between six months and five years, but they can last up to ten years. Consequently,
the asset’s residual value may be significant. From an accounting perspective, these arrange-
ments do not even appear as off-balance sheet commitments, because they are merely rental
agreements.
Long-term rental agreements are essentially used in vehicle rental. This type of agreement
does not include a purchase option.
The term “financial leasing” (location financement) encompasses all financial rental and finance
lease arrangements. A lease is classified as a finance lease if it transfers to the lessee substantially
all the risks and rewards incident to ownership of a given asset in return for rental payments. In
principle, a contract of this type cannot be cancelled and ensures that the lessor will recoup the
capital invested plus interest.
1.1. The accounting treatment of leasing in France
Owing to the fact that the Fourth EC Directive does not provide any rule for the disclo-
sure of leased assets, the requirements for the disclosure of leasing are not harmonized in the
European Union.
 In general, it can be stated that under French law the juridical ownership principle forms
the basis of disclosure in individual accounts whereas an economic approach can be adopted in
consolidated accounts. French financial statements disclose finance-leased assets within the bal-
ance sheet of the lessor and not the lessee until a purchase option is exercised.
Under these conditions, the accounting of leasing in individual accounts is not the same
in France and in Spain.
 In this study, to comply with the French accounting principles, leased assets are not in-
cluded in the total balance sheet on the assets side and lease commitments are not included in
the balance sheet on the liabilities side
 However supplementary information provided by members of the Central Balance
Sheet Office makes it possible to evaluate the weight of financial leasing and improve the quality
of comparisons made between companies.
Therefore extra information is given:
— On the one hand the weight of leased assets can be appreciated by the ratio “ net
leased assets/total balance sheet ”.
— On the other hand the weight of lease commitments has been measured by compar-
ing its amount to the total financial debt.
1.2. Restatements used in the French Balance Sheet Data Office analysis
The ownership concept applied to balance sheets under the French accounting code
means that leased assets may not be recorded as an asset and lease commitments may not be
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entered as a liability. Consequently, the balance sheets of companies that lease assets are more
“streamlined” than those of companies that borrow in order to purchase assets outright.
In order to obtain more meaningful comparisons of the performance of companies, financial
leasing is subject to restatement in order to analyse more carefully investment and financial debt.
IAS Standard 17 proposes restating by distinguishing between acquisitions and financing,
and booking them separately. This would require monitoring each contract separately. The Cen-
tral Balance Sheet Office has put in place a simplified restating mechanism:
— it restates all the equipment leases and then the property leases, rather than consid-
ering each contract separately,
— the loan amount repaid at the end of each financial year is considered to be identical
to the depreciated value of the asset,
— the rate of depreciation follows the pattern of rental payments recorded as charges,
·— earnings are adjusted for interest, which is calculated as the sum of all rental pay-
ments minus depreciation charges.
The functional analysis plan used by the Central Balance Sheet Office includes fixed assets
acquired under finance leases. This makes it possible to refine the different levels of earnings
and get a more accurate idea of real flows. The approach consists in considering fixed assets
acquired under finance leases as having been acquired and financed by a loan that has to be
repaid over the duration of the contract.
The main restatements are as follows:
The annual finance lease charge is split into two parts:
— the first corresponds to an estimate of the depreciation charges that the company
would have paid if it had acquired the fixed assets instead of entering into a finance
lease agreement;
— the second part corresponds to the interest expense of the imputed loan.
When the finance lease is entered into, this leads to:
— an increase in productive investment, by the amount of the value of the assets appear-
ing in the contract;
— on the assets side, the tangible assets (plants and machinery) are increased by the val-
ue of the fixed assets in the finance lease contract.
— on the liabilities side, financial debt (bank loans) are increased by the same amount.
During the term of the lease:
The bank loan decreases at the same pace as the repayments estimated according to the
share in capital of the finance lease payments.
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2. FINANCIAL LEASING IN SPAIN
Spanish companies, same as French companies, use leasing techniques to invest and to
finance their investment projects. All the kinds of leasing that have been enumerated in the pre-
vious section for France exist in Spain, and the juridical approach is also the same. The differ-
ences between the two countries are referred to the different ways to account the leasing, fol-
lowing the rules established in each National Accounting Plan.
2.1. The accounting treatment of leasing in Spain
The Spanish General Accounting Plan, conferred by RD 1643/1990 establishes in its valu-
ation rules a specific reference in relation with leasing accounting.
“When due to the economic conditions of a financial leasing there are no reasonable
doubts that the purchase option will be carried out, the tenant should register the operation in
the following terms.
The rights derived of financial leasing contracts referred in the above paragraph, should
enter in the accounts as intangible assets by its cash price, we have to register in the debit side
the entire debts, finance lease payments plus purchase option value. The difference between
both prices, the financial expenses of the transaction, has to be registered as expenses to be
distributed in several years. The rights registered as intangible assets have to be amortized,
whenever necessary, attending to the lifetime of the asset. When the asset is purchased, the
value of the rights registered and its correlative accumulated amortization will be cancelled and
this amount will be transferred to tangible assets. Expenses to be distributed in several years
should be attributed to results according to a financial criterion.
In the case of lease back, when the economic conditions of a sale, related to the financial
leasing of sole assets, show out that this is a way of financing, the tenant has to register the
transaction in the following way. He has to cancel the asset with its net value and has to recog-
nize the intangible asset with the same value. He also has to register in the liabilities the finan-
cial lease payments plus purchase option value; the difference between the debt and the re-
ceived finance should be registered as expenditures to be distributed in several years”.
To sum up, the Spanish General Accounting Plan, establishes that the financial leasing has
to be registered as intangible assets if the asset is going to be bought through the purchase
option. On the contrary, the French General Accounting Plan does not contemplate the activa-
tion of the leased asset.

ANNEX IV
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
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1. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the French and Spanish industrial companies made in chapter III, must be
complemented with the analysis of the financial system framework of the two countries, to
contribute to the explanations of some patterns of the financial structure of the companies.
This annex reviews the main aspects of the financial markets of the two countries and
try to reply to the following questions:
1. What financing sources can companies find in the primary market? More specifically,
what types of financing do financial intermediaries offer to companies? And what se-
curities may companies issue and what is the issuance procedure they must follow?
2. Which are the official secondary markets and what do they require of companies
wishing to have their securities traded on them?
Knowledge of the general conditions of access to these sources of financing is relevant
insofar as the requirements established (their greater or lesser complexity) may explain (great-
er or lesser, respectively) resort to the sources analysed.
2. FRENCH FINANCIAL SYSTEM
2.1. Introduction
The banking system plays a predominant role in financing the country’s economy by ex-
tending loans to corporations. However especially in France, the amounts of loans extended to
companies were moderate during the nineties.
Direct financing on financial markets has been gradually competing with credit extended
by banks. The transformations of the banking and financial system have had consequences on
the activity of banks and have sparked off new forms of intermediation. Financial intermediation
has gradually developed.
2.2. French banking system
Banks provide funding resources, collect savings and are major participants in the clear-
ing system and offer their customers means of payment. The traditional function of a bank has
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been to channel funds available from economic agents with savings (especially households) who
want to invest and provide other economic agents with borrowing needs (especially corpora-
tions) with long-term funding to finance economic growth. France’s banking system played the
preponderant role in financing the country’s economy up until the middle of the nineteen-
eighties.
The French banking system is made up of a diverse range of institutions. The Banking Act
defines six legal categories of credit institutions. Between 1987 and 1999, the total number of insti-
tutions authorised to carry out banking operations dropped by 45.5% from 2,152 to 1,172.
Since the start of the 1990s, the number of credit institutions has declined by approxi-
mately 910 (excl. institutions registered in Monaco). This fall concerned savings banks and finan-
cial corporations especially, as well as to a lesser extent banks belonging to the French Bankers’
Association and mutual and co-operative banks. It was also due to the application of the 1996
Financial Activity Modernisation Act, which resulted, in particular, in the closure of securities
houses. Note that the same Act led to the development of investment firms, the number of
which rose from 290 at the end of 1996 to 528 at the end of 1999.
TABLE 1
MARKET SHARE OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS BY LEGAL CATEGORY. 1999
(as a %)
Banks belonging to the French Bankers’ Association 366        38.9        44.3        
Mutual and co-operative banks 121        39.8        29.5        
Savings banks 31        19.8        7.6        
Municipal credit banks  22        0.1        0.1        
Financial corporations 605        1.3        11.4        
Specialised financial institutions 24        0.1        7.1        
TOTAL 1,172        100.0        100.0        
   Source: Banque de France







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Credit institutions Investment firms
Source and production: Banque de France – Companies Observatory. Last update: March 2001
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2.2.1. Banks belonging to the French Bankers’ Association or commercial banks
In 1999, there were 366 such banks, which constitute France’ oldest and biggest network.
Banks belonging to the French Bankers’ Association or commercial banks are authorised to car-
ry out all types of banking operations. They can be split into four very distinct groups:
— The “large banks”, which have recently been involved in a spate of merger activity.
They include BNP, Crédit Lyonnais and Société Générale, Crédit du Nord and Crédit
Industriel et Commercial (CIC), all of which have a strong foothold in the regions.
Also in this group are Crédit Commercial de France and Paribas, which are mainly
oriented towards the corporate market. Since 1996, Société Générale has taken over
Crédit du Nord, which was previously controlled by Paribas, Crédit Mutuel acquired
CIC in 1998, and BNP took control of Paribas in 1999.
— Trading banks, of which there are around 20. These are credit institutions which have
been authorised to provide investment services.
— Regional and local banks. Their number stands at around 50 but it is declining.
— Foreign banks, whose number, by contrast, increased from 120 in 1980 to 181 in
1999. This highlights the increasingly international nature of the Paris financial centre.
In 1999, these four groups together took 38.9% of deposits and issued 44.3% of loans.
2.2.2. Mutual and co-operative banks
In 1999, there were 121 mutual and co-operative banks. They took 39.8% of deposits and
issued 29.5% of loans. This category is the one that has flourished the most in recent years.
These banks are not controlled by shareholders but by their members. Their activity is very
similar to that of commercial banks. They operate on the basis of decentralised structures and
are divided into four networks: Crédit Agricole, Banques Populaires, Crédit Mutuel and Crédit
Coopératif. They now include savings banks and provident institutions, which previously had a
specific legal form.
2.2.3. Savings banks
There are currently 34 savings banks in France. Up until the Act of 25 June 1999, savings
banks were non-profit institutions authorised to receive deposits and grant loans. They were
controlled by the State through the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations.
The aim of the above-mentioned Act was to adapt the savings banks network, which is
the second-biggest French banking group in terms of savings deposits, to the context of in-
creased globalisation and competition. This adjustment was all the more necessary as savings
banks have a strong regional and local foothold and are well established on the market for the
financing of individuals and local authorities. In 1999, the savings bank network acquired 90% of
the capital of Crédit Foncier de France.
The new Act introduced a substantial change to the form of savings and provident insti-
tutions, which now have the legal form of a co-operative and come under the authority of a
new strengthened central body (Caisse Nationale des Caises d’Epargne et de Prévoyance). The
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adoption of a co-operative status was designed to reinforce the network’s place in the local
community and to strengthen the relationship between member and institution.
In 1999, savings banks received 19.8% of deposits and issued 7.6% of loans.
2.2.4. Financial corporations
There are 605 such institutions. Alongside institutions which receive deposits from the
public, a number of other corporations are classified as banks under the Act of 1984. These
include corporations specialised in a particular activity, such as car loans, business equipment
leasing, property loans, etc. Most financial corporations are subsidiaries of banking groups, but
they can also be subsidiaries of commercial or industrial groups, such as DIAC, a subsidiary of
Renault. Financial corporations also include the investment firms set up in response to the
changes affecting the securities industry.
In 1999, financial corporations received 1.3% of deposits and issued 11.4% of loans.
2.2.5. Specialised financial institutions
There are 24 such institutions. Originally, specialised financial institutions were public in-
stitutions set up to grant subsidised loans to specific sectors and to SMEs. They included Crédit
Local de France, Crédit National, Crédit Foncier de France, Crédit d’Equipement des PME, as
well as regional development agencies.
Most of these institutions were adversely affected by deregulation and by the fact that
the State dropped its traditional policies of granting subsidised loans. Specialised financial insti-
tutions have been involved in widespread restructuring operations. The biggest of these took
place in 1996, when CEPME and Sofaris merged to form Banque des PME, while Crédit Nation-
al and Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur joined forces, creating the Natexis group.
Crédit Local de France now belongs to the Dexia group.
2.2.6. Municipal credit banks
In addition to the five above-mentioned categories of credit institutions, the Banking Act
defined a sixth group: municipal credit banks. This category is smaller than the other five: it
comprises just 22 institutions and in 1999 received 0.1% of deposits and granted 0.1% of loans.
Finally, a description of the banking system would not be complete without mention of
the Post Office group, whose financial services play an important role.
2.3. The capital market
 The capital market helps to channel available capital into economically useful activities in
the public and private sectors at the lowest possible cost. The market plays a regulating role in
the distribution of resources.
Equity issues, along with cash flows, are essential sources of financial equilibrium for busi-
nesses.
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2.3.1. The various functions of the capital market
The capital market is a channel for financing the national economy: the market attracts a por-
tion of saving and channels it into financing for the real economy. It collects capital from eco-
nomic agents with savings (households mainly) and provides businesses and government agen-
cies with long-term funding. It helps to finance business growth. The capital market helps to fi-
nance business investment. The capital raised through the capital market provides long-term fi-
nancing in addition to financing derived from retained earnings.
The market provides a short conduit between savers looking to invest their capital and
investors who need capital.
The capital market helps keep investments liquid: stock market mechanisms adjust the sup-
ply and demand of securities, thus helping to promote their liquidity. Unlike other types of in-
vestments, in real assets, for example, capital market investments can be realised at any time.
For a market for a security to be liquid, buyers and sellers must be able to find counter-
parties for their transactions. This is only possible when the market for a security is deep
enough, meaning that a large number of securities are in circulation and available to the public,
and when the number of daily trades in the security is large enough.
The capital market is an instrument for measuring equity values: by quoting prices for a given
share, the capital market helps to assess the value of a business. In fact, the banking system,
business leaders and tax authorities all recognise share prices, along with other methods, such
as financial analysis, as valid indicators of value.
The capital market promotes change in industry and business structures: the capital market
facilitates business mergers by enabling companies to use their own shares to pay for acquisi-
tions.
The capital market is where securities representing ownership rights (equities) or a debt
(bonds) are traded. Equities give their holders voting rights and entitle them to a share of the
company’s profits in the form of a dividend, whereas bonds pay their holders interest. These
distinctions have become increasingly blurred with the emergence of more sophisticated secu-
rities, such as convertible bonds, non-voting loan stock, investment certificates and non-voting
preferred shares.
The Act of 3 January 1983 gave corporations the right to issue “compound” securities
relying on foreign exchange and conversion techniques. Mounting globalisation in the early nine-
teen-eighties led European operators to emulate the techniques used in the United States.
The Financial Activity Modernisation Act 96.597 of 2 July 1996 was passed to transpose
the European Investment Services Directive of 10 May 1993 into French law. The first article
the Act defines a new concept called financial instruments. There are four categories of such
instruments:
— shares and other securities that afford or may afford access to equity,
— debt securities other than trade bills (effets de commerce) and cash vouchers (bons de
caisse),
— Units or shares in collective investment undertakings (SICAV, FCP, FCC, SCPI),
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— Financial futures (forward contracts on bills, securities, indices and currencies, interest
rate futures, swaps, commodity futures and forwards, put and call options on financial
instruments).
The capital market encompasses the primary market, where new offerings are distribut-
ed, and the secondary market, or stock exchange, where existing issues are traded. The purpose
of the primary market is to attract long-term capital to finance the economy. Issues of securi-
ties that increase the equity capital of companies are the preferred way for businesses to ac-
quire the external resources that they need to finance their investment.
The gross issuance amount of equities and bonds accounted for an average of 50% of all
investment in the period from 1992 to 2000.
On average, issues of equities and bonds account for more than half of the external
sources of funds for manufacturing and trading companies. Equities account for only some 20%
of investment financing. Manufacturing and trading companies are the second largest beneficiar-
ies of the capital market, behind government agencies and in front of financial institutions. Man-
ufacturing and trading companies raise capital through:
— equity issues,
— bonds issued either directly or through specialised financing bodies.
The table below shows a large increase in issuance in 2000 owning to the big jump in
equities issues, which reached EUR 66.8 billion, and a substantial increase in bond issuance,
which rose by 35% to reach EUR 49 billion. Corporate bonds accounted for a growing share of
issuance, where as government issuance remained steady at EUR 45.4 billion.
An active primary market requires an efficient secondary market, where existing issues are
traded. Thus, the stock market ensures the liquidity of what are in principle long-term investments.
The stock market is the market for negotiable securities. The purpose of the stock market is
to bring supply and demand together so that saving invested in securities remains liquid at all
times and so that investors can exchange securities for other securities as part of their portfo-
lio management strategy.
TABLE 2
PROPORTION OF SECURITIES ISSUES IN INVESTMENT FINANCING
1992 93.6                   229.56               40.8                 
1993 118.6                   214.62               55.3                 
1994 102.3                   217.93               47.0                 
1995 96.3                   222.10               43.4                 
1996 116.1                   222.06               52.3                 
1997 116.3                   222.04               52.4                 
1998 123.4                   237.97               51.9                 
1999 118.8                   253.03               47.0                 
2000 161.2                   269.21               60.0                 
   Sources: OECD and Euronext
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The stock market helps to distribute corporate capital to the public in the form of shares
using two procedures:
— initial public offerings,
— rights issues.
In the case of an initial public offering, the main shareholders of a limited liability compa-
ny or a limited stock partnership put some of their shares on the market for sale to the public.
Once a company’s shares are traded on the market, it can increase the number of its
shareholders through capital increases involving the sale of shares for cash.
The stock market facilitates restructuring.
Businesses’ production structures change frequently through mergers and acquisi-
tions. These operations can be financed by issuing securities and they are easier to carry
out when the shares of the companies concerned are already traded on the stock market.
The shareholders in the acquired company can be paid in shares or bonds issued by the
acquiring company.
In the case of acquisition of a minority interest or a controlling interest, the acquiring
company can make a bid offering its own shares in exchange for the acquired company’s
shares.
TABLE 3
SECURITIES ISSUES (IN EUR BILLIONS)
Year Govt. bonds Other bonds Equities Total
1992 30.9          24.9          37.7          93.6          
1993 58.8          23.2          36.6          118.6          
1994 39.9          21.6          40.8          102.3          
1995 40.2          16.4          39.7          96.3          
1996 45.9          26.5          43.7          116.1          
1997 51.2          20.5          44.7          116.3          
1998 52.4          22.0          49.0          123.4          
1999 45.4          36.4          37.0          118.8          
2000 45.4          49.0          66.8          161.2          
   Source: Euronext
TABLE 4
TRADING (IN EUR BILLIONS)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Equities 101.0 150.5 171.1 160.5 221.1 371.1 527.2 733.4 1,176.2 
Bonds 659.3 1,101.3 1,042.9 858.6 988.3 775.8 405.0 61.5 50.4 
Total (1) 760.3 1,251.8 1,214.0 1,019.1 1,209.4 1,147.0 932.2 794.9 1,225.9 
   Source: Euronext
   (a)    All markets covered by the Paris Bourse
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Between 1992 and 1996, publicly traded companies engaged in:
• 584 capital increases involving sales of shares for cash,
• 205 share exchange offers,
• 499 takeover bids,
• 111 initial public offerings.
Prices and market capitalisation measure the market value of the equities and bonds
traded on the stock market. This ongoing valuation makes the stock market a valuable indicator
for observing the economy.
2.3.2. How the capital market works
Starting in 1986, traditional open-outcry trading was phased out and replaced by a
screen-trading system. As a result, the trading floors in Paris, Bordeaux, Lille, Lyons, Marseilles,
Nancy and Nantes were shut down.
There are different market compartments.
2.3.2.1. REGULATED MARKETS
The Premier Marché (formerly called the “Cote officielle”), the Second Marché and the
Nouveau Marché.
The listing rules for the Premier Marché are much stricter than the rules in the other
markets. The Premier Marché lists the largest French and foreign companies as well as nearly all
government and corporate bond issues.
Fewer than 500 French companies are listed on the Premier Marché, but the average
market capitalisation has increased substantially owing to privatisation and rising share prices.
The value of trading in Premier Marché shares and, more particularly, bonds accounts for
90% of the value of trading in all markets. This, along with the size of the listed companies, testi-
fies to the dynamic activity of the Premier Marché.
The Second Marché opened in February 1983. It was designed to attract medium sized
companies by offering more flexible rules, particularly with regard to the proportion of shares
offered to the public. Some large companies are listed on the Second Marché, as a first step
towards being listed on the Premier Marché.
The Nouveau Marché opened in February 1996. It was designed for rapidly growing Euro-
pean companies with expansion plans that would like to raise equity financing to speed up their
expansion and to obtain stable financing.
The Nouveau Marché is not restricted to high-technology firms. Any company, even
one that has yet to show a profit, can be listed on this market, if it meets the listing crite-
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ria. Applicants do not need to have a track record of three profitable years, as is the case
for the Second Marché. Unlike a listing on the Premier Marché or Second Marché, an IPO
on the Nouveau Marché automatically means that the company being listed is increasing its
capital.
SCHEME 1
LISTING REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES
Premier Marché Second Marché Nouveau Marché Marché Libre
Criteria





EUR 100 m float of
EUR 10 m for
companies listed on
foreign markets





25% of share capital or
600,000 shares
10% of share capital 100,000 shares worth
EUR 5 m, 20% of share
capital, including at least










statements if fy ended









statements is fy ended




. No track record
. capital > EUR 1.5 m
. founding shareholders’
commitment to hold 80% to
100% of their shares for 1
year or 6 months
. prospectus approved by




prior to the start of
trading
Usual cost At least EUR 1 m,








7% to 10% of the amount
raised
Costs low, except for
communication
expenses
Choices regarding advertising budgets, road shows and prospectuses largely determine listing costs.
Market liquidity In principle, the most
liquid market, especially
in the case of shares













This market is usually very
narrow
Advantages . easier to place issues with major investors
(regulation + liquidity)
. bearer certificates
. eligible for tax sheltered long-term savings
products
. change in conversion ratio for convertible bond
issues, etc.




































2) publication in BALO (shareholders’ meetings; financial operations)
3) notification of SBF of any material change in ownership
public disclosure of any event in the company’s business that is likely to cause a change in share prices
COB Commission des Opérations de Bourse (market
regulator)
BALO Bulletin des annonces légales obligatoires
SBF Former name: Société des bourses françaises , the
company’s new name is Paris Bourse SBF SA




The Marché Libre opened on 23 September 1996. The abbreviation OTC was dropped
for this unregulated market. It replaced the “Hors Cote” compartment, which was abolished
under the Financial Activity Modernisation Act of 2 July 1996.
The Marché Libre is a means of disseminating buy and sell orders and a trading facility
for securities issued by companies that are not listed on regulated markets in France. In this
market compartment, there are no listing procedures and issuers are not bound by any disclo-
sure requirements.
Orders are matched once a day at 3.00 pm. The Marché Libre is a cash-settlement mar-
ket. The Paris-Bourse systems handle trades, payments, deliveries and data dissemination.
The main features of this market are the lack of investor protection and the relatively
small size of the companies traded.
Delisted Securities
This compartment is where securities that have been removed from the regulated mar-
kets are traded. Such securities are withdrawn from this compartment within six months of
delisting and can no longer be traded.
Derivatives Markets
The first derivatives markets opened in 1986 to enable operators to hedge against vari-
ous risks, such as exchange rate risk or interest rate risk. More and more long-term lending is
indexed on money market rates, which has increased interest rate risk exposure and made in-
terest rates more volatile. Market participants are also concerned about price risk exposure on
variable income securities, meaning the risk of making a capital loss on their equities portfolios.
Two types of products are traded on organised derivatives markets:
— futures
— traded options
Futures and futures options are the main financial instruments traded on France’s finan-
cial futures markets, Matif, (formerly, Marché à terme d’instruments financiers, and now called
Marché à terme international de France).
A futures contract is an agreement on a particular price and a stipulated date under which,
— the buyer takes delivery and pays for a specific amount of the underlying product;
— the seller delivers and receives payment for a specified amount of the underlying
product.
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Some contracts can be settled with cash payment of the difference between the traded
price and the settlement price.
Three categories of products are traded on the MATIF:
1. Interest rate futures for hedging, arbitraging or speculation transactions on long-
term, medium-term and short-term interest rates;
2. Stock index futures for hedging equities portfolios or speculating on the future trend
in French equities prices, futures contracts on the CAC 40 stock market index;
3. Commodities futures on sugar, coffee, cacao and potatoes.
The key to MATIF’s success lies in the enormous popularity of the Notional Future and
its offshoot, the Option on the Notional Future. This popularity boosted the MATIF, making it
the third largest interest rate futures market in the world in 1988. The Notional, which became
the Euro Notional on 4 January 1999, accounted for half of the contracts traded on the MATIF
for a very long time.
The other futures traded on the MATIF include the 3-month PIBOR future and the 3-
month EURODEM future.
Traded Options: Options give their buyers the right (but not the obligation) to buy (call
options) or sell (put options) a specified amount of an asset at a price stipulated from the out-
set before a particular date. The distinctive characteristic of traded options, compared to OTC
options, is that there is an organised market where option buyers can resell their options and
option writers can buy back their options.
Option contracts are traded on the Monep or Matif markets. These contracts can take
different forms depending on the risks being hedged:
— The Marché des Options Négociables de Paris (MONEP) lists equity options and
CAC 40 index options. These contracts are intended for speculation, arbitraging and
hedging with regard to equities portfolios.
— The MATIF lists traded option contracts on the Notional Future in French francs, the
3-month PIBOR future and the 3-month EURODEM future, as well as currency op-
tions.
Equity Options (1): the Marché des Options Négociables de Paris (MONEP) mainly lists
call and put options on equities. The stocks chosen as the underlying assets for traded options
have to meet certain criteria relating to the size of the floating supply of shares and how repre-
sentative the stock is of its economic sector. An option contract relates to a set number of
shares of the underlying stock and the buyer can exercise the option at any time up until the
last trading day before the option expires. The expiry dates fall every three months and option
contracts can cover three, six, or nine months.
A call option buyer can decide to buy the underlying shares at any time and the option
writer must deliver them at the agreed-upon price (exercise price). A put option buyer can de-
(1) Société des Bourses Françaises decided to close the market for plain options, options to double and
premia in May 1989. These markets had been deserted after the Monep opened in June 1987.
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cide to sell the underlying shares to the option writer, who must take delivery and pay the
agreed-upon price. It both cases, the decision is up to the option buyer. The option buyer pays a
premium for this right when buying the option from the writer. The option prices quoted on
the market represent the cost of an option for a single underlying share. The premium is equal
to this price multiplied by the number of shares.
Index Options: A market for trading in options on the CAC 40 index opened in 1988. This
type of option, which is not based on a deliverable underlying asset, is very popular in other
countries, because index option markets are more liquid, less complex to operate and less
costly than equity option markets. Investors can use index option markets to profit from rises
and falls in the whole Paris market on the basis of a single trade and without being exposed to
risks on specific stocks.
Interest Rate Options: the features of options contracts on the 3-month Pibor and the 3-
month Eurodem traded on the Matif are similar to the features of the equity option contracts
explained above. There are call options and put options, the buyer pays the writer the full pre-
mium immediately and option traders must maintain margin deposits that are adjusted for the
size of their positions.
Currency Options: large corporations use currency options to manage their exchange rate
risk. The Matif introduced its first two currency option contracts in May 1994. These were the
$/DEM and the $/FRF contracts. The underlying asset for both contracts is a spot foreign ex-
change transaction ($/DEM or $/FRF).
2.4. The institutional framework in France
The European Investment Services Directive (ISD), which came into force on 1 January
1996, required the European Union Member States to adapt their national legislation.
France accomplished this by passing the “Financial Activity Modernisation Act” of 2 July
1996. Prior to this date, three types of financial intermediaries had been active on the markets
for what are now called investment services:
— credit institutions, which were the only operators on the primary market for issues
of new securities. Credit institutions could trade in all financial instruments except
transferable securities.
— stockbrokers, whose legal form had been redefined in 1988. Stockbrokers held the
monopoly on trading in transferable securities and the exclusive right to trade on the
stock market. As stockbrokers, they did not have access to the primary market for
issues of new securities.
— Portfolio management companies, which engaged solely in individual portfolio man-
agement.
These three types of intermediaries were subject to three separate supervisory authori-
ties and three sets of rules, even when they were engaged in the same types of activity.
2.4.1. The New Regulatory Framework
The new Act defines only two types of intermediaries, which are now called investment
service providers:
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— credit institutions (banks, savings institutions, etc.),
— investment firms (formerly stockbrokers and portfolio management companies,
which no longer exist as distinct legal forms).
Both types of intermediaries can engage in the market activities of their choice, including
receiving and transmitting customer orders, executing orders, portfolio management, under-
writing and placement, subject to authorisation from:
— the Commission des Opérations de Bourse (COB) in the case of portfolio manage-
ment,
— the Conseil des Marchés Financiers (CMF) and the Comité des Établissements de
Crédit et des Entreprises d’Investissement (CECB) for other activities.
Authorised traders wishing to trade on regulated markets must become members of the
markets concerned.
The Financial Activity Modernisation Act distinguishes between two types of markets:
— “regulated” markets are officially recognised as such when they meet a set of criteria
relating to operating procedures, listing requirements and disclosure requirements
(Premier Marché, Second Marché and Nouveau Marché),
— and over-the-counter markets, which do not have to meet any minimum require-
ments.
Commission des Opérations de Bourse
The Commission des Opérations de Bourse (COB) was set up in 1967 and modelled on
the American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It is an independent administrative
authority managed by 10 commissioners. The COB’s role is to ensure investor protection, pub-
lic disclosure and smooth operation of markets in financial instruments, according to Ordinance
67-833 of 28 September 1967, as amended.
Its key powers relate to supervision of disclosures by companies making public offerings
and supervision of market operations. It has specific responsibility for supervision of UCITS, in-
vestments in “various assets” and the commercial paper market.
The COB’s supervision of disclosures is primarily conducted before information is dis-
closed. Within the limits set by European regulations governing mutual recognition, which
streamline the procedures, the COB approves or rejects the documents (prospectuses, etc.)
that issuers are required to publish and make available to the public:
— before listing financial instruments;
— when making a public offering;
— when making takeover bids, exchange offers or buy-out offers.
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For these purposes, the COB:
— monitors companies’ disclosures;
— authorises new mutual funds. Issues of money market instruments are subject to spe-
cial rules: only unrated issuers are required to publish a financial presentation report.
This report must be filed with the COB and the Banque de France by the issue date
at the latest, regardless of the maturity of the securities;
— grants authorisation to credit institutions and investment firms to engage in portfolio
management;
— ensures the legality of transactions. French law prohibits insider dealing and price ma-
nipulation,
— deals with complaints from the public.
The COB also has the right to oppose the listing of a security on a regulated market. It
also has the power to impose penalties for violations of its rules.
The Conseil des Marchés Financiers
The Conseil des Marchés Financiers (CMF) is an industry body governed by a 16-mem-
ber board. It is the French market authority and its brief covers all operations (except portfolio
management) conducted by credit institutions and investment firms on the regulated and OTC
markets.
Its main functions are:
— supervision of regulated markets,
— acceptance of business plans and licensing of intermediaries offering investment serv-
ices (other than asset management),
— acceptance and management of public offerings and takeover bids
The Conseil des arches financiers (CMF) replaced the Conseil des bourses de valeurs
(CBV) and the Conseil du marché à terme (CMT), which were the former regulators of the
stock market and futures market respectively.
The CMF is an industry body and the members are appointed at the suggestion of bodies
representing firms making public offerings, investors, market intermediaries, including invest-
ment firms, and the employees of these corporations and institutions.
The CMF has a plenary assembly, specialised groups and disciplinary groups. A Banque de
France representative attends the plenary sessions and has a vote.
The CMF’s main tasks are to draft and implement the general regulations that establish
the general organisation standards and operating rules for regulated markets, along with the
rules applying to investment service providers on best practices, organisation, administration,
supervision and security. The general regulations also set the operating conditions for bookrun-
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ners, custodians and depositaries. The CMF also examines applications for authorisation to con-
duct intermediation activities and makes recommendations on the creation, recognition and
closure of regulated markets.
It defines the rules for such operations as public offerings and the rules for constituting
guarantee funds. It approves the by-laws of clearing houses and guarantee schemes and it ap-
proves the master agreements used for transactions in financial instruments, etc.
In comparison to its predecessors, the CBV and the CMT, the Conseil des marches finan-
ciers has fewer powers in terms of prudential supervision and authorisation of institutions and
in terms of the operating rules for regulated markets. These rules are now set by the undertak-
ings running the markets.
On the other hand, the CMF has broader powers to set the rules for engaging in invest-
ment service activities. This represents a substantial responsibility in view of the broad defini-
tion of financial instruments given in the first article of the Financial Activity Modernisation Act,
the definition of investment services in the fourth article and the definition of related services
given in the fifth article. This means that the CMF has taken over the rule-making powers of the
central securities depository (Sicovam) and the power to licence bookrunners formerly held by
the Ministry of the Economy.
Paris Bourse SBF SA
Up until September 2000, the CMF was assisted in its securities market tasks by a market
undertaking called, Paris Bourse SBF SA, (formerly named Société des bourses françaises –SBF-).
In June 1999, Paris Bourse SBF SA merged the entities involved in market activities (SBF, Matif SA,
Monep SA and Société du Nouveau Marché) and centralised its clearing activities at a central
clearing bank called Clearnet SBF SA. All of its technology and software engineering activities
were also merged to form a new subsidiary called Euronext SBF SA. Paris Bourse’s main func-
tions were to apply and interpret the CMF’s regulations and decisions and to supervise market
professionals.
2.4.2. Recent Developments
The Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris stock markets have merged to form Euronext, the
first pan-European stock market.
The merger was announced in March 2000 and, on 22 September 2000 a holding company
named Euronext N.V. was set up. Shareholders in the Amsterdam Exchanges, Brussels Exchanges
and ParisBourseSBF SA received shares in the new company in exchange for their shares.
Three market undertakings, which are all wholly owned subsidiaries, have been set up
because of regulatory requirements with regard to listing procedures and takeovers, as well as
a desire to have Euronext fit into the specific cultural environment of each country. These sub-
sidiaries are Euronext Amsterdam N.V., Euronext Brussels SA/N.V. and Euronext Paris SA. They
are three points of access to a unified market for issuers, intermediaries and investors. In the
first half of 2001, trading will be unified, followed by clearing and settlement in the second quar-
ter. The creation of Euronext will enable investors to use a single access point to trade in a
broad range of securities and derivatives (futures and options on interest rates, indices, equities
and commodities).
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Euronext is a unified market and will have:
— a single trading platform
— a single order book for each stock, which will make the market for each stock more
transparent and more liquid;
— a single clearing house that acts as the central counterparty for all traders guarantee-
ing payment and delivery for all participants;
— a single securities settlement system.
Trading: the most liquid stocks listed on Euronext will be traded continuously throughout
the day, with opening and closing call auctions. Less liquid stocks will be trading by call auction
only.
As is the case on the French market today, market makers will be able to make markets
in both continuously traded and call auction securities.
Timetable: the Euronext 100 and Next 150 indices, which were launched on 2 October
2000, are disseminated in real time. The other indices in the Euronext family will be created in
the coming months.
New market rules are being drafted. They will be incorporated into the market computer
systems once they have been validated by the regulators in the three countries. This process
should be completed in the first quarter of 2001.
2.4.3. General organisation of the French market
Euronext Paris SA:
— sets the market regulations and submits them to the CMF for approval
— admits new listings,
— admits market members
— manages the computerised trading systems,
— disseminates trading and price data,
— registers trades between member firms through its wholly owned subsidiary, Clear-
net SA, a clearing house that guarantees payment and delivery of securities bought
and sold,
— provides issuers with services for listing their securities and executing their financial
transactions.
Member Firms: market access had been restricted to Agents de Change until this category
of intermediary was abolished in 1988 to be replaced by stockbrokers. Today, market access is
granted to all French and foreign financial intermediaries established in France.
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Computerisation has made it possible to offer market access to intermediaries in other
countries, who are referred to as “remote members”.
— Trading members are authorised (2) credit institutions and investment firms that have
become members of the market in order to execute buy and sell orders;
— Clearing members are the institutions that handle settlement through Clearnet SA,
ensuring that deliveries and payments to buyers and sellers are made within the stip-
ulated time limits, once the trading members have executed their trades.
Trading members can also apply to be clearing members and handle all of these opera-
tions on their own. Otherwise, they can limit their activities to execution of orders and con-
tract out settlement operations to a clearing member.
Order Collectors: when they are not Euronext members, financial intermediaries, such
banks and investment firms, can collect their customers orders and transmit them to a trading
member, thus sparing their customers from further formalities. Order collectors have to be li-
























(2) The CMF and the CECEI grant authorisations for trading members located in France. The home coun-
try authorities grant authorisations for trading members located in other European Union countries that operate
under a European passport.
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Order Transmitters are not authorised to open accounts, handle securities or receive cash.
They are service providers that transmit orders, using computer links in most cases, to the in-
termediary (trading member or order collector) that manages the customers’ accounts.
Harmonised Listings: Euronext’s functional and technical integration was designed to re-
spect the legal and cultural environment of each country.
The means that the companies listed on Euronext via Paris will continue to operate under
French supervision, French regulations and French procedures. As in the past, companies will have
to produce a prospectus and submit it to the COB for approval before listing their securities.
Euronext listings will distinguish between new economy stocks (information technology,
telecommunications, new media, biotechnology, etc.) and old economy stocks.
Indices: The national indices (AEX 25, BEL 20, CAC 40, etc.) will be maintained, calculated
and disseminated in the same way.
At the same time, a new family of Euronext indices will be established to give a full re-
flection of the transnational character of the sectoral components of the listings.
The Euronext 100 and Next 150 indices covering the largest market capitalisations were
launched in October 2000. Other indices reflecting the new segmentation of the Euronext mar-
ket will be introduced in 2001.
The CAC 40 index, as its name indicates, is made up of 40 stocks. The stocks are chosen
from amongst the 100 largest market capitalisations on the French market that have the broad-
est shareholder base amongst French and foreign institutional investors and private investors
and that are the most actively traded on a daily basis.
Trading: all securities have been traded on a cash basis since 25 September 2000. However,
intermediaries can offer their customers deferred settlement service for a limited number of
French and foreign stocks traded on the Premier Marché, Second Marché and Nouveau Marchés.
A stock has to meet two criteria to be eligible for deferred settlement:
— it must be a component of the SBF 120 index
— or it must have a market capitalisation of more than EUR 1 billion and the value of
daily trading must reach at least EUR 1 million.
Euronext Paris SA publishes the list of stocks eligible for deferred settlement.
Orders: they must provide specific information on the validity period and execution price.
Pricing Process: trading takes place on a centralised, order-driven market, where member
firms act as brokers.
Trading no longer takes place on the floor of the Paris stock exchange building (3). Trans-
actions are now conducted via a screen trading system.
(3) The Paris stock exchange building no longer houses any trading activity. It is now used as a venue for
conferences and other events.
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The overall system architecture is based four systems that operate synergistically:
— the central trading system;
— input for the central trading system comes from order routing systems. Orders can
be entered by trading members, order collectors or even individual customers using
a minitel or internet connection;
— output from the central trading system goes to the real-time data dissemination sys-
tem and the securities settlement system.
Orders for each stock are automatically ranked by price limit on the central order book
as they enter the system.
Two rules determine the order of execution:
— Price: buy orders with higher price limits are executed before those with lower price
limits. Conversely, sell orders with lower price limits are executed before those with
higher price limits;
— Time. Two orders to buy or sell with the same price limit are executed in chronolog-
ical order.
There are several stages in the trading day:
— Pre-opening from 7:45 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., when orders are fed into the central order
book but no transactions occur;
— Opening at 9:00 a.m., when the system calculates a call auction price that successfully
matches the largest number of the orders received;
— Trading from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., when trading is continuous and a new order im-
mediately triggers one or more trades if the central order book contains matching
orders. The execution price is the price limit for the matching order in the central
order book.
— Pre-closing from 5:30 p.m. to 5:35 p.m. when orders are fed into the central order
book by no trades take place, as is the case during the pre-opening stage;
— Closing at 5:35 p.m., when a call auction determines the closing prices.
Once a trade is completed, the trading system immediately:
— sends trade confirmations to the trading members that entered the buy and sell or-
ders, with all the information necessary to book the trade;
— sends settlement instructions to the Clearnet clearinghouse;
— updates trading screen data.
Data Dissemination: the trading system automatically feeds data to the dissemination
system.
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Settlement: France switched to a book-entry system for all securities. This meant that se-
curities were deposited with authorised intermediaries (banks and investment firms) that hold
accounts with the central securities depository SICOVAM (4).
Registered and bearer certificates now only exist as book entries and they circulate only
in the form of transfers between intermediaries’ accounts.
The settlement system is based on two fundamental principles and a computer system.
The system also provides a settlement guarantee from Euronext via its subsidiary Clearnet SA.
The two fundamental principles are delivery-versus-payment and a standard time frame for set-
tlement. The available balances of the intermediaries’ cash and securities accounts are checked
prior to each settlement to ensure that payment is not made for securities that cannot be de-
livered and that securities are not delivered when payment cannot be made.
Trades are recorded on the customers’ accounts on T, the trade date and ownership is
transferred. Then, on T + 3, meaning three trading days after the trade, the intermediaries’ secu-
rities and cash accounts are debited.
SICOVAM’S SPECIAL ROLE
Sicovam has initiated and managed major changes on the French market, such as the
switch to a book-entry system in 1984, the bearer certificate identification service in 1987 and
the Relit computerised delivery-versus-payment settlement system in 1991. The central deposi-
tory has always anticipated its members’ needs and been ready to meet them. Virtually every
securities transaction in France involves Sicovam at some point.
It initiated the set of requirements for custodians that have applied since 1 January 1995
to its 700 or so subsidiaries and subsidiaries’ subsidiaries that now provide services of unri-
valled quality. The requirements introduced segregated accounts for customers, which prevent
custodians from using their customers’ securities for their proprietary transactions. This change
has enhanced the safety of customers’ securities deposits.
In 1995, Sicovam joined forces with the Banque de France and its Saturne settlement sys-
tem for Treasury notes and money market instruments. The result was a single market-wide
settlement system called RGV (Relit Grande Vitesse), which started operating in 1998. It was
the first settlement system to provide real-time finality of payment.
2.5. Financial instruments
2.5.1. Equities or Shares
A share is one of the equal parts into which the share capital of a joint stock company or
a corporation is divided. The ownership of a share is evidenced by certificates or by entries in a
computer data-base. Shares are variable-yield securities.
There are different types of shares:
— Ordinary shares are issued by companies on incorporating and increasing their capi-
tal by the issuance of new shares.
(4) SICOVAM will become Euroclear France in January 2001.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA - BANQUE DE FRANCE / FRENCH AND SPANISH INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS 195
ANNEX IV
— Preference shares: Preference shareholders are paid a dividend corresponding to a
steady interest rate with a limited risk; they have a prior claim over ordinary share-
holders whose dividend payment depends on profits.
— Preferred non-voting shares: they have the same face value as the ordinary shares.
These shareholders are paid a peferential dividend but are not allowed to vote in the
annual general shareholders meetings.
Listed companies may be the target of take-over bids in which the shares are paid for in
cash. If shares are offered in exchange for a stake in the company (usually shares issued by the
bidding firm), this process is known as a public offer of exchange.
2.5.2. Bonds
Bonds are securities that establish the holders’ rights as creditors. The key characteristics
of these securities are that they are redeemable under the conditions defined at the time of
issue and that, except in special cases, they pay annual interest.
Public limited companies, the central government, local authorities and public sector
agencies and bodies can obtain the long-term funding they need by issuing bonds.
Each bond issue has its own specific characteristics: maturity, number of securities issued,
par value of the securities, interest rate, coupon payment date, issue price, redemption price
and redemption procedures.
1. Corporate Bonds
In order to protect investors, the only entities legally entitled to issue bonds are:
— public limited companies, except for investment firms,
— Industrial groups and Regional Development Companies (SDR).
When a company borrows money by issuing bonds, it obtains new funds and, in exchange, it
incurs the financial expense of making the interest payments and redeeming the bonds.
On the other hand, if a company increases its capital by selling new shares for cash, the
funds raised increase the company’s equity. It is then up to the company to remunerate the
newly issued shares, which entitle the shareholders to a share of the company’s annual profit in
the form of a dividend payment.
A company’s choice between issuing bonds or equities depends on several factors, such
as the nature of its funding requirements and its standing on the capital market.
Holders of a single bond issue automatically form a group that looks out for the bond-
holders’ interests.
CONVENTIONAL BONDS
This is the most common type of bond. These bonds pay a fixed rate of interest and are
redeemed at the price set out in the indenture. Sometimes, bondholders are paid a redemption
premium.
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FLOATING AND ADJUSTABLE RATE BONDS
The first floating rate bonds were issued in 1976. The interest on such bonds, which may
be paid once or twice a year, is calculated at then end of the period on the basis of the monthly
average money market rates or else on the basis of the bond market rate on the date the pay-
ment is calculated. The interest paid is equal to the chosen reference rate plus or minus a
spread that depends on the issuer’s creditworthiness.
The first adjustable rate bonds were issued in 1980. The interest payment for the year or
half year is calculated at the start of the period on the basis of the monthly average money
market or bond market rates on the issue date and one each successive adjustment date. These
bonds created a family of securities paying a fixed income, but over a given period of between 6
months and 3 years, which is shorter than the total life of the bond.
SUBORDINATED PERPETUAL BONDS (TSDI)
These bonds are only redeemed when the company is wound up and after all the other
creditors have been paid off (except for those holding non-voting loan stock). The financial
community considers such instruments to be virtual equity, and they reinforce the stable fund-
ing of the issuing company.
CONVERTIBLE BONDS
Companies can issue bonds that can be converted into shares.
The indenture must specify:
— the conversion conditions and basis (e.g. one share for one bond),
— the period during which holders can exchange their bonds for shares. Legal provi-
sions require that such bond issues be convertible at any time.
Companies can also issue bonds that are exchangeable:
— for shares that have already been issued and are held by others,
— or for shares that are specially issued for this purpose.
In the second case, the company increases its capital at the same time as it issues the
bonds. The shares are subscribed by banks or entities that have bank guarantees.
BONDS WITH BOND WARRANTS (OBSO)
Some bonds are issued with a warrant that entitles the holder to subscribe a second
bond later on at dates and prices specified in the indenture.
BONDS WITH EQUITY WARRANTS (OBSA)
This category of bonds was introduced by the Investment Development and Protection
Act of 3 January 1983.
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These bonds come with one or more warrants that entitle the holder to subscribe to
shares to be issued by the company at one or more prestated prices under terms and condi-
tions set out in the indenture. The exercise period for such warrants must not run more than
three months past the final redemption date of the bonds.
SINGLE COUPON BONDS
One of the advantages of a single coupon bond is that it provides investors with a fixed
yield to maturity.
Furthermore, the interest due on a single coupon bond is not paid each year. Instead it is
reinvested to earn even more interest, hence the term “compound interest”.
ZERO COUPON BONDS
As their name suggests, zero coupon bonds do not pay annual interest. The yield of the
bond is deferred until maturity and paid in the form of a large redemption premium.
When bonds are separated from their coupons and the principal and interest payments
are traded separately on the secondary market, the resulting securities are called STRIPS (Sepa-
rate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities). 
Zero coupon bonds and strips are fairly similar and both originated in the United States.
They both offer advantages for buyers and investors in terms of duration; since there are no
interim interest payments there is no uncertainty about reinvestment yields. They also offer tax
advantages since the earnings are taxed later and/or at a lower rate than interest on conven-
tional bonds.
This flexibility means that the issuer can offer a lower yield at the issue date.
The French government introduced strips to the market in 1986 with its “Félins”. These
early strips were not very popular, but they did pave the way for the technique that has been
legal in France since 1991, by which Sicovam and primary dealers in government securities can
strip French Treasury bonds on the secondary market, while reserving the right to reconstitute
the whole bonds later on.
FRENCH TREASURY BONDS (OATS)
Bonds issued by France’s central government are currently called obligations assimilables
du Trésor (OAT). Technically, these bonds are no different from conventional bonds. They are sim-
ply bonds with the same indenture clauses as earlier issues, except for the issue price. This
means that different tranches can be fungible and subsequent issues can be added to the same
listing.
Furthermore, after of the FELIN (Fonds d’état libres d’intérêt nominal) strips introduced in 1986
failed to catch on, the central government experimented with a new type of strip in 1992. This in-
volved separating bonds into the corpus, representing the principal and a series of coupons and list-
ing all of them separately on the secondary market. This technique actually creates zero coupon
bonds, since the investor does not receive any interim payments before the bond matures.
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After converting all of its securities to the euro on 4 January 1999, the French govern-
ment has naturally become a driving force on the euro market, where all public and private
sector issuers will now have to find their places.
GOVERNMENT BONDS
The central government stopped using underwriting groups to issue various types of se-
curities when it switched to auctions in the mid nineteen-eighties. However, in 1993, the central
government revived the underwriting group procedure for the “Balladur” bond, a 6% bond ma-
turing in July 1997 that raised a total of FRF 110 billion.
TREASURY BILLS AND NOTES
Treasury bills and notes are used in addition to long-term debt instruments to provide
more flexible cash management in the short and medium term. This is particularly useful at
times when interest rates look likely to rise, since investors tend to prefer shorter maturities at
such times.
This category includes two types of securities that correspond to different needs:
— Bons à taux fixe (BTF) are discount Treasury bills. These bills with maturities of up to
one year and no coupon payments are used to meet short-term borrowing require-
ments resulting from fluctuations in the government’s cash position over the year.
They are also used for short-term market intervention. BTFs account for less than
10% of negotiable public sector debt.
— Bons à taux fixe et intérêt annuel (BTAN) are fixed-rate medium-term Treasury notes
with annual coupon payments. They are issued with maturities of two to five years for
medium-term management of government debt. They are a key element in the Treas-
ury’s issuance programmes and they bridge the gap between BTFs and OATs. They
account for a large proportion of negotiable public sector debt. The percentage usu-
ally fluctuates between 20% and 30%.
GOVERNMENT SECURITY ISSUANCE AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
Being fully aware that the markets are by far its main source of financing, the French gov-
ernment manages its debt to achieve three main objectives:
— reducing the apparent and real cost of borrowing and adjusting maturities as far as
possible using all of the techniques that have proven effective in the private sector,
such a swaps;
— being a trailblazer for the introduction and development of new instruments on the
Paris market;
— ongoing improvements in the timing of government borrowing on the bond market.
The government’s policy relies on several instruments:
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a) Treasury Auctions
Treasury auctions are the preferred technique for issuing government securities in
France. Auctions were used to issue current account Treasury notes starting in 1973. Auctions
of OATs started at the end of 1985, followed by auctions of BTFs and BTANs. The auction
technique is based on the principle of competitive bidding and helps to ensure transparency
and investor confidence.
The Banque de France, acting as a service provider for the Treasury and the bidding insti-
tutions, developed the Telsat (télétransmission des soumissions aux adjudications de valeurs du Tré-
sor) computerised bidding system. The Banque de France Securities Division uses the system to
transmit the bids to the Treasury less than one minute after bidding closes.
b) The Government Debt Management Fund (fonds de soutien des rentes et valeurs du
Trésor (FSR))
In addition to modernising its issuance policy, the French Treasury had to improve the
management of the secondary market for its securities via the intervention of the Government
Debt Management Fund. The Fund is entitled to conduct all transactions in all securities issued
by the central government. Agency France Trésor, which was established on 8 February 2001
and reports to the Permanent Head of the Treasury Directorate, is responsible for managing all
of the central government’s cash holdings and debt.
c) Primary Dealers in Government Securities [spécialistes en valeurs du Trésor (SVT)]
The Treasury works with a network of twenty financial intermediaries (including ten for-
eign institutions) that are specialists modelled on American “Primary Dealers”. These specialists
in Treasury bonds, bills and notes are responsible for placing issues and making a secondary
market for them. By dealing with this network, the Treasury achieves four objectives: it ensures
a transparent and liquid secondary market for Treasury securities, it obtains the most accurate
information possible about financial markets, it promotes consultations on government security
issuance policies and it ensures more international ownership French government securities.
France’s primary dealers are generally, but not exclusively, banks. They must respect a se-
ries of commitments:
— They must employ a team of Treasury securities professionals to place issues with in-
vestors and to trade on the government securities market;
— They must quote bid and asked prices at all times for the main Treasury issues;
— They must make substantial efforts to place Treasury securities;
— They must be regular and substantial bidders at Treasury auctions.
In exchange, the Treasury makes certain commitments to its primary dealers:
— It holds regular meetings with them.
— It involves them in the elaboration of its issuance policy.
— It grants them the right to make non-competitive bids.
— It gives them the right to strip and reconstitute OATs.
Today, OATs account for every one of the top thirty bond listings in terms of market
capitalisation and liquidity.
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2.5.3. Money market securities
France’s financial markets were traditionally compartmentalised. The short-term financing
market (money market) was totally separate from the medium-term and long-term financing
market (capital market). Access to the different market compartments was restricted to certain
economic agents. For example, individuals and businesses did not have access to the money
market, which was open, with a few rare exceptions, to credit institutions only.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Under the terms of Act 91-716 of 26 July 1991 (Article 19.1), “negotiable debt instruments
are securities issued at the issuer’s discretion and traded on a regulated market or over the counter,
SCHEME 3
MARKET ORGANISATION. OVERVIEW AT 1 JANUARY 1999
                     Instruments
Characteristics
Certificates of deposit Commercial paper Negotiable medium-term notes
Issuers – Resident and non-resident
credit institutions
– Caisse des dépôts et
consignations
– Resident and non-resident non-
bank companies, with 2 years in
business, incorporated as public
limited companies, public sector
firms, cooperatives, EIGs or
private companies whose
members are all eligible issuers.
– Investment firms
– EEC institutions and
international organisations of
which France is a member
– All eligible issuers of certificates
of deposit or commercial paper
Initial maturity 1 day to 1 year 1 day to 1 year 1 day to 1 year or more
Minimum amount FRF 1 million or the countervalue of FRF 1 million in euro or foreign currency
Book entry circulation Mandatory since 26 January 1993
Rating Optional
Rated issuers are subject to a streamlined disclosure procedure.
The rating must be determined by a specialised rating agency on the list drawn up by the Ministry of the
Economy
COB approval required for
unrated issuers not located in
France
COB approval required for
unrated issuers
COB approval required for
unrated non-bank issuers and
unrated credit institutions not
located in France
COB approval terms
COB approval lapses if the issuer is absent from the market for more than one year.
COB can withdraw its approval if the issuer fails to comply with disclosure requirements.
Issue price Negotiable debt securities can be issued at a discount and include a redemption premium. If an issue of a
negotiable debt security does not guarantee full redemption of the principal, the prospectus must contain a
warning to this effect. Furthermore, the proportion of the principal that the issuer guarantees must be
specified at the time of issue.
Issue currency Euro (including its national denominations) or any foreign currency, unless temporarily banned by the
Banque de France.
Remuneration No restrictions
When the remuneration varies under the terms of an index-linking clause that does not refer to a usual
interbank market, money market or bond market rate, the Banque of France must be informed of the
index-linking clause prior to issue.
Buy backs No restrictions




Issuers shall inform the Banque de France of early redemption on a weekly basis.
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each of which represents a claim on the issuer for a specified period”. The market in such instru-
ments opened in 1985 with short-term securities. It expanded substantially in 1992 with the intro-
duction of negotiable medium-term notes. This event marked the division of the money market into
two distinct segments: the short-term segment, where securities with initial maturities of up to one
year were traded, and the medium and long-term segment, where securities with initial maturities
of over one year were traded. This is still the prevailing pattern today.
Money market securities were introduced as part of the reform of the money market
implemented in the mid nineteen-eighties. This reform led to decompartmentalisation of the fi-
nancial market by increasing the range and quality of instruments available for borrowers and
SCHEME 3
MARKET ORGANISATION. OVERVIEW AT 1 JANUARY 1999 (continuation)
                       Instruments
Characteristics
Certificates of deposit Commercial paper Negotiable medium-term notes
The guarantee may be provided by:
•   a credit institution that is eligible to provide such a guarantee
• an investment firm that is authorised to issue commercial paper, if
said firm directly or indirectly owns at least 20% of the issuer’s capital
or is at least 20% directly or indirectly owned by the issuer.
Guarantee (if any)
In addition, for issuers mentioned
in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th indents of III
in Article 19 of the Act of 26 July
1991, an entity that is authorised
to issue commercial paper if said
entity directly or indirectly owns at
least 20% of the issuer’s capital
or is at least 20% directly or
indirectly owned by the issuer.
These securities can be
guaranteed under the rules
applied to certificates of deposit
or commercial paper, depending
on the status of the issuer.
Manager, Paying agent The paying agent must be a credit institution or an investment firm located in France, or the Caisse des
dépôts et consignations (credit institutions and investment firms located in France can act as the paying
agent for their own securities).
Securities can be managed by Sicovam at the issuer’s request.
Placement and trading Placement and trading by credit institutions, investment firms and the Caisse des dépôts et consignations
Market supervision,
penalties
The Banque de France takes the necessary measures to ensure smooth market operation. The Banque
de France may suspend or ban any issuer that fails to comply with the provisions in force.
Money supply category:
securities with initial
maturities of up to 2 years
When held by non-financial
agents or by financial customers
(investment firms and non-
money-market funds):
M 3 – M 2
Securities issued by credit
institutions if held by non-financial
agents or by financial customers
(investment firms and non-money
market funds):
M 3 – M 2
Reserve requirements Except for securities held by
credit institutions subject to
reserve requirements as part of
the ESCB (in which case proof of
who the end holder is will be
required), the reserve
requirement applied to
outstanding certificates of deposit
issues is 2%.
Except for securities held by
credit institutions subject to
reserve requirements as part of
the ESCB (in which case proof of




term note issues are:
? 2% for securities with an initial
maturity of up to 2 years;
? 0% for securities with an initial
maturity of more than 2 years
Disclosure requirements A financial report must be filed with the Banque de France two weeks before the first issue. The report
must be updated on an annual basis.
Unrated issuers must file a financial report with the COB 1 month before the first issue and receive the
COB’s approval. The report must be updated on an annual basis.
Unrated issuers must file a half-yearly business report and a quarterly cash position statement with the
Banque de France and the COB.
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lenders so that their financing and investment needs could be better met. In very general terms,
the reform consisted of making a distinction within the money market between:
The interbank market, which is only accessible to credit institutions and the organisations
mentioned in Article 8 of the 1984 French Banking Act (Treasury, Banque de France, the finan-
cial arm of the Post Office, Caisse des dépôts et consignations, Institut d’émission des Départe-
ments d’outre-mer, Institut d’émission d’outre-mer). Regulation 85-17, as amended, also granted
partial access to investment firms in 1997.
The money market, which is open to all economic agents, but with distinctions between
securities depending on the status of the issuers and the maturities.
Up until the regulatory reform of 1998 (see below), there were four categories of securities:
1. Certificates of deposit (CDs), these short-term securities issued by banking institutions
were introduced in March 1985;
2. Bills issued by financial institutions and companies (BISF), originally, only specialised finan-
cial institutions were allowed to issue such bills when they were introduced in De-
cember 1985, then financial companies were given the right to issue them in May
1986, followed by securities houses in March 1987. At first, these securities carried
an initial maturity of at least two years, but this requirement was shortened to ten
days in March 1987. This category of securities was abolished in 1999, but the same
issuers are now entitled to issue certificates of deposit;
3. Commercial paper (CP), is another form of short-term securities introduced in De-
cember 1985. They are mainly issued by industrial and commercial companies;
4. The maximum initial maturity of these various securities was set at seven years
and securities with longer maturities were traded on the bond market. But with
the introduction of negotiable medium-term notes in March 1992, the maximum
was gradually brought down to one year so that negotiable medium-term notes
could be used to provide a continuous range of issues maturing after more than
one year.
Issuers and investors now have a continuous range of maturities from very short-
term to long-term. At the same time, the minimum maturity of bonds has also be short-
ened gradually so that it is now possible to issue different types of securities with the
same initial maturity.
The latest major reform took place at the end of 1998. It was undertaken to take ac-
count of practices on other countries’ money markets that are in competition with France’s
money market and to incorporate the consequences of European unification and, more espe-
cially, the Financial Activity Modernisation Act of 2 July 1996, which transposed the European
Investment Services Directive of 10 May 1993 into French law. Changes in French laws and reg-
ulations had two major aims: modernising the market and opening it up to European and inter-
national participants.
The main results of this reform were:
— abolishing the category for bills issued by financial institutions and companies, which
had become an excessively narrow compartment, and merging it with the certificates
of deposit compartment.
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— reducing the minimum maturity for short-term securities from 10 days to 1 day;
— complete deregulation of remuneration of securities;
— opening the certificates of deposit market up to non-resident credit institutions;
— allowing investment firms to issue commercial paper;
— entitling all European investment service providers to engage in securities placement
and trading.
3. SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM
3.1. Introduction
To finance their real current assets and undertake investment projects, non-financial cor-
porations initially count on funds obtained from current transactions or operations (which, in
terms of business accounting, is called self-financing and, in National Accounts terms, gross sav-
ing) and on capital subsidies or capital transfers, according to the National Accounts denomina-
tion. Insofar as these resources are not sufficient, companies show a financing requirement,
needing in this case to obtain additional funds from sources outside the firm itself. The options
open are:
1. To resort to financial markets in order to:
— apply for loans from financial intermediaries, essentially banks and savings banks.
— place securities (promissory notes, bonds and shares) directly with savers and fi-
nancial intermediaries.
— sell financial assets, in particular from the securities portfolio. One particular in-
stance of this means of financing is public offerings.
2. To access one of the two channels through which companies can obtain funds with-
out resorting to the financial market. This involves credit extended by suppliers and
financing received from group companies.
Described below are different aspects of the first of these two channels, both from the financial
markets (or primary or issuance markets), where companies obtain funds through loans and credit insti-
tutions, the placing of securities with investors of financial intermediaries and the sale of financial assets,
and from the official secondary markets, where previously issued shares are bought and sold.
3.2. Primary market for the financing of companies
3.2.1. Financing via credit institutions
A distinction is made in Spain between the following types of credit institutions: banks,
savings banks, credit co-operatives, specialised credit institutions (SCIs) and the Official Credit
BANCO DE ESPAÑA - BANQUE DE FRANCE / FRENCH AND SPANISH INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS204
ANNEX IV
Institute (ICO). The size of each category differs greatly, as can be seen in the tables below.
Banks account for around 50% of the total credit extended to other resident sectors (non-
financial corporations and households), followed by savings banks with approximately 40%. Be-
tween them, credit co-operatives, SCIs and the ICO account for the remaining 10%.
The following table reports the total loans extended by credit institutions to non-
financial corporations in the years 1997 to 2000, and their weight in relation to total financing
received by corporations in terms of both flows and stocks.
In addition to credit institutions, mention should be made of other companies that contribute
to the financing of Spanish companies, essentially SMEs. These are venture capital companies (VCCs) and
mutual guarantee companies (MGCs). The former are public limited companies, which invest their capital
in the temporary and minority-interest financing of innovative SMEs that are non-financial and, in prin-
ciple, unlisted. They further provide value added in the form of management support.
Mutual guarantee companies are a business promotion instrument, extending credit to
SMEs and allowing them to channel, promote and encourage the investment financing guaran-
teed by MGCs. Their corporate purpose is to offer bank-guaranteed backing or other credit
assistance in favour of their SME partners that is acceptable to banks, with the aim of obtaining
privileged credit facilities or better credit terms than SMEs would obtain by themselves in the
market. They also give advice and assessment on alternative sources of investment finance. They
cannot directly extend any type of credit to their SME partners. MGCs may enter such partner-
ships with any type of SME, irrespective of the activity in which the latter may engage.
TABLE 5
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS. NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS AND EMPLOYEES
no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no.
institutions employees institutions employees institutions employees institutions employees
Resident banks 159    139,198 152    135,164 146    131,460 141    127,582 
Savings banks 51    90,153 51    93,812 50    97,276 48    101,718 
Credit co-operatives 97    12,804 97    13,292 94    13,855 92    14,495 
SCIs 108    4,936 103    5,154 96    5,229 86    4,889 
ICO 1    270 1    263 1    264 1    267 
TOTAL 416    247,361 404    247,685 387    248,084 368    243,795 
1997 1998 1999 2000
   Source: Banco de España Boletín Estadístico
TABLE 6
CREDIT FROM CREDIT INSTITUTIONS TO OTHER RESIDENT SECTORS
1997 1998 1999 2000
Resident banks 183,962       209,650       237,078       272,799       
Savings banks 133,293       161,912       188,995       227,803       
Credit co-operatives 15,462       18,583       22,065       26,031       
SCIs 17,633       19,503       23,813       27,281       
ICO 3,996       4,205       5,014       5,494       
TOTAL 354,346       413,854       476,966       559,407       
   Source: Banco de España Boletín Estadístico 
EUR m
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Further information on these financial instruments at the service of Spanish companies
may be consulted in the electronic version of the document “Corporate finance in Europe from
1986 to 1996” published by the European Committee of Central Balance Sheet Data Offices
(ECCB) working group on equity.
3.2.2. Financing via securities issuance
The issuance of securities is basically regulated by Spanish corporate law (Ley de Sociedades
Anónimas — LSA) and securities market legislation (Ley de Mercados de Valores — LMV), along
with the associated complementary provisions. The LSA has specific regulations for each type of
security (promissory notes, bonds and equity). By contrast, the LMV contains general provisions
with which all securities issuance must comply, irrespective of the instrument issued.
1. To communicate the issue to the CNMV (National Securities Market Commission),
furnishing the documents evidencing the issue resolution, the characteristics of the
securities issued and the rights and obligations of holders.
2. To have the company’s annual accounts audited.
3. To publish a prospectus with the information needed for investors to come to a
well-founded decision on the investment proposed to them. This prospectus should
be filed with the CNMV.
TABLE 7
CREDIT FROM CREDIT INSTITUTIONS TO OTHER RESIDENT SECTORS
%
1997 1998 1999 2000
Resident banks 51.9         50.7         49.7         48.8         
Savings banks 37.6         39.1         39.6         40.7         
Credit co-operatives 4.4         4.5         4.6         4.7         
SCIs 5.0         4.7         5.0         4.9         
ICO 1.1         1.0         1.1         1.0         
TOTAL 100.0         100.0         100.0         100.0         
   Source: Banco de España Boletín Estadístico 
TABLE 8
LOANS BY CREDIT INSTITUTIONS TO NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
EUR m,  %
1997 1998 1999 2000
A. Loans to non-financial corporations (flow) 19,459   25,524   29,962   46,533   
B. Loans to non-financial corporations (stock) 178,109   201,969   232,163   278,165   
A/Memorandum item 1)(%) 32.8      31.3      25.7      24.1      
B/Memorandum item 2)(%) 17.7      16.3      15.5      16.5      
Memorandum item:
1. Net incurrence of liabilities (flow) 59,302   81,598   116,728   189,132   
2. Total liabilities (stock) 1,005,084   1,242,150   1,498,853   1,687,304   
   Source: Banco de España Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy.
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On the supply side, several regulatory changes (5) enacted in 1998 paved the way for
subsequent private bond issues and capital increases by making the issuance process more flex-
ible, simpler and cheaper, and by extending the range of instruments available. Specifically, the
rules introduced the short-form programme prospectus, which enables several issues to be
made without having to submit a complete prospectus for each specific issue, and eliminated
the prospectus for admission to listing. Moreover, the registration of capital increases has been
made possible before they are actually carried out, envisaging the issuance of several types of
shares (callable, non-voting stock, preferred dividend stock and preference stock). In addition,
the extension of the regulations on asset securitisation (6) added greater flexibility to securiti-
sation operations and widened the range of assets susceptible to securitisation. That said, the
effectiveness of these regulations has been limited as yet since the weight of asset securitisation
in Spain is less than that in other more developed markets.
On the demand side, the inclusion from 1999 first, of fixed-income securities issued by
private companies, and further, of tier-two loans of a certain amount acting as collateral for the
ESCB’s operations to inject liquidity into the Eurosystem, has boosted the demand for these
types of securities by credit institutions. Furthermore, the tax arrangements applicable to fixed-
income issues by private companies (which exempt corporations from withholdings on the re-
turns obtained, placing such returns on the same footing as government debt) have boosted the
demand for these instruments.
3.2.2.1. COMMERCIAL PAPER ISSUES
Commercial paper is conceived as a short-term financing instrument. The issuance of com-
mercial paper maturing at over eighteen months entails a greater obligation of registration with the
CNMV (Order dated 28/5/1999). The LSA stipulates no special regulation for its issue, whereupon it
depends on the decision of the Board of Directors. Commercial paper issues can be auctioned di-
rectly or their placement negotiated with a bank that undertakes to sell them to its clients.
3.2.2.2. BOND ISSUANCE
· The issuance of bonds by a public limited company shall be approved by its share-
holders in general meeting, which may delegate this power to the Board of Directors, except in
the case of convertible bonds.
• The LSA stipulates that the book value of the total volume of bonds outstanding may
not exceed the book value of own funds (capital plus reserves, including legally author-
ised asset revaluations) per the balance sheet.
• A bondholder syndicate shall be set up to ensure holders’ interests are protected.
• Habitually, these bonds are amortised under the so-called “French system”, involving a con-
stant repayment and interest instalment. The sinking fund method that is habitual in the US
is rarely applied. Another variant is the zero-coupon issue, where the securities are ac-
quired for their face value (or below it) and are amortised with different premia according
to the repayment period. The interest payments are made on the debt maturing.
(5) Royal Decree 2590/1998 on amendments to the legal regime governing securities markets and Law 37/
1998 reforming the LMV.
(6) Royal Decree 926/1998, of 14 May.
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The data in table 9 show that issues by resident companies of non-equity securities in recent
years have not grown. Net issues from 1997 to 2000 were negative except in 1999. In the case of
fixed-income securities issues, these accounted in 2000 for –1.5% of total financing received (net
incurrence of liabilities in National Accounts terms). And in stocks, fixed-income securities account-
ed that same year for 1.3% of total liabilities. In addition, regard should be had to the great concen-
tration in the use of this channel of financing: only 7 companies obtained net positive financing in the
period 1999-2000. Of these, 4 accounted for 75% of the total volume of such financing.
In sum, the information available suggests that the strong increase in fixed-income issues
has been concentrated in a small number of large corporations which, circumstantially, have
needed large volumes of financing. In any event, the number is not significant relative to the
total aggregate of non-financial corporations. The evidence indicates that, despite the changes
enacted by the government to create a setting more conducive to issuance activity, other struc-
tural factors that take a long time to work through (such as the fragmentation of the industrial
apparatus, asymmetrical information problems or Spanish banks’ lending policy) continue to
constrain the growth of this market.
3.2.2.3. ISSUANCE OF ORDINARY SHARES
The issuance of ordinary shares is the commonest form of finance on incorporating and
increasing the capital of public limited companies (Chapter 2 of the main body of the study
discusses the importance of this type of corporate form in Spain). The specific aspects of com-
pany incorporation are included in the LSA, which stipulates the minimum capital stock for a
Spanish public limited company at EUR 60,100.
In the Spanish financial system, all capital increases are undertaken via privileged subscrip-
tion (rights issues), i.e. acknowledging the right of the previous shareholders to subscribe to the
TABLE 9
NON-EQUITY SECURITIES OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS RESIDENT IN SPAIN
EUR m, % and units.
1997 1998 1999 2000
A. Net issues (EUR m): -834   -533   2,544   -2,875   
Short-term 164   430   1,144   -4,149   
Medium- and long-term -999   -964   1,400   1,274   
Issues as % of net incurrence of liabilities
(A/Memorandum item 1) -1.4       -0.6       2.2       -1.5       
B. Stock outstanding (EUR m): 21,022   20,611   23,463   21,317   
Short-term 5,529   5,921   7,180   3,099   
Medium-and long-term 15,493   14,690   16,283   18,218   
Stock of securities as % of total liabilities
(B/ Memorandum item 2) 2.1       1.7       1.6       1.3       
C. No. of issuers (a) n.a. 9   10   7   
Short-term n.a. 6   5   4   
Long-term n.a. 5   8   6   
Memorandum item:
1. Net incurrence of liabilities (flow) 59,302   81,598   116,728   189,132   
2. Total liabilities (stock) 1,005,084   1,242,150   1,498,853   1,687,304   
   Sources: CNMV and Banco de España (Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy)
   (a)   Understood as those whose net issues are positive.
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new shares issued. The LSA declares rights issues inapplicable when the capital increase is the
result of the conversion of bonds into shares, of the take-over of another company, of part of
the assets spun off another company, or of the purchase of shares via a takeover bid.
The price at issue of new shares should be lie between the minimum limit of the face
value, for legal reasons, and the maximum limit of the market price, for economic reasons.
To conduct a capital increase the LSA and the LMV impose a series of requirements on a
company that must be met so as to ensure the operation is carried out with the proper mer-
cantile and financial safeguards. Those demanded by the LSA are as follows:
1. Approval of the capital increase by the shareholders in general meeting, which may
delegate the power to increase capital to the directors, under the terms specified by
the law.
2. Acknowledgement of the right of previous shareholders to subscribe preferentially
to the new shares in proportion to the number of shares they hold at the time of
the increase, over a period of no less than one month, with the aforementioned qual-
ifications and exceptions. Recent regulatory changes (7) have made for more flexible
treatment of the waiving of pre-emptive rights, thereby prompting an increase in the
number and volume of capital increases.
3. If the capital increase comes about through a public subscription offering, the sub-
scribers of new shares must be provided with a “subscription bulletin” featuring the
key data on the increase and on the subscription made.
4. Registration in the Mercantile Register in accordance with the capital increase and
its execution.
5. Minimal disbursement of 25% of the face value at the time of the increase being
made.
3.2.2.4. ISSUANCE OF NON-VOTING STOCK AND PRIVILEGED SHARES
Public limited companies have the option of issuing non-voting shares that are entitled to
a minimum dividend. This minimum dividend should be envisaged in the company’s by-laws and
may not be less than 5% of the capital paid in for each non-voting share.
The LSA also provides for the issuance of shares conferring privileges in respect of ordi-
nary shares.
3.2.2.5. PUBLIC SHARE OFFERING (PSO)
PSOs are regulated in Spain by Royal Decree 291/1992, of 27 March, on share issues and
public offerings. The content of this legislation is consistent with the associated Community
provisions and, specifically, with the terms of Directive 89/2998/EEC on issue prospectuses. This
(7) Article 159 of the LSA authorised the exclusion of pre-emptive rights under compliance with certain
conditions. Subsequently, Laws 37/1998 and 50/1998 enabled listed companies to exclude and moreover issue for a
lower-than-actual (listed) value.
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legislation defines them as “the offer to the public of negotiable securities on national territory,
on behalf of the issuer or a third party, and whose issuance is not subject to compliance with all
the requirements envisaged for securities issuance, or had taken place more than two years pri-
or to the date of the public offering”. Subsequently, this Royal Decree was amended by Royal
Decree 2590/1998 to introduce an improvement in relation to the undertaking of advertising
activities.
The PSO is used for the stock market launch of companies offering their shares to the
public. It may or may not be done with a simultaneous capital increase (which is deemed to be
a public subscription offering and, as such, is included in national statistics). It is one of the most
commonly used instruments for the privatisation of state-owned firms. The main features of a
PSO are as follows:
• The public offering is usually associated with the sale of listed shares or shares which,
after the operation, will be admitted to listing.
• An initial nominal amount is usually set for the offering, which in some cases may be
increased depending on the call options that the underwriting institutions or financial
intermediaries intervening in the operation can exercise (green shoe) or on the indica-
tion of the offeror.
• The offering may be distributed in different tranches whose size is determined a priori
or a posteriori by the offeror, depending on demand:
— National or international
— Retail or institutional. Within the retail tranche, in some cases, a tranche for em-
ployees is additionally set aside.
• The following figures should be identified in a PSO:
— Overall co-ordinators: these co-ordinate the offering in all its tranches.
— Agent: makes collections and payments, carries out pro rata allocations and repre-
sents the offeror before non-associated placement institutions.
— Underwriters: they enter into a commitment to place and underwrite the offering.
— Syndicate: grouping of institutions involved in the operation.
• Three types of commission payable to the foregoing institutions are defined: manage-
ment, underwriting and placement.
• There is a standard calendar for these operations.
3.2.2.6. ISSUANCE OF EQUITY UNITS
The predominant form of legal entity in Spain is the private limited company, as reported
in Chapter II of the main text of this study. This type of company, along with the other legal
forms (co-operatives, general partnerships, limited partnerships, commercial and industrial
agencies, public entities), issues equity holdings or units. The step-up in recent years in the crea-
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tion of companies – in particular private limited companies – means that it is the issue of equity
units along with that of unlisted shares, the predominant means of financing on the primary
markets, to which non-financial companies and, especially, SMEs resort (see table 10). Much of
the regulation governing private limited companies derives from the rules for public limited
companies, although there is a specific law. The main differences between both sets of rules, as
far as the content of this document is concerned, relate to:
1. The minimum amount required to incorporate a private limited company is ESP
500,000 (EUR 3,000), compared with ESP 10 million (EUR 60,000) in the case of
public limited companies. This amount must be fully paid in (unlike public limited
companies, where a minimum of 25% of the face value has to be paid in).
2. The law expressly stipulates that equity units of private limited companies shall not
be considered as securities (8), and they may not be represented in the form of secu-
rities or book entries.
3. The transfer of equity units is subject to a series of requirements that make it practi-
cally impossible to trade them. That explains why there can be no secondary market
for this instrument. Private limited company status, as stated in the preamble of the
law regulating them, is specifically intended for small-sized undertakings.
Table 10 shows the growing increase in the issuance of variable-yield securities (shares and
other equity in National Accounts parlance). The substantial volume of listed share placements that
has contributed to the significant increase in the size of Spanish stock markets was due in 1997 and
1998 to the public offerings of securities arising from privatisation, and in 1999 and 2000 to the
subscription operations of a small number of listed companies with high financing requirements.
These latter requirements were attributable both to the processes of international expansion and
mergers and acquisitions undertaken and to the costs of acquiring UMTS licences in the case of
telecommunications companies. The issuance of listed shares finally accounted for 9.6% of the total
financing received by non-financial corporations in the year 2000.
Drawing on the overall information provided by the financial accounts of the Spanish
economy, the main sources of financing have been loans arranged with credit institutions, trade
credit and, especially, the issuance of unlisted shares and other equity, in step with the greater
number of companies that issue these securities.
3.3. Official secondary markets
3.3.1. Official secondary markets.  Traded securities
Strictly speaking, the secondary markets are not a financing channel for non-financial cor-
porations. However, without them the existence of the primary markets for financing would
not be possible, since it is the former which give the system its liquidity and make the purchase
of financial assets more attractive to investors, insofar as investors can convert such assets into
liquidity when they so require.
(8) Mercantile law stipulates that equity units are not considered to be securities. The essentially juridical
basis of this legislative precept lies in the impossibility of the equity units being represented in the form of securities
or book entries. From the economic and macroeconomic-analysis standpoint, equity units, along with other repre-
sentative forms of shareholders’ claims in respect of a company’s net worth, come under the category “securities”
(caption AF.5 in National Accounts).
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The official secondary markets in Spain are regulated by the Securities Market Law (SML)
(Law 24/1988) and complementary provisions, amended by Law 37/1998, which transposed Di-
rective 93/22/EEC, of 10 May 1993, on investment services in the area of negotiable securities,
into Spanish law. Essentially, the following specific aspects were introduced by this legislation:
• The right of all investment services firms to have access to any EU state as a member
and, likewise, to have access to or membership of clearing and settlement systems.
• To extend the category of securities to other financial instruments present in our markets.
• To distinguish between regulated (including official secondary markets) and unregulated
markets, which is crucial for the design of the operating arrangements for the single
securities market.
Several kinds of fixed-income and variable-yield securities are traded on the Spanish sec-
ondary markets, issued by corporations and public entities (the State and other official agen-
cies). Corporations mainly issue commercial paper, ordinary and convertible bonds, and shares.
A distinction should be drawn between the following secondary market segments:
— The private fixed-income stock market.
— The AIAF (Spanish Securities Dealers’ Association) fixed-income market, specialising
in the trading of private fixed-income securities and “matador” bonds.
— The government debt book-entry market specialising in the trading of government
debt securities.
TABLE 10
SHARES AND OTHER EQUITY OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS RESIDENT IN SPAIN.
BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC SHARE OFFERINGS
EUR m
1997 1998 1999 2000
A. Shares and other equity (net flow) 10,016  13,999  29,714  75,031  
Listed shares 326  1,378  8,021  18,105  
Unlisted shares 3,426  5,141  10,401  44,756  
Equity units 6,265  7,479  11,292  12,170  
As a proportion of incurrence of liabilities
(A/ Memorandum item 2.a) 16.9       17.2       25.5       39.7       
B. Shares and other equity (stock) 489,737  659,927  825,778  895,670  
Listed shares 136,900  192,829  270,429  276,396  
Unlisted shares 252,981  370,140  435,095  482,813  
Other equity 99,856  96,958  120,254  136,461  
As a proportion of total liabilities
(B/Memorandum item 2.b) (%) 48.7       53.1       55.1       53.1       
Memorandum item 1:
Public Share Offering (PSO) 10,652  11,072  5,042  2,695  
Privatisation 9,852  10,857  772  0  
Other 800  215  4,270  2,695  
Memorandum item 2:
a. Net incurrence of liabilities (flow) 59,302  81,598  116,728  189,132  
b. Total liabilities (stock) 1,005,084  1,242,150  1,498,853  1,687,304  
   Sources: CNMV and Banco de España (Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy)
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Regarding the secondary markets for equity, the SML, via the so-called first market, “new
market” and second market, confers exclusivity rights on the Spanish stock exchanges for the
trading of this type of security. Securities traded on the official secondary markets may be in
the form of securities or, what is currently more usual, in book-entry form, a computerised ac-
counting entry of the rights conferred by the securities to which they refer.
The SCLV (Securities Clearing and Settlement Service) is the Spanish central securities
depository. It is entrusted with the accounting record of book-entry securities and the exclu-
sive management of transactions entered into on Spanish stock markets, on the AIAF fixed-in-
come market and on the Market for Latin-American securities (Latibex). All matters relating to
the SCLV are regulated “without prejudice” to the authority of the Spanish Regional (Autono-
mous) Governments.
3.3.2. The stock market in the Spanish financial system
3.3.2.1. ORGANISATION
The securities stock exchanges are the mainstay of the secondary market, The exchanges
are institutions that provide economic agents with the infrastructure and facilities needed to
trade both bonds and equities. In Spain the exchanges are created and regulated by law, follow-
ing the model of the Germanic and Latin countries rather than the Anglo-Saxon model, where
stock exchanges are the result of the private association of their members:
— There are Stock Exchanges in Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia, with substantial
differences in size. Each Exchange is governed by a Management Company, which is in
the form of a public limited company and whose shareholders are the members of
the Exchange. The management companies oversee and manage the Exchanges, seek-
ing to ensure their members comply with regulations. They steward the daily func-
tioning of the stock market by means of the Trading Commission.
— The Exchange members – essentially agency brokers and securities-dealer companies




1997 1998 1999 2000
Equity market (a) 163,261    261,276    291,975    492,980    
Market capitalisation (Madrid Stock
Exchange) 214,039    295,157    383,403    414,961    
Of which, new technologies - - - 23,835    
Fixed-income market (b) 54,217    53,148    44,718    39,692    
Government debt 21,890    603    160    73    
Regional government debt 30,043    51,791    42,858    38,723    
Other 2,284    754    1,700    896    
   Sources: Madrid Stock Exchange management company, Spanish stock markets and CNMV.
   (a)   Includes financial and non-financial corporations.
   (b)   Effective volumes.
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corporation that is not a member of the Exchange can conduct purchases and sales
via a market member. Dealers can transact operations acting as a principal or on ac-
count of third parties. Brokers can only do the latter.
— Securities market supervision and inspection are entrusted to the CNMV (National
Securities Market Commission), a public agency with its own legal personality that is
governed by a Council designated by the Government and the Ministry of the Econo-
my. The CNMV has to ensure that the securities markets evidence transparency and
proper price-setting.
— In accordance with the provisions of the SML, the four Stock Exchange Management
Companies set up a Stock Exchange Company which created the Exchange Intercon-
nection System for automated quotation (SIBE) or the “continuous market”. As re-
gards non-financial corporations, approximately half of all issuing companies are listed.
As can be seen in table 12, the continuous market concentrates the biggest volume of
trades.
— Further to an Order issued by the Ministry of Economy and Finance on 22 Decem-
ber 1999, a specialised new market for stock exchange trading was created. Duly
named “New Market” (NM), it commenced operating on 10 April 2000. The reasons
behind this were the fact that the legal framework previously in place was insufficient
to cover high-technology firms’ financing requirements.
— There is a second market geared to small and medium-sized companies in which ad-
mission and listing requirements and the subsequent periodic information involve less
demanding obligations. To date, the second market of the Spanish bourses is very
small.
— The registration for accounting purposes of securities admitted and not admitted to
trading on the Stock Exchanges and the management of the clearing and settlement
of securities and of cash arising from the trading of stock market transactions is en-
trusted to the above-mentioned Securities Clearing and Settlement Service (SCLV by
its Spanish name). The capital of the SCLV is held by the management companies of
the various Spanish exchanges and member entities.
3.3.2.2. SECURITIES TRADING SYSTEMS
On the basis of how they are transacted, stock market operations can be classified as
normal market operations, on one hand, and special and exceptional operations on the other.
Normal market operations are conducted through the interaction of supply and demand via
trading systems habitually organised and purpose-designed by the Stock Exchanges, and which
give rise to official prices or quotes. There are three trading systems for these normal opera-
tions:
• Continuous market: the main trading system (see table 12).
• Traditional ring-trading or open outcry system.
• Electronic Fixed-Income System: for the trading of fixed-income securities and war-
rants.
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Special and exceptional operations are traded both on the Continuous Market, under the
Special Operations Market module, and in ring trading. The operations are called “special” be-
cause they are transacted outside the trading systems and at a different time. Subsequently, they
are communicated to the Stock Exchange supervisory bodies, for the market’s information.
They must meet the following requirements:
• The price shall not be more than 5% higher or lower than the highest or lowest clos-
ing exchange rates or weighted average exchange rate.
• The amount shall not be less in equity securities than 300,000 euro (this is also so for fixed
income), or 20% of the average daily effective amount traded in the last calendar quarter in
the case of continuous market trades, or 120,000 euro and 25% in the event of ring trad-
ing. In both systems there are two limitations to the execution of transactions: the first is
related to price swings – both up and down – in each session, which are limited: the sec-
ond involves the volume of transactions, for which a limit is also defined.
Exceptional operations are also arranged outside the trading systems, but their execution
requires express authorisation from the Stock Exchange supervisory bodies. Minimum volumes
must exceed 1.5 million euro if securities quoted on the continuous market are involved
(300,000 euro in the case of ring trading) and 40% of the average effective amount traded in
the last calendar quarter.
If a company, a group of companies or a group of individuals is intending to acquire a
significant interest in a corporation, a special situation arises leading to the formulation of a
takeover bid (OPA by their Spanish name). OPAs are conducted outside the stock market and
have their own specific regulations (RD 1197/1991). Subsequent Royal Decrees, the latest being
RD 1676/1999, of 29 October, have amended the former in order to eliminate certain regulato-
ry costs, but without detracting from the safeguards for investors in the company targeted by
the takeover bid.
3.3.2.3. INVESTOR SAFEGUARD REGULATIONS
Securities-dealer companies and agency brokers, securities issuers and all market partici-
pants are subject to a series of obligations geared to protecting investors. Spanish regulations
TABLE 12
VOLUME OF EQUITY TRADES: EXCHANGE INTERCONNECTION SYSTEM AND RING TRADING
EUR m
1997 1998 1999 2000
Exchange Interconnection System 160,937    257,844    286,046    488,863    
Ring trading: 2,234    3,432    5,929    4,118    
Madrid Stock Exchange 1,502    2,564    4,631    2,846    
Barcelona Stock Exchange 483    375    865    631    
Bilbao Stock Exchange 237    283    182    256    
Valencia Stock Exchange 102    211    251    385    
Total 163,261    261,276    291,975    492,981    
   Source: Stock Exchange Company and management companies of the Stock Exchanges.
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oblige securities issuers to provide the stock markets with regular information: twice yearly
they must disclose their complete financial statements, and quarterly they must give a prelimi-
nary estimate of yearly earnings. As promptly as possible they must also report any event or
decision that may appreciably influence the price of the securities they have issued. They are
further bound to annually audit their accounts and report both on their significant holdings in
other listed companies and on their holdings and purchases of own shares.
3.3.2.4. CONDITIONS FOR THE STOCK MARKET LISTING OF A COMPANY’S SHARES
Conditions differ according to the type of securities it is sought to have listed. At the
time of this paper being drafted, a distinction is drawn between traditional securities and the
shares of companies related to the new technologies or high-growth industries. Different con-
ditions again must be distinguished for the second market (that for SMEs).
1. For traditional securities, certain legal, financial and reporting requirements must be
met for stock market listing:
Legal requirements:
— Regular situation of the company from the legal standpoint. The company should
have been operating for at least two years.
— Freely tradable shares.
— The number of shareholders with a holding of less than 25% of capital stock shall
be equal to or higher than 100.
Financial requirements:
— Minimum capital: minimum capital stock of 200 million pesetas (1.2 million euro),
without counting in this figure the capital of the shareholders who have a stake
equal to or greater than 25%.
— Minimum profitability in recent years: the 1967 Stock Market Regulations estab-
lished the requirement of profits in the two prior years or in three of the past
five years. Subsequently, this stipulation was reformed by means of the Ministerial
Order of 19 June 1997, and compliance with any of the following circumstances
was set in its place:
• Justification, by the issuer, of profits being obtained in the coming years. The
Ministerial Order of 22 December replaced this requirement with that involv-
ing the filing by the issuing entity with the CNMV of a report on its business
and financial prospects and the consequences of this for earnings over the
coming years.
• That the issuing entity should have been incorporated as the result of a merger,
spin-off or contribution of a branch of activity.
• That the issuer is undergoing reorganisation or economic restructuring or pri-
vatisation by a state-owned entity.
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Reporting requirement:
— To have disclosed its financial statements for the three years prior to the applica-
tion for listing.
2. The so-called New Market: forum for trading of the securities of companies in inno-
vative high-technology sectors or in other sectors offering great possibilities of fu-
ture growth. The market is regulated by the Ministerial Order of 22 December 1999.
The CNMV Circular 1/2000, of 9 February, implemented the most specific aspects of
the listing and permanence of accepted securities, and established trading rules.
This market is characterised by its listing and reporting transparency rules, which are
better fitted to the particularities of the types of companies involved. The Spanish
“New Market” came on stream on 10 April 2000. It differs from the traditional stock
markets in the following significant respects:
Admission to listing:
— Filing of a report from the issuing company on business and earnings prospects
for the coming years.
Reporting transparency:
— Greater reporting transparency is required, which is attained through the de-
scription, in the prospectus for admission to listing, of the risks associated with
the company’s activity; the disclosure of the lock-ups affecting shareholders with
significant stakes; and, at least once a year, the publication of a report on the busi-
ness performance and outlook for the future. In addition to the disclosure of
lock-ups, that of the position of such shareholders in future capital increases is
required.
Price fluctuation:
— Given the greater volatility of the prices of these shares, fluctuation limits are
wider than on the traditional stock markets. Specifically, there are no limits in the
case of the first listing and, subsequently, it is set at 25% (which can be extended
during the session) against 15% on the traditional market.
3. The second market for securities
For listing, corporations must apply to the CNMV and to the related Stock Exchange
Management Company, complying with the following requirements:
— Minimum paid-in capital and reserves not less than 25 million pesetas (150,250 EUR)
— Full audit of the company by acknowledged experts.
— Contract with a counterparty company to smooth the supply of securities and mon-
ey to the market.
— The audited annual report, balance sheet and profit and loss account shall be sent
annually to the CNMV and Stock Exchange Management Company.
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— Trading is under special ring-trading arrangements whose results are disclosed sepa-
rately in the Official Trading Bulletin.
3.3.2.5. CONDITIONS FOR THE SUSPENSION AND EXCLUSION FROM THE STOCK MARKET
OF A COMPANY’S SHARES
Grounds for suspension:
The CNMV may suspend the trading of a company’s shares on the Spanish stock ex-
changes in the event of:
— Special circumstances that may disturb the normal conduct of transactions or that
may advise suspension with a view to protecting investors.
— The company failing to meet its periodic reporting obligations.
— A takeover bid being made against the shares of the company.
Grounds for exclusion:
— The CNMV can rule that the market listing of those shares whose dissemination, fre-
quency and volume of trading does not reach set minimum limits be excluded. Exclu-
sion may also be requested by the company that issued the shares. In this case, if the
CNMV considers that exclusion may impair the legitimate rights of the shareholders,
it may turn down the request or make it conditional upon the presentation of a take-
over bid.
3.3.3. Other official secondary markets
3.3.3.1. (SPANISH SECURITIES DEALERS’ ASSOCIATION) FIXED-INCOME OFFICIAL SECONDARY MARKET
— The Ministerial Order of 1 August 1991 recognises the AIAF as an official secondary
market for national securities on which commercial paper, medium- and long-term
private fixed-income securities (commercial paper, mortgage certificates, mortgage
bonds and other mortgage certificates) and “matador” bonds are traded. A Ministerial
Order of 27 July 1995 approved the conversion of AIAF into a plc, authorising its arti-
cles of incorporation in the light of its future transformation into an official market.
— The market is open (all types of financial intermediaries can operate directly on it),
decentralised and flexible.
— Transactions are mainly between wholesalers, whereby the market is notably liquid
for large-value operations but not for operations of small amounts, since the mini-
mum trade is 25 million pesetas (EUR 150,250)
— Securities listing rules on this market are similar to those set for trading on fixed-
income securities markets.
— The registration, clearing and settlement service for Spanish private fixed-income in-
struments listed on the AIAF market was run by the company Espaclear S.A. until 1
January 2000, at which point it was absorbed by SCLV (Securities Clearing and Settle-
ment Service, S.A.), which took over all of Espaclear’s former activities.
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3.3.3.2. THE PUBLIC DEBT BOOK-ENTRY MARKET
— This is an official market on which public debt in the form of book entries is traded.
The Central Depository and the Securities Clearing System of the Spanish Public
Debt Book-Entry Market, with which all securities listed on this market are regis-
tered, is called CADE. The Banco de España, through the book-entry system, is the
market’s governing body and manages CADE which, as it is a department within its
organisation, lacks legal personality.
— CADE is a real-time settlement system that manages debt issues, their redemption,
interest payments and transaction balance transfers on the secondary market.
— The market members are financial institutions, who may operate on their own ac-
count or on behalf of third parties.
— On 7 June 2000 the Banco de España and the SCLV set up a new company called “Pro-
motora para la Sociedad de Gestión de los Sistemas Españoles de Liquidación, S.A.”. The
company’s corporate purpose was to study, prepare and promote the legal, organisational
and technical changes needed to unify the clearing, settlement and registration systems
currently entrusted to the book-entry system and to SCLV. This integration is open to
the regional central depositories (Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia), and to the registration
and settlement system for the derivatives markets (MEFF), if they decide to participate.
The commercial name of the company created is “IBERCLEAR”, and its capital is 55%-




1997 1998 1999 2000
Fixed-income AIAF market (a) 21,173     43,120     86,269     99,826     
Commercial paper (b) 4,447     7,935     25,284     46,425     
Bonds certificates and other securities (b) 10,950     28,761     58,572     52,189     
"Matador" bonds 5,776     6,424     2,413     1,212     
   Source: AIAF
   (a)   Nominal volumes.
   (b)   Securities issued by credit institutions and non-financial corporations.
TABLE 14
TURNOVER ON THE PUBLIC DEBT MARKET
EUR m
1997 1998 1999 2000
Public debt book-entry market (a) 12,352,112  14,478,979  13,109,675  13,788,917  
Spot (b) 1,700,197  1,747,709  1,817,465  1,585,460  
Repos 10,577,350  12,676,285  11,254,309  12,186,364  
Forward (b) 74,565  54,985  37,901  17,903  
   Source: Banco de España
   (a)   Includes only transactions with government securities.
   (b)   Nominal volumes.
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— On 18 October 2000 the Board of Directors of IBERCLEAR adopted the decision to
use the technical platform lending support to the public debt book-entry system to
implement the incorporation of national private fixed-income securities listed on the
four Spanish stock exchanges and on the AIAF fixed-income market. And this without
prejudice to initiating measures allowing, as soon as possible, the unification of the
management of the fixed-income and variable-yield systems with the very means of
the future Management Company to be set up once legal and technical considera-
tions allowed.
3.4. The official derivatives markets
The Spanish financial derivatives markets are currently organised by MEFF HOLDING,
S.A. This company holds the shares of another two corporations: MEFF fixed income and MEFF
equities. MEFF Holding came into being in 1992 as the result of the merger of MEFFSA (Spanish
Financial Futures Market) and MOFEX (Spanish Financial Options Market). The merger has
helped streamline the derivatives market, with MEFF fixed income looking after the trading of
bond futures and options, and MEFF equities the trading of equity futures and options. On 8
September 1995 the Valencia Citrus Fruit and Commodities Futures Market commenced oper-
ating, trading orange futures.
The main organisational functions of these companies in respect of the derivatives mar-
kets are as follows:
1. They define the types of contracts traded.




· MIBOR 90 days · IBEX 35
· MIBOR 360 days Individual equity futures.
· 5-year notional bond
· 10-year notional bond
· 30-year notional bond
· DIFF contract (1)
Options
· MIBOR 90 days · IBEX 35 (European options)
· 5-year notional bond
· 10-year notional bond
· 30-year notional bond
(US options) · Shares of several listed
companies (US option)
Source: MEFF




Futures contracts on navel-










Interest rate spread futures:
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3. They act as a clearing house between buyers and sellers.
4. They set the guarantees demanded of agents assuming future commitments.
The following table offers a schematic presentation of the official derivatives markets in
Spain and the contracts traded on them.
The integration of euro area money markets and the elimination of foreign exchange risk
have led to stiffer competition among European derivatives markets by appreciably increasing
the inter-substitutability of fixed income-linked products traded on these markets. Against this
background, the markets have reacted by establishing alliances and, in some cases, modifying
their functional structure. The Spanish, French, Portuguese and Italian markets thus entered into
an alliance called Euro-Globex, which is the European arm of the worldwide Globex futures
market, in which the US CME market also participates.
TABLE 16
TURNOVER ON MEFF DERIVATIVES MARKETS
EUR m
1997 1998 1999 2000
MEFF derivatives markets (a) 3,286,810   2,668,336   966,975   689,214   
Fixed income 3,012,658   2,111,985   378,065   109,655   
Short-term 1,631,754   1,125,422   20,262   205   
Medium- and long-term 1,380,904   986,543   357,803   109,450   
Equity   274,152   556,351   588,910   579,132   
Ibex 35 270,719   549,329   574,109   549,132   
Individual options 3,433   7,022   14,801   30,462   
Financial derivatives markets (no. of contracts in thousands)
Financial futures (b)
3-year notional bond 3   - - -
5-year notional bond 6   27   - -
10-year notional bond 12,649   9,413   3,615   1,095   
Mibor 90 1,480   1,134   13   -
Mibor 360 48   20   - -
IBEX-35 3,638   5,185   5,102   4,183   
Price spreads (c) 10   3   - -
Financial options (b)
3-year notional bond - - - -
5-year notional bond - - - -
10-year notional bond 1,541   648   1   -
Mibor 90 241   91   2   -
IBEX-35 848   1,010   861   766   
Equities 1,485   2,695   8,092   16,581   
   Source: MEFF
   (a)   Volumes are expressed in monetary units. They have been obtained by multiplying the number of contracts traded by their size.
   (b)   The 1997 and 1998 data have been adjusted to the new face value of the contracts.
   (c)   There are three contracts: the German Diff, the French Diff, and the Italian Diff.
ANNEX V
INSOLVENCY LAW IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
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1. INTRODUCCIÓN
The insolvency law has direct influence in the recovery of debts by creditors. The level of
capitalisation of companies and the level of debts, specially banking debts, tend to depend di-
rectly on the legal conventions concerning the degree of protection of creditors’ rights provid-
ed by the national insolvency procedures.
The insolvency laws in France and Spain are very similar, and in both countries pursue
the same objective: to save companies in difficulty and give them the possibility of continuity.
This objective has priority over the detrimental effect on creditor rights.
This institutional factor can contribute to explain the high level of capitalization of the
industrial companies in the two countries.
Next, there is a summary of the insolvency procedures in each country so that the read-
er interested can know them.
2. INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES IN FRENCH LAW
2.1. Introduction
The overhaul of the law on companies in difficulty was instigated by Act 84 148 of 1
March 1984, governing «prevention and out-of-court settlements for companies in difficulty»
If preventive measures do not succeed, and the company’s available assets are not suffi-
cient to meet its payables, the firm is technically insolvent. Recovery proceedings are then initi-
ated, pursuant to the provisions of Act 85-98 of 25 January 1985 on corporate recovery and
liquidation.
Act 94-475 of 10 June 1994 was introduced to make the use of prevention more attrac-
tive. It thus bolstered early warning mechanisms and reorganised the procedure for out-of-
court settlements. The reform centred on:
— modernising the procedure through greater transparency and tighter ethical stand-
ards for business reorganisations and disposals,
— restoring creditors’ rights, and hence the confidence of credit institutions – an impor-
tant consideration often justified by the need to encourage business lending.
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The French system for dealing with struggling companies is based on a two-fold proce-
dure. Before payments are suspended, preventive steps must be taken to avoid failure either by
anticipating difficulties, or by solving these problems by means of an out-of-court settlement. If
prevention fails, a recovery procedure is then initiated, with a view to saving the ailing company.
(1) The basic objective of the French recovery procedure is to save companies in diffi-
culty. Maintaining economic activity and hence safeguarding jobs is the second most important
consideration, while satisfying creditors is the third (Biais and Mallecot, 1996). Although credi-
tors’ rights were considerably strengthened by the reform of 1994 (Act 94-475), creditor inter-
ests remain explicitly subordinated in French recovery and liquidation procedures.
(2) The fact that French insolvency law is geared primarily towards preventing liquida-
tion is evidenced by the structure and sequence of the procedures.
2.2. Prior to suspension of payments
2.2.1. Early warning procedure
Act 84-148, introduced in 1985, provided for a special early warning procedure to be ap-
plied as soon as an enterprise shows clears signs of being in financial difficulty. This procedure
essentially entails a legal obligation on the part of the company’s external auditor (i.e. the statu-
tory auditors), the works council, partners of limited liability companies and shareholders of
public limited companies and of the president of the commercial court, in the case of commer-
cial interest groups and sole traders, to draw the management’s attention to looming financial
problems without notifying a third party.
2.2.2. Out-of-court settlements
 The same act introduced a procedure enabling companies to reach an out-of-court set-
tlement with their creditors. This procedure may only be initiated by management. A request to
initiate this procedure must be accompanied by proposals by management for tackling the com-
pany’s difficulties. If the president of the court believes that the debtor’s proposals will lead to
recovery, out-of-court proceedings are opened and a conciliator is appointed. The out-of-court
settlement procedure is opened for a maximum of three months, and may be extended by one
STRUCTURE AND SEQUENCE OF FRENCH PROCEDURES FOR RECOVERY AND LIQUIDATION
Early warning procedure  
Out -of -court settlement  
Legal treatment  
Liquidation  Observation period  
Liquidation  Recovery plan  
Continuation of activities  Sale of company 
assets  
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month at the request of the conciliator. The president of the court may announce a stay of pro-
ceedings to enable the parties to try and reach an agreement. This stay extends to all legal pro-
ceedings and all enforcement procedures by existing creditors.
Out-of-court proceedings are intended to an agreement between the debtor, who under-
takes to adopt a number of measures to turn around the company, and its creditors, who con-
sent to grant payment deadlines and partial debt forgiveness, in order to avoid court-ordered
debt enforcement. If the enterprise fails to reach an out-of-court settlement with its creditors
and is no longer able to meet its obligations, it is technically insolvent.
2.3. Legal treatment of difficulties
If an insolvent enterprise fails to reach an out-of-court settlement with its creditors and
the company’s available assets are not sufficient to meet its payables, recovery proceedings can
be initiated. Insolvency procedures are opened when payments are suspended.
2.3.1. Opening recovery procedures
Following a preliminary examination by a commercial or regional court, the recovery
proceedings are declared open. This procedure was instituted under Act 85-98 of January 25
1985. It may either result in the liquidation of the enterprise (immediate judicial liquidation if
there is no hope of recovery), or in the opening of an observation period.
2.3.2. The observation period
Under the general procedure, the observation period lasts for a maximum of six months
but may be extended twice for a period of six months through a reasoned decision by the
court, either on its own initiative, or at the request of the administrator, the debtor or the state
prosecutor. Furthermore, under exceptional circumstances, it may be extended for a maximum
period of eight months following a reasoned decision by the court, convened at the request of
the state prosecutor, under Article L8 Paragraph 2.
Under the simplified procedure (applicable to companies with fewer than 50 employees
and with a turnover of less than FRF 20 million, excluding VAT) the observation period lasts
for four months and may be renewed once, for a further four months maximum following a
reasoned decision by the court, either on its own initiative, or at the request of the debtor,
the state prosecutor or the administrator, if one has been appointed, as per Article L140, Par-
agraph 1.
A court-appointed receiver (general procedure) or bankruptcy judge (simplified proce-
dure) examines the company’s balance sheet with a view to proposing a recovery plan. The
firm’s financial situation and recovery capacity are studied in detail in order to decide whether
the firm should continue its activities or be disposed of. During this observation period, the
company continues to operate and all proceedings against it are stayed in order to preserve the
firm’s economic potential.
This procedure substantially modifies the situation of the creditors, who no longer con-
stitute a body with a legal personality possessing assets. They form a group whose interests are
collectively defended by a court-appointed representative.
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 As of the order initiating the procedure, individual legal action by creditors and enforce-
ment procedures are stayed. The rule, whereby claims arising prior to the initiating order may not
be paid without special authorisation, continues to apply to unsecured and preferential creditors.
The employees of an insolvent firm are given more favourable treatment than other
creditors. During the observation period, staff may only be dismissed for economic reasons un-
der exceptional circumstances. The last six months’ wages due before the order to initiate legal
proceedings enjoy preferential payment rights over all movable or fixed assets. This also applies
to compensation due for dismissals that took place before the order to initiate proceedings.
The last sixty days’ wages (to a limit of a monthly ceiling) must be paid within ten days of the
opening of legal proceedings (reinforced rights of preference which contravene the principle of
non-payment of existing claims). Wages due after the decision to open proceedings are paid as
normal at their due date.
In order to encourage financing so that the company can continue its business, and for
the allocation of credit after the opening of recovery proceedings, creditors whose claims arise
after the decision to initiate proceedings enjoy preferential rights. Pursuant to Article 40, these
claims are paid at their due date if the company continues to operate.
At the end of the observation period, an assessment of the enterprise’s economic health
and conditions is carried out, and a decision is made in favour of a recovery plan or judicial
liquidation (continuation or disposal).
2.3.3. The final stage
The court-approved recovery plan lays down the terms and conditions for either the
continued operation of the enterprise by the debtor, or its sale to a third party.
2.3.3.1. RECOVERY
A plan for continued operation is however only approved if there is a genuine prospect
of turning around the enterprise and of satisfying the claims of its creditors (Article 69). The
debt owed to the creditors is restructured. Debtholders may agree to write off a portion of
their loan and may also agree to reschedule payments. The continued operation of the firm may
also be subject to the discontinuation, addition or disposal of certain business lines. The court
may demand the replacement of one or more managers, if this is key to the survival of the
company. During the application of the plan, the company director continues operations while
honouring his commitments.
However, if continued operation by the debtor is impossible but recovery appears to be
possible, disposal seems to be the most suitable means of ensuring that all or part of this busi-
ness and jobs are saved and liabilities settled. In the event of partial disposal, and in the absence
of a continuation plan for the company, the assets not included in the disposal plan are realised,
as in the event of liquidation.
2.3.3.2. LIQUIDATION
A company is liquidated either at the end of the observation period or without an obser-
vation period if the debtor’s activity ceases or recovery is evidently impossible. In the liquida-
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tion order, the representative of the creditors is appointed as liquidator. The order which opens
or declares judicial liquidation bans the debtor from exercising his functions and orders a halt
to company operations.
If the sale of the firm is ordered, the firm effectively disappears. The company’s capital is
entirely amortised and its debts are written off. The assets of the firm are sold. Proceeds from
the sale of company assets are used to repay the creditors, who cannot necessarily expect their
claims to be satisfied in full or even in part. Creditors share the proceeds from the sale in ac-
cordance with their ranking (precedence is given to creditors with reinforced rights of prefer-
ence and new creditors).
The same priority ranking prevails in the case of court-ordered liquidation if there is no
hope of rescuing the firm. On completion of the liquidation procedure, the debtor is discharged
from his remaining liabilities. Unpaid creditors may only take individual legal action against the
debtor in the case of fraud or personal bankruptcy. Debts are paid in the following order: cred-
itors with reinforced rights of preference, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, holders of
subordinated debt, shareholders.
2.3.3.3. PENALTIES IMPOSED ON DEBTORS, PARTNERS AND MANAGEMENT
Pecuniary liability: the court may order the management to wholly or partially make up
the shortfall in the company’s assets, or it may extend the recovery procedure, to which the
legal entity is subject, to the management.
Personal liability: personal penalties, in particular personal insolvency (civil law) and per-
sonal bankruptcy (criminal law) are only imposed on debtors as natural persons or managers of
legal entities with an economic activity in the most serious cases.
If personal bankruptcy is declared, managers are disqualified from managing or control-
ling a company, as long as liabilities are unpaid. Penalties are attributed for five years but are
annulled as soon as the liabilities are completely settled. Bankruptcy carries fines and a prison
sentence.
2.3.3.4. THE TREATMENT OF CREDITORS
The implications of French law governing the position of creditors (especially creditor
institutions) vary according to the different phases of the insolvency proceedings.
During the observation period the enterprise is shielded from its creditors, existing
debts are put on hold and payment of any previous debt is barred in order to grant the enter-
prise a breathing space. However, claims which arise after the decision to initiate proceedings
are exempt from this rule so as to provide a financial incentive to creditors who participate in
the further financing of the enterprise (Article 40).
The decision to initiate the recovery procedure interrupts the statutory and agreed in-
terest accruals, as well as all late interest and increments (Article 55). Mortgages, securities,
liens, as well as judicial decisions and acts, reflecting or embodying rights in rem, can no longer
be made following the opening of the recovery procedure (Article 57).
The role of collateral is therefore reduced, and is only required to maintain the ranking
of claims. However, the suspension of payments does not cover goods delivered under reserva-
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tion of ownership. Under French law, goods sold under a reservation of ownership clause, mak-
ing the transfer of title conditional on the full payment of the price, can be claimed if they are in
their original state at the time when the procedure is opened (Art. 59 of Act 94-475 of
10 June 1994).
If the enterprise is permitted to carry on its business, it must meet its payment commit-
ments in full. The terms and conditions of payment of existing debts, which must be declared in
good time or entered in the register, are fixed with consideration to the creditor ranking stipu-
lated by law and in compliance with the debt reduction and rescheduling terms agreed with
creditors.
 Pursuant to Article 40 of the 1985 Act, in the event of total disposal or, should the com-
pany continue to operate, if claims are not settled at their due date, claims arising duly after the
order to open proceedings are paid before all other claims, irrespective of whether they enjoy
preferential rights or are backed by collateral. However, employees’ claims, which come with
preferential rights or reinforced rights of preference, and claims for very small amounts (Article
76) shall be paid immediately.
Furthermore, creditors in possession of collateral shall be paid first when the security is
sold, and the proceeds from the sale are shared out in accordance with the ranking of existing
creditors possessing collateral-backed claims as stipulated by law (1).
Act 94-475 of 10 June 1994 on the prevention and treatment of difficulties affecting busi-
nesses introduced the following:
— a modernisation of the procedure, through greater transparency and tighter ethical
standards for business recovery and disposals,
— restoring creditors’ rights and hence of the confidence of credit institutions – an im-
portant consideration often justified by the need to encourage business lending.
The second aspect of the reform extended creditors’ powers to the implementation re-
garding the procedure, in that it allowed them to take individual action, and it improved the
situation of creditors with collateral-backed claims. As well as introducing measures in favour of
collateral-backed creditors, the legal reforms also sought to improve the lot of unsecured cred-
itors.
In the event of liquidation, the ranking of existing and new creditors was redefined when
the measures arising from the reform of 10 June came into force (Act 94-475). While payment
of new creditors (claims under Article 40) is also subject to preferential treatment, their claims
are nevertheless ranked below the (existing) claims of the following creditor groups:
1) employees
2) court fees relating to the legal proceedings
3) creditors holding claims secured by property
(1) Precedence is given to general preferential rights, which include employees’ reinforced rights of prefer-
ence, preferential social security claims, and of special preferential rights, which above all include collateral-backed
claims in the form of liens.
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4) creditors holding claims secured by movable goods
5) creditors holding claims with liens on production facilities and machinery or equip-
ment.
However, in order not to compromise the success of restructuring plans, the ranking of
claims under Article 40 is maintained if business is continued. Additionally it should be stressed
that, within the category of new creditors, restructuring loans granted by credit institutions are
ranked third, below employees’ claims and court fees (Dammann, 1996).
3. BANKRUPTCY LAW REGULATIONS IN SPAIN (2)
3.1. Introduction
The motivation behind the legal regulation of general business insolvency is for two main
reasons:
• The need to harmonise the rights of all creditors involved, so that if there is any differ-
ence in treatment, this must be justified objectively, avoiding favouritism and advanta-
geous positions, in order to group all creditors into a collective attachment.
• To prevent a disorderly attachment from ruining the possibility of the firm’s continuity,
with the subsequent damage this entails for the economy in general and employment.
This involves giving opportunities to the firm to continue through the collective attach-
ment procedure.
Under Spanish law, the system turns on two main figures: suspension of payments and
bankruptcy.
3.2. Suspension of payments
Suspension of payments is a vehicle to prevent bankruptcy. It can only be voluntarily re-
quested by the debtor, and entails a stop to individual actions by creditors. The latter become
involved in the collective procedure whose aim is to reach an agreement with the debtor that
allows the insolvency to be resolved at the lowest financial cost possible for the parties, avoid-
ing the possibility of liquidation of the firm, which occurs in bankruptcy.
Requirements for suspension of payments:
• Entrepreneurial status of the debtor.
• It may only be applied for voluntarily by the debtor. In the case of companies, a resolu-
tion shall have been approved by the shareholders at a general meeting convened spe-
cifically in this connection.
• Suspension of payments shall be declared by a judge. In his/her statement, the suspen-
sion of payments shall be qualified as provisional or definitive. In the latter case, credi-
(2) The bankruptcy law in Spain is now under revision. One of the forecasting changes will be, to give
preference in the satisfaction of credits, to those creditors who have real guarantees.
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tors whose claims account for at least two-fifths of liabilities may request that bank-
ruptcy be declared.
Characteristics of the agreement:
• The agreement is binding on all creditors, except those who, having right of abstention,
should have availed themselves of this right. Those entitled in this connection are the
holders of those assets or rights which, while apparently included in the debtor’s as-
sets, do not actually correspond to the debtor either because ownership thereof has
not been transferred or because they were not in the name of the owner but of a
principal, custodian or some similar figure.
• Arrangements for either the postponement of the debt, the partial acquittance thereof
or both simultaneously may be established. Once legally approved, this shall be binding
on all parties.
• In the event of non-compliance by the debtor with the agreement, the creditors are
authorised to request annulment and the declaration of bankruptcy of the debtor.
In sum, suspension of payments is a process designed to prevent bankruptcy. It allows
liquidity shortfalls to be resolved without endangering the continuity of a company. Should the
process fail, any creditor has the option of requesting bankruptcy proceedings.
3.3. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is a judicial procedure which attempts to secure settlement of the debtor’s
net worth in order to share it amongst a group of creditors ranked according to objective rules
of preference. Once the bankruptcy has been testified, there are a series of personal effects for
the debtor which, in terms of net worth, essentially involve ineligibility to manage his/her assets.
Bankruptcy proceedings:
1) To initiate bankruptcy proceedings, the following conditions must be met:
• Entrepreneurial status of the debtor.
• Debtor’s suspension of current payment of obligations.
• The declaration shall be made by a judge.
• The application may be at the request of the debtor or any other legitimate creditor.
2) To pursue proceedings, a series of official bodies are required under Spanish law,
namely:
• The judge, who declares the bankruptcy and handles the entire procedure.
• The trustees are entrusted with managing the bankruptcy assets and representing
the debtor in and outside court. The trustees shall be three creditors appointed in
the first shareholders’ meeting. They shall have extensive management powers,
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their main purpose being to ensure the continuing value of the assets, since these
will have to be disposed of at some point to satisfy the creditors.
• The receiver is the supervisory and inspection body and liaises between the trus-
tees and the judge.
• The general shareholders’ meeting is the deliberating body. Its intercession is neces-
sary whenever the creditors wish to express their will.
3) Being a collective procedure, bankruptcy requires a series of transactions affecting
both the debtor’s assets as a whole and the creditors as a group.
• Body of creditors: the first consequence of the declaration of bankruptcy for cred-
itors is the loss of the right freely to take individual action, which is replaced by
joint action. There is room in the group of creditors for all those affected by the
solution given to the bankruptcy procedure, i.e. for all those who have no separate
right of execution on specific assets of the debtor. There is also a series of specific
changes in creditors’ rights:
— Suspension of interest from the bankruptcy declaration date, except in mort-
gage loans and pledged loans, to the respective guarantee end-date.
— Maturity of deferred loans.
— Offsetting of creditor’s and bankrupt party’s loans.
— In the event of the bankruptcy of one or more joint debtors, the common
creditor may take part in all the bankruptcies for the total amount of the cred-
it, until the total is met.
— Resolution of bilateral contracts in the course of execution.
• Debtor’s overall assets. Here there are two main transactions: delimitation or leav-
ing in the overall assets only those which, being the debtor’s own, can be executed,
and to repay into the overall assets those that should be available for execution.
Transactions proper to bankruptcy:
These are those aimed at liquidating the debtor’s net worth to pay the creditors, follow-
ing the preference and order set by the legal rules. Liquidation involves three transactions:
1. Examination and recognition of credits
2. Ordering of credits: this is of particular relevance in determining the preference or
order to be assigned to what has been obtained from the liquidation to the payment
of the various credits. Spanish law provides for three possibilities of assigning credi-
tor seniority when making the liquidation.
• Right of abstention. The creditor who is acknowledged as having and exercises this
right will not be affected by the agreement; accordingly, if he does not take part in
the agreement, his right will remain whole and will not be affected by the possible
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partial acquittances of debt agreed. Privileged, singularly privileged and mortgage
creditors have this right.
• Right of separation. Some creditors are able to encash their credits on assets be-
longing in principle to the overall assets, but which can be separated to satisfy
those credits. This right is enjoyed by the following credits:
1. Creditors who have pledges made though notarised deed or loan document
with the intercession of a broker. The creditor will be able to execute it sepa-
rately, selling the item on the stock exchange, if it is quoted, or otherwise with
the broker’s intercession.
2. In the event of a chattel mortgage and non-displacement pledge, when they
are made through a notarised deed or a loan document with the intercession
of a broker and officially registered, the mortgaged or pledged assets will not
be included in the overall bankruptcy assets unless the guaranteed credit is
satisfied.
3. The naval mortgaged creditor can exercise his/her right against the affected
ship or ships if the debtor is declared bankrupt.
4. The creditor with a chattel mortgage who had begun the mortgage execution
before the bankruptcy declaration can act in the same way. And if his/her cred-
it is not covered with the sale of the property, he/she will be considered as a
scriptural creditor as regards the rest.
Common privilege. This is the right to collect in preference to other creditors, moving to
the head of the queue of those who expect to collect on the proceeds from the bankruptcy
assets. This privilege comes down specifically to the ordering of credits which are executed by
means of a general creditors’ meeting called to this end. The ordering involves a classification of
the credits and their subsequent ranking, so that the liquid credit of the bankruptcy is not
equally shared among the creditors, but must be placed in the related order. Classification is
carried out by dividing the credits into two sections: the first includes the credits satisfied with
the result of the chattel assets of the bankruptcy; the second includes those which must be paid
with the proceeds of the property assets. Article 913 of the Commercial Code establishes the
order of the credits that must be satisfied with the proceeds of the chattel goods:
1) Credits of employees for the last six months’ work prior to the bankruptcy.
2) Credits arising from obligatory social subsidy and insurance regimes and labour mu-
tualism arrangements for the last six months prior to the bankruptcy.
3) Creditors with any preferential entitlement provided for in the Commercial Code.
4) Common privilege creditors, and legal mortgage creditors in instances where they
may have priority over the chattel goods (3).
5) Scriptural creditors along with those accredited as such through instruments or
mercantile contracts intervened by an agent or broker.
(3) Articles 1922 of the Civil Code and 168 of the Mortgage Law dated February 8 1946.
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6) Common creditors, firstly for mercantile transactions and subsequently for civil
transactions.
Article 914 indicates the order for paying the credits of the second section, i.e. those
which are the outcome of the property assets:
1) Creditors with real right, in the terms and order established in the Mortgage Act.
2) Singularly privileged and other creditors envisaged in article 913, described above in
the section on priority in relation to chattel goods, in the order established therein.
3. Payment to creditors: once the ordering has been carried out, payment can begin.
This must be made observing the above-mentioned classification in the two sections.
In each section the order established in articles 913 and 914 shall be observed,
avoiding paying credits from one range before having paid those preceding it. In each
class, creditors will receive their credits irrespective of dates, and if there is not
enough to meet payments to an entire class, a pro rata basis shall be used. There is
an exception in this rule for mortgage and scriptural creditors, who will collect by
order of the dates of their securities.
3.4. Actual use of both procedures
In practice, few companies resort to these two procedures. The table below lists the in-
stances of officially declared suspensions of payments and bankruptcies in recent years:
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF SUSPENSIONS OF PAYMENTS AND BANKRUPTCIES IN SPAIN
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Suspensions of payments 798 1,135 1,446 969 650 649 479 348 290 223
Bankruptcies 352 507 618 697 695 713 656 548 484 380
   Source: INE

ANNEX VI
PENSION FUNDS AND EMPLOYEE SAVINGS
SCHEME IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
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1. INTRODUCTION
Retirement systems aim to guarantee elderly people the right to an income once their
working life is over. Demographic development in most of the western countries is at the origin
of the problems posed by the financing of the retirement systems. Pension funds are frequently
evoked in the recurring debate over the financing of the retirement system and its recent de-
velopments.
Whereas in Spain legislation was introduced in order to promote pension funds, France
is unique in Europe in that it has almost no funded pension schemes. Only certain professions
are entitled to such arrangements. In France, the problem of funding the retirement system
sparked off a debate on employee saving schemes.
2. PENSION FUNDS AND EMPLOYEE SAVINGS SCHEME IN FRANCE
2.1. Financing retirement – Pension funds
In France, a universal mandatory pension system has gradually been put in place over
several hundred years.
The basic state pension system, instituted by the Orders of 4 and 19 October 1945, is
based on the “pay-as-you-go” (PAYG) method. In the private sector, the level of provision has
been significantly improved by supplementary schemes:
• one for white-collar workers (cadres), set up in 1947 and run by the Association géné-
rale des institutions de retraite des cadres (AGIRC);
• several for blue-collar workers (non-cadres), created between 1962 and 1972, and
brought together under an umbrella organisation, the Association des régimes de re-
traite complémentaires (ARRCO).
With the “demographic time bomb” threatening the PAYG system, ways of supplement-
ing the current approach using other mechanisms, including, potentially, funded schemes, were
considered.
In 1990, a task force led by the then Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, considered the ques-
tion of France’s ageing population and aired the problem of financing the retirement system in a
White Paper published in 1991.
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The “Thomas” Act on pension funds, named after the member of parliament who tabled
the bill, was passed in 1995. However, the necessary enacting decrees were not adopted, so it
never came into force.
Pension funds are frequently evoked in the recurring debate over the financing of the re-
tirement system and its recent developments.
France is unique in Europe in that it has almost no funded pension schemes. Only certain
professions are entitled to such arrangements; for example, civil servants are covered by the
“Préfon” scheme, and the “Madelin” Act created funded schemes for professionals.
In France, the problem of funding the retirement system sparked off a debate on employ-
ee savings schemes. This ultimately led to the “Fabius” Act, which was adopted on 7 Febru-
ary 2001 and promulgated on 15 February 2001.
2.1.1. Defining pension funds
It should be borne in mind, however, that employee savings schemes and retirement sav-
ings are not the same thing.
Employee savings schemes are closely linked to company performance. That makes them
less predictable than retirement savings, which involve regular payments over a long period that
are locked in and then paid out not as a lump sum but as annuities.
However, in France, a pension fund is any mechanism that is:
— designed to encourage individuals to save;
— accompanied by tax incentives;
— intended to supplement pensions, which are expected to decline.
Thus, pension funds publicly solicit savings. Their objective is to manage these monies
over several decades and then to pay out annuities, which in turn have gained sufficiently in val-
ue to safeguard the purchasing power of the annuitants and contributors.
“A pension fund is a defined benefit and/or defined contribution retirement scheme, set
up by one or more private or public companies. It acts as a non-bank financial organisation that
collects employee and/or employer contributions (inflows), manages them on a funded basis
and then pays out benefits, either as a life annuity or as a lump-sum payment (outflows) when a
member retires.” (Najat El Mekkaoui de Freitas). Membership of a pension fund guarantees a
retirement income for affiliated employees.
Pension funds are independent of their sponsoring company and differ from other finan-
cial organisations, especially banks and insurance corporations.
2.1.2. Different approaches to financing pension funds
2.1.2.1. DEFINED BENEFIT
Under defined benefit (DB) schemes, the pension fund sponsor, i.e. the employer, under-
takes to pay retiring members a pension corresponding to a pre-determined percentage of their
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wage based on the number of years with the firm (unit benefit). Such funds are often financed by
the employer, which means that the employer is the fundholder, not the employees. If employees
participate in financing, their contribution is set at a percentage of their wage (flat benefit).
2.1.2.2. DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
Under defined contribution (DC) schemes, both the employee and employer finance the
scheme. The contributions determine the level of the commitment made by the pension scheme.
The employer’s payments can take the form either of a fixed sum or a percentage of the
employee’s wage. Payments are sometimes linked to company earnings. The pension, which is
paid to each employee into a personal account, is thus equal to the monies saved plus (or mi-
nus) the gains (or losses) from investments. The last ten years have seen a relatively sharp rise
in the number of DC schemes.
This trend is the result of greater regulatory flexibility, particularly as regards pension
portability for employees stopping work or changing jobs. In fact, DC funds generally offer total
portability, unlike DB mechanisms, where employees typically have to build up many years of
service to avoid losing their pension.
2.1.2.3. HYBRID SCHEMES
A new type of pension fund is emerging: hybrid schemes that combine DC and DB fi-
nancing. Some 120 French-style pension funds exist, worth a total EUR 15,24 billion
(FRF 100 billion). Most were set up by large groups like Usinor, Air Liquide, Péchiney and Saint-
Gobain. Some companies, such as Rhône-Poulenc and Accor, have even developed sophisticated
long-term savings plans where funds are invested according to a timescale fixed by the employ-
ee (e.g. retirement or home purchase).
Other products exist in addition to individual pension schemes, such as long-term com-
pany savings schemes for employees, equity savings plans and people’s savings plans, which are
open to everyone.
2.1.3. The reserve fund
The national reserve fund was set up in 1999 to bolster the PAYG schemes and help
them cope with the problems of the next 20 years when the post-war baby-boom generation
reaches retirement.
Increasing funding is being supplied to the reserve fund from three sources. By 2020, a
total EUR 76,22 billion (FRF 500 billion) should be obtained via the overall surpluses built up by
the national pension scheme (Caisse nationale d’assurance-vieillesse), the old-age solidarity
fund (Fonds de solidarité-vieillesse), and the solidarity-related social security contributions made
by businesses. A portion of the social security levies on capital income should bring in EUR
22,87 billion (FRF 150 billion), and the financial income earned by these funds should come to
EUR 50,31 billion (FRF 330 billion). All in all, by 2020, the reserve fund should be supplemented
to the tune of around EUR 152,45 billion (FRF 1,000 billion).
A portion of the income from the sale of UMTS licences is also earmarked for the retire-
ment reserve fund.
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The fund could be managed either according to a long-term investment strategy, with a
view to setting up a long-term fund, or with a nearer-term perspective, to limit increases in the
contributions. Investment will be in equities, which offer high yields but are volatile, or in gov-
ernment securities, which are safer, but offer lower returns on investment.
2.2. Employee savings schemes
France offers an impressive array of employee savings schemes. It is one of the few coun-
tries to have introduced a mandatory profit-sharing mechanism for employees.
Most options on offer elsewhere are also available in France, where they usually come
with attractive social security and tax exemptions.
Incentive schemes, profit-sharing schemes and company savings schemes are the three
main types of mechanism.
— Incentive schemes
First created in 1959 and modified by the Order of 21 October 1986, incentive schemes
are designed to motivate employees by setting specific goals. They must be covered by a three-
year company agreement negotiated with and signed by the employees or their representatives.
Under certain conditions, notably in terms of duration, the sums earned under incentive
schemes are exempt from social security contributions. However, employees may choose to ac-
cess these sums, which subsequently become taxable.
— Profit-sharing schemes
Profit-sharing requirement became mandatory in 1967 for companies employing 50 or
more people, and optional for smaller businesses. Since the aim is to give workers a share in
the company’s profits, employees’ rights are calculated at the close of each financial year and
taken to a special account. The calculation, which is performed within the framework of ordi-
nary law, uses the following formula:
½ (after-tax profits in France – 5% of share capital) x 
added-value
wages
Depending on the company’s regulations, sums earned through profit-sharing are locked
in for three or five years (although early distribution is provided for in nine cases) and must be
invested throughout the period. They are exempt from social security contributions, employees
do not pay income tax on them (provided they are tied up for five years) and they can be de-
ducted from the firm’s taxable profits.
According to the stipulations of the scheme, employees’ profit-sharing rights can give rise to:
1. an allocation of shares in the company
• this option is of little interest for unlisted companies
• however, listed companies are entitled to buy back their own shares and then dis-
tribute them among employees
2. a claim on the company, which can take the form of bonds or accounts with an
agreed maturity
3. investment in the financial markets
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Here, employees receive units in a unit trust (Société d’investissement à capital variable, SI-
CAV) or shares in an investment fund (fonds communs de placement, FCP); alternatively, pay-
ments are made in their name into a company savings scheme.
— Company savings schemes
All companies are entitled to set up these optional schemes. Firms use them to encour-
age and help their employees (or former employees who have retired) to build up savings for
specific projects or as a supplement to their pension.
Company savings schemes can be introduced on the basis of collective bargaining or at
the firm’s initiative. Members pay in sums earned from profit-sharing or incentive plans, or con-
tribute directly from their wages or pensions. Total annual payments, excluding those from prof-
it-sharing, may not exceed 25% of the employee’s yearly gross wage. The company may opt to
top up the amounts invested, by making an “abondement”, which is limited to triple the amount
contributed by employees and capped at an annual FRF 15,000 per person, or FRF 22,500 if the
funds are at least partly invested in the company’s own shares.
Company savings schemes are collective savings vehicles that allow employees, assisted
by their company, to put together securities portfolios. Funds paid into the scheme may be in-
vested in shares in a SICAV or paid into a company investment fund (fonds commun de place-
ment d’entreprise, FCPE), which may be diversified or invested in the company’s shares. Various
rules are in place to guarantee the liquidity of the funds invested.
Company savings plans have taken off in recent years. In 1997, 8,702 companies operated
this kind of scheme, 51% more than in 1993, and 1.35 million employees were members. Funds
collected totalled FRF 19.3 billion, with FRF 4.2 billion coming from profit-sharing,
FRF 4.1 billion from incentive schemes, FRF 7.3 billion in voluntary payments by employees plus
FRF 3.6 billion in company top-ups. The average deposit by investors in 1997 was FRF 14,000.
On average, one employee out of every two makes a payment of one kind or another every
year. Two-thirds of them receive company top-ups, which average FRF 4,000 and exert a sub-
stantial multiplier effect on voluntary payments.
Company savings schemes
Creation Optional. Set up either at the company's initiative or on the basis of collective 
bargaining. 
Eligibility The scheme must be offered to all employees of the company and may be extended to 
retired employees or made unavailable to recent employees (< 6 months). 
Payments • Employees may choose to make payments (up to of ¼ annual income). 
• The company pays in funds: 
– under the mandatory profit-sharing scheme; 
– under the optional incentive scheme; 
– through voluntary top-ups, up to three times' the employee's payment. A ceiling of 
EUR 2,300 applies, or EUR 3,450 if funds are used to purchase equities or 
investment certificates issued by the company. 
Tax advantages  Capital payments exempt from social security contributions. 
Reinvested income tax-exempt. 
Condition: funds must be locked in for five years. 
Funds invested in: – securities issued by SICAV or FCP; 
– securities issued by the company, notably in the case of leveraged management 
buy-outs; 
– capital increases reserved for employees (Act of 1973). 
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Stock options constitute a fourth type of mechanism often considered to fall outside the
category of employee savings due to their generally elitist character and because of the way
they are used by companies. First seen in France in 1970, stock options offer employees, espe-
cially at management level, preferential conditions under which to subscribe for or buy shares
in their company or a company belonging to the same group.
A new system of business founders’ share warrants (bons de souscription de parts de créa-
teurs d’entreprises) has recently been put in place for certain unlisted companies.
The release of the Balligand-Foucauld report on wage-based savings, submitted to the
Prime Minister in January 2000, was behind the surge in employee savings schemes. Further im-
petus was supplied in July 2000 by the Fabius bill, which set out a three-pronged set of objec-
tives:
— ensure fairer distribution of the benefits of growth;
— expand savings mechanisms to include small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);
— ncourage precautionary savings (without calling into question the PAYG –Pay as you
go- pension system).
A new Employee Savings Act was adopted by the French National Assembly on 7 Febru-
ary 2001 and promulgated on 19 February 2001. The enacting decrees appeared in the Journal
Officiel of 3 August 2001
This Act mainly aims to:
— improve existing savings mechanisms;
— make it easier for the employees of SMEs to benefit from such plans;
— lengthen the savings horizon;
— increase employee share ownership and give employees more clout.
The new Act provides for the creation of two new mechanisms: the intercompany savings
scheme (plan d’épargne interentreprises) and the voluntary partnership employee savings scheme
(plan partenarial d’épargne salariale volontaire).
2.2.1. Improving existing mechanisms
The length of time that employees are required to have worked in the company or group
before they can join the savings scheme or participate in profit-sharing and incentive schemes
has been cut from six to three months.
A employee savings passbook (livret d’épargne salariale) has been created so that people
changing jobs can transfer their assets to the scheme at their new place of work.
Company savings schemes may be transferred, under the following conditions, if employees
change jobs:
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• sums earned under a previous scheme may be reinvested in a new one;
• no more than 25% of the employee’s annual wage may be invested in the new
scheme;
• periods during which funds have already been blocked are taken into account when
transferring to a new account, unless the funds transferred are being used to buy secu-
rities as part of a capital increase reserved for employees.
After the lock-in period, the funds paid into the savings plan or earned under profit-shar-
ing arrangements can be deposited in a time savings account (compte épargne temps).
A new type of financial vehicle has been created: a SICAV invested in the company’s own se-
curities.
2.2.2. Broadening access to wage-based savings
The tax-free provision for investment has been raised from 25% to 50% of the total
amount paid under profit-sharing for all agreements in place when the Act was promulgated
and for any agreements concluded in the subsequent two years.
Companies with a workforce of under 100 that have created an incentive scheme and
that have set up a company savings scheme at the date on which the Act was published or in
the subsequent two years are entitled to build up a tax-free provision for investment. This pro-
vision may be equal to 50% of the top-up on the employee’s payments from the incentive
scheme and is assigned to the savings scheme.
Intercompany savings schemes are intended to make it easier for SMEs to set up employee
savings schemes.
Intercompany schemes may be implemented at a sector level or for a geographical
area; alternatively, they can be set up by a group of companies seeking to create a joint sav-
ings vehicle.
They can be set up on the basis of a collective agreement reached within the company’s
works council or if two-thirds of the employees of each participating company give their ap-
proval. Such schemes make it possible to share certain “costs”. Employees are free to sign up
regardless of whether their employer has joined the scheme.
SMEs are likely to be encouraged to make more use of company savings schemes funded
by profit-sharing and incentives. Notably, this type of scheme can now be set up by the author-
ised representatives (1) of companies employing between 1-100 people. Company managers
and authorised representatives are also entitled to become personal members of schemes
(they may pay in up to ¼ of their wage) as are sole proprietors (they are allowed to pay in ¼
of their professional income liable for income tax).
(1) Mandataires sociaux non titulaires d’un contrat de travail, i.e. duly authorised representatives who do
not have an employment contract. Company managers, CEOs and managing directors of public limited companies,
and board members or managers of limited liability companies may all fall into this category..
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2.2.3. Extending savings horizons through voluntary partnership employee savings schemes
The voluntary partnership employee savings scheme is a diversified savings vehicle that
allows employees to build up precautionary savings or to carry out specific projects, such as
financing a property transaction or setting up a pension supplement.
This type of scheme can take one of two forms:
— a minimum ten-year fixed maturity as of the first payment; or
— sliding maturities, with each payment being locked in for ten years.
As an incentive, these new schemes offer added advantages over company savings
schemes. The annual ceiling on the top-up is EUR 4,600.
The employer is obliged to pay a fixed contribution of 8.20% on the part of the annual
company top-up in excess of EUR 2,300 per employee. This contribution is taken to the nation-
al old-age solidarity fund (fonds de solidarité-vieillesse).
The rules governing such plans must stipulate that part of the monies contributed may
be used to buy units in funds invested in “ethical” companies, i.e. those that help to integrate
people in the labour market, employ handicapped people, or enjoy a special legal status (associ-
ation, co-operative, etc.).
Only businesses already offering their workers a company savings scheme may set up this
type of scheme.
2.2.4. Increasing employee share ownership and giving employees more clout
If employees are not covered by a savings scheme agreement, the employer is obliged to
hold annual talks to consider one or more of the different mechanisms.
The regulations governing the company savings scheme must then be submitted to the
Departmental office for labour, employment and vocational training (Direction Départementale
du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle, DDTEFP).
Once the decision to create a company savings scheme is taken, the works council or
staff representatives must be consulted on the proposed regulations at least two weeks before
submission to the DDTEFP.
Companies are encouraged to introduce, or step up, employee share ownership to ena-
ble employees to benefit from the growth in value of their company and to shift savings to-
wards the production base by promoting equity investment.
Just six million of France’s almost 21 million salaried workers hold shares in an FCPE.
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Employee share ownership is gaining ground thanks to mechanisms that allow staffmem-
bers to subscribe to IPOs for example, or to participate in privatisations via stock option plans
offered by firms listed in the CAC 40, and via company savings schemes. This trend is particular-
ly striking among high tech firms and in leveraged management buy-outs. First introduced to
France in 1984, LMBOs are designed to ensure the survival of a company when there is no
successor to the outgoing management.
3. PENSION FUNDS IN SPAIN
3.1. Internal company Pension Funds: regulating legislation
Law 8/1987 on regulation of Pension Schemes and Funds specifies the nature of Pension
Funds and establishes their purpose as being to provide to workers, at the time they start to
receive their pensions, a standard of living similar to that which they have enjoyed hitherto. Ad-
ditional provision one of this law provides that pension commitments assumed by companies
shall be covered by insurance contracts, pension schemes or both.
Transitional provision fourteen of Law 30/1995 of 8 November 1995 on the regulation and
supervision of private insurance provides that employers who at the time the law enters into
force have pension commitments with their workers or employees that are not covered as re-
quired by the aforesaid additional provision one of Law 8/1987 shall, within three years from such
entry into force, comply with the provisions thereof. In practice, this means that pension funds
must be external to non-financial corporations, being held with a financial institution. This same transi-
tional provision provides exceptionally for a longer period for certain types of company.
Additional provision thirteen of the Law accompanying the 1999 Budget extended these
periods to 1 January 2001. Subsequently, the 2001 Budget Law further extended the period to
November 2002.
In 1990, transitional provision four of the General Chart of Accounts provided that firms
with a shortfall between their accrued pension commitments and those insured and covered in
 CONDITIONS IMPROVEMENTS 
Profit-sharing • companies employing fewer than 50 people. • provision for investment raised from 25% to 
50% for agreements signed in the two years 
following publication of the Act. 
Incentive schemes • companies employing fewer than 100 
people; 
• incentives must be invested in a savings 
scheme; 
• company must pay a top-up. 




• can be set up by authorised representatives 
of companies employing between 1-100 
people. 
• authorised representatives of the company 
are eligible to take part in the company 
scheme, with payments limited to 25% of 
their wage. 
 CONDITIONS INNOVATIONS 
Intercompany 
savings schemes 
• set up through collective bargaining; 
• apply to a particular geographical area or 
sector. 
• employees of different companies can be 
members of the same scheme, regardless of 





• set up through collective bargaining; 
• company savings scheme or intercompany 
savings scheme must already exist. 
• funds locked in for 10 years; 
• max. company top-up EUR 4,600 compared 
with EUR 2,300 for company savings 
schemes. Employer must pay pension 
contribution of 8.20% on portion of top-up 
exceeding EUR 2,300; 
• haircut increased from 20% to 30% in case 
of capital increases reserved for employees. 
Key measures contained in the bill
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accounting terms up to the year prior to the entry into force of the Law on partial reform and
adaptation of commercial law to the European Community Directives relating to companies,
must systematically set aside such provisions as are necessary to cover such shortfall within the
following periods, starting from the beginning of the first financial year that ends after 30 June
1990:
a. For provisions corresponding to current pensions as at the beginning of the said fi-
nancial year, 7 years.
b. For provisions corresponding to deferred pensions as at the beginning of the said
period, 15 years.
These periods have since been extended for certain sectors of activity.
These accounting rules mean, in practice, that most companies with pension commit-
ments for which external pension funds still do not exist shall set aside provisions for this pur-
pose. However, according to Central Balance Sheet Office data, relating to all sectors, i.e. includ-
ing non-industrial ones, out of somewhat more than 3,500 medium and large reporting firms,
only about 270 show these commitments in their accounts, another 169 firms having external
funds. There is no information available on how many firms have commitments and do not
show them in their accounts.
ANNEX VII
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL SECURITY
IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
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1. INTRODUCTION
The social security system is designed to shield citizens from different “social” risks, such
as illness, disability …) which prevent people from earning a professional income, or which gen-
erate specific expenses.
In Spain as in France, the social security system is built around several statutory schemes.
However most of the people in each country are covered by the general scheme.
Much of the funding for social security systems comes from levies on employees’ com-
pensation or self-employed workers’ turnover. However in France new financing policies were
devised to broaden this base to take all household income into account, while pro-employment
policies scaled down the contributions required of low earners.
2. THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. PAYROLL-RELATED SOCIAL
SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS IN FRANCE
Since 1945, social security coverage has gradually been extended to all sections of the
population. The most recent stage in this process was the passing of the Act of 28 July 1999,
which introduced a universal sickness coverage mechanism to deliver basic protection to all
French residents, together with additional measures for the least well-off.
The way in which the social security system is funded has also evolved since 1945. Al-
though payroll contributions still provide the bulk of the financing for the various social security
schemes, there has been a sharp rise in the share contributed by other receipts, including those
from taxes, the social security surcharge (Contribution Sociale Généralisée – CSG), which was in-
troduced by the Act of 23 July 1993 and is levied on all income arising on work, benefits and
assets, the solidarity contribution made by businesses (Contribution Sociale de Solidarité à la
Charge des Entreprises – CSSS), and the social security debt reimbursement levy (Contribution au
Remboursement de la Dette Sociale – CRDS) created by the Order of 24 January 1996.
The social security system is built around several statutory schemes:
Persons covered
General scheme employees in trade and industry
Scheme for people working in the agricultural sector employees and the self-employed in the agricultural sector
Special schemes specific categories of workers, such as civil servants or
employees of the national rail authority and power and
gas utilities
Independent schemes self-employed individuals other than those in the
agricultural sector (craftsmen, retailers, professionals, etc.)
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More than 80% of French people are covered by the general scheme, which is divided
into four sections: health insurance and cover for occupational injuries, family allowances, the
national pension scheme and collection. Collection offices, run by the organisation URSSAF (Un-
ion de Recouvrement des Cotisations de Sécurité Sociale et d’Allocations Familiales), help collect the
monies used to fund the general social security scheme.
The welfare system is rounded out by additional benefits, welfare assistance, unemploy-
ment insurance, etc., provided by the public authorities, the ASSEDICs (Associations pour l’emploi
dans l’industrie et le commerce – organisations that manage local unemployment insurance funds)
and supplementary retirement funds.
Much of the funding for France’s social security system comes from levies on employees’
compensation or self-employed workers’ turnover. New financing policies were devised to
broaden this base to take all household income into account, while pro-employment policies
scaled down the contributions required of low earners.
The receipts of the social security schemes in 1999 came mainly from the following cate-
gories:
— “effective contributions”, which account for 57% of all receipts and correspond to
the contributions made by employees and employers to social security funds.
— “notional contributions”, which account for 8.3% of all receipts and reflect monies
paid by employers (such as SNCF, the French railway authority, RATP, the Paris trans-
port authority and EDF, the national power utility) into the schemes that they run.
Employers are required to ensure that their scheme is in sound financial health.
— “public contributions”, which account for 3% of all receipts and correspond to direct
payments by the State:
• additional subsidies to ensure that certain special schemes are properly funded;
• statutory government contributions;
• repayment of benefits or allowances paid out by the schemes on the government’s
behalf.
“Earmarked taxes and levies”, which account for 18.8% of receipts, comprise various fis-
cal levies, contributions and taxes assigned to social security funding. The main ones are:
— the CSG surcharge levied on all household income. The contribution arising on la-
bour incomes is paid exclusively by employees and related categories. It is withheld
by the employer and paid to the URSSAF collection office. It is used to fund health
insurance, family benefits and the old-age solidarity fund.
— the CSSS solidarity contributions made by businesses.
However, this item does not include the CRDS levy allocated to the Social Security Debt
Redemption Fund (Caisse d’amortissement de la dette sociale – CADES). The CADES fund is con-
sidered to be a financial institution, not a social security fund.
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General provisions
Base for contributions Elements used to calculate the base for social security contributions.
The base for social security contributions includes the employee's basic wage plus any bonuses
(payments made on top of the individual's basic wage), with the exception of bonuses that are
expressly exempted under legal or regulatory provisions, or paid as a refund for job-related
expenses. Bonuses are also subject to the CSG surcharge and the CRDS levy, after a flat-rate
5% allowance for job-related expenses.
The social security ceiling is used as the base for certain contributions linked to the national
pension scheme and housing benefits.
Minimum base for
contributions
The minimum base used to calculate contributions is fixed according to the French minimum
wage, to which are added any benefits, bonuses or increases arising from legal or regulatory
provisions.
Summary of bonuses and incentives (1)
Type of bonus Base for social security
contributions
Base for CSG surcharge and CRDS
levy
Incentive : Extra month's salary, end-
of-year bonus, holiday bonus, etc. (2)
Included included (5% allowance)
Seniority bonus Included included (5% allowance)
Attendance bonus included included (5% allowance)
Productivity bonus included included (5% allowance)
Bonus related to working
conditions (3)
included included (5% allowance)
Expatriation bonus included included (5% allowance)
Job-related expenses: flat-rate
allowances and proven expenses
excluded under certain conditions excluded under certain conditions
although there is an additional allowance
Works council bonus included  (4) included (5% allowance)
Employer's contributions  to
supplementary retirement and
provident schemes
contributions not exceeding 85% of the
social security ceiling are excluded
(19% for provident schemes)
Profit-sharing and incentive plans excluded included (5% allowance)
Social security ceiling The social security ceiling takes account of all compensation paid in the course of the year. The














≤ 14,950 (2 279€)
Bracket B between 14,950
(2 279€) and 59,800
(9 117€)
Bracket C 59,800 (9 117€) to
119,600 (18 233€)
(1) Bonuses are defined as payments made to employees on top of their basic wage in accordance with legal or contrac-
tual provisions at a company or individual level. Bonuses are included in the base used to calculate social security contributions
unless they are expressly exempted under legal or regulatory provisions, or paid as a refund for job-related expenses. Bonuses are
also subject to the CSG surcharge and the CRDS levy, after a 5% flat-rate allowance for job-related expenses.
(2) Under certain conditions, stock options are subject to social-security, CSG surcharge and CRDS levy contributions.
(3) e.g. dangerous, cold or dirty work, high output requirements, night shifts or work on sundays and holidays.
(4) Excepting statutory exemptions and allowances by the Central Agency for Social Security Funds (Agence Centrale des
Organismes de Sécurité Sociale – ACOSS).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA - BANQUE DE FRANCE / FRENCH AND SPANISH INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS252
ANNEX VII
PAYROLL-RELATED SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS (1)






Health insurance Total wage 12.80 0.75
National pension scheme Total wage 1.60 -
Social security ceiling 8.20 6.55
Widow's insurance Total wage - 0.10
Family allowances Total wage 5.40 -
Occupational injuries Total wage -
Housing benefits Total wage 0.40 -
Social security ceiling 0.10
CSG
CSG non deductible 95% of gross CSG - 2.40
CSG deductible 95% of gross CSG - 5.10
CRDS 95% of gross CRDS - 0.50
Unemployment insurance and ASF 1999:
Bracket A 5.13 3.01
Bracket B 5.26 3.60
2000 and 2001
Bracket A (AC) 3.70 2.10
Bracket A (ASF) 1.16 0.80
Bracket B (AC) 3.70 2.60
Bracket B (ASF) 1.29 0.89
AGS (FNGS) Brackets A and B at
1/1/1999
0.25 -
Brackets A and B at
1/1/2000
0.20 -
Brackets A and B at
1/1/2001
0.10
Supplementary retirement schemes rates at 1/1/1999
general employees Brackets 1 and 2 4.5 3




Brackets A, B and C (CET) 0.13 0.08
rates since 1/1/2000
general employees Bracket 1 4.5 3








Brackets A, B and C (CET) 0.17 0.11
rates at 1/1/2001
Brackets A, B and C (CET) 0.22
Mandatory supplementary provident
contributions
Bracket A 1.50 -
APEC Bracket B 0.036 0.024
Taxes and profit sharing
Construction Total wages paid 0.45
Apprenticeship Total wages paid 0.50
Vocational training Wages paid 1.50
(1) CSG: Social security surcharge.
CRDS: Social security debt reimbursement levy.
AC: Unemployment insurance.
ASF: Financial Structure Association (Association pour la structure financière). ). The authorised representatives of companies contributing to
the Association des régimes de retraite complémentaires (ARRCO) and of the Association générale des institutions de retraite des cadres (AGIRC),
the organisations running the supplementary retirement schemes for general and upper level employees respectively, have had to contribute to the
ASF since 1 January 1996.
AGS: Wage guarantee mechanism.
FNGS: National fund guaranteeing the payment of wages.
CET: Exceptional and temporary payment required by the AGIRC since 1 January 1997.
APEC: Association for the employment of upper level employees. In addition to paying the APEC contribution, the employee and employer
are jointly liable for an additional flat-rate contribution, which came to FRF 105.90 (16,14 •) in 2000, and FRF 107.70 (EUR 16.42) in 2001.
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2.1. Occupational injuries
The employer pays all contributions relative to occupational injuries and illness. Since 1 Janu-
ary 1991, such contributions have been calculated on the basis of all wages paid. A flat-rate contribu-
tion is applicable in certain professions. The rate stands at around 1% to 2% of the wage bill.
2.2. Contribution to employees’ transport expenses
Certain localities and large conurbations require companies with a workforce of more
than nine people to contribute to their employees’ public transport expenses. This payment is
calculated on the basis of the entire payroll. With the exception of the Paris region, this contri-
bution may not exceed 1.75% in large localities that have carried out major infrastructure work.
Elsewhere, it varies between 0.55% and 1% depending on the size of the local population.
2.3. Social security surcharge (CSG)
This surcharge is paid by employees and related categories exclusively. It is withheld by
the employer and paid to the URSSAF collection office.
The CSG surcharge is payable by all employees domiciled in France for the purposes of
income tax (regardless of their social security situation).
2.3.1. Base
The base for the CSG surcharge is now the same as that of the CRDS levy in terms of
work-related income. It applies to compensation paid since 1 February 1996.
2.3.2. Exempted income
The following are exempt: compensation paid to apprentices, payment in kind made to
people not paid in cash, transport expenses paid by employers in the Paris region, employers’
contributions to luncheon vouchers, management fees paid by employers in respect of company
savings schemes.
2.4. Social security debt reimbursement levy (CRDS)
The CRDS levy is paid by employees and applies to compensation paid since 1 Febru-
ary 1996. It is withheld by the employer and paid over to social security collection offices. It is
not deductible from taxable income and therefore must be integrated back into employees’
taxable wages.
2.4.1. Base
All work-related income previously subject to social security contributions and to the
former CSG surcharge is now subject to the CRDS levy, as are the following, which have been
subject to the CSG surcharge since 1 January 1997:
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— employers’ contributions to funding for supplementary provident and retirement
benefits;
— the portion of severance payments or of monies paid on breach of an employment
contract (to compensate for losses resulting from the breach) in excess of the
amount set down in the collective agreement for that sector;
— all monies paid when an employment contract is modified;
— additional allowances paid during parental childcare leave or periods of part-time
work;
— daily social security allowances paid in the case of sickness, maternity and occupation-
al injuries or illness.
One notable difference between the CSG base and the base used to calculate social se-
curity contributions is that the former also includes monies paid in respect of profit-sharing and
incentive plans.
2.4.2. Allowance
As for the CSG surcharge, the gross amount paid by an employer according to the terms
of an employment contract is subject to the CRDS levy, after deduction of a 5% allowance for
job-related expenses. Additional allowances for job-related expenses do not apply.
2.5. Unemployment insurance
In 1999, 2000 and 2001, the maximum monthly compensation subject to unemployment
insurance contributions was as follows:
— 1999: FRF 57,880
— 2000: FRF 58,800
— 2001: FRF 59,800
2.6. Wage guarantee mechanism (AGS)
Contribution: paid solely by the employer and set at 0.20% of wages up to four times




Bracket A ≤ 14,470 (2 206 €) ≤ 14,700 (2 241 €) ≤ 14,950 (2 279 €)
Bracket B from 14,470 (2 206 €) to
57,880 (8 824 €)
from 14,700 (2 241 €) to
58,800 (8 964 €)
from 14,950 (2 279 €) to
59,800 (9 116 €)
Bracket C from 57,880 (8 824 €) to
115,760
from 58,800 (8 964 €) to
117,600 (17 928 €)
from 59,800 (9 116 €) to
119,600 (18 223 €)
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— 1999: FRF 57,880
— 2000: FRF 58,800
— 2001: FRF 59,800
The wage guarantee mechanism, which is effective in the case of a company’s court-or-
dered reorganisation or liquidation, is limited to:
— thirteen times the monthly ceiling used to calculate contributions to the unemploy-
ment insurance scheme where employees’ claims arise from legal or regulatory pro-
visions or from the terms of a collective agreement that specify the amount, and that
are included in the terms of an employment contract signed more than six months
prior to the decision announcing the reorganisation or liquidation;
— four times the ceiling used to calculate contributions to the unemployment insurance
scheme in other cases.
2.7. SUPPLEMENTARY RETIREMENT SCHEMES
2.7.1. Scheme for upper level employees (Cadres)
In 1999, 2000 and 2001, the maximum monthly compensation on which contributions
had to be paid was as follows:
— 1999: FRF 115,760
— 2000: FRF 117,600
— 2001: FRF 119,600 (EUR 18,233)
Contributions are calculated on the basis of gross compensation, up to the following ceilings:
2.7.1.1. CONTRIBUTION RATES
Bracket A contributions go to ARRCO, with the breakdown between employer and em-
ployee being in principle 60/40.
Bracket B contributions go to AGIRC. The rates for brackets B and C are as follows:
12.50% for the employer and 7.5% for the employee.
(in FRF)
Monthly limits Maximum monthly base
Bracket
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2.7.1.2. MINIMUM POINTS MECHANISM
Participants in the retirement scheme for upper level employees accumulate “points”
during their working life.
A minimum points mechanism was introduced on 1 January  1989. It applies to all mem-
bers of the retirement scheme for upper level employees even if their compensation is below
or only just above the social security ceiling.
2.7.2. ARRCO full contribution scheme for general employees
In 1999, 2000 and 2001, the maximum monthly compensation on which contributions
had to be paid was as follows:
— 1999: FRF 43,410
— 2000: FRF 44,100
— 2001: FRF 44,850
Contributions are calculated on the basis of gross compensation, up to the following ceilings:
2.7.2.1. CONTRIBUTION RATES
For bracket 1, the effective minimum contribution rate is 7.5% (usually 4.5% for the em-
ployer and 3% for the employee). For bracket 2, the rate rises to 12.50% (7.5% for the employ-
er and 5% for the employee).
3. REGULATIONS GOVERNING SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
IN SPAIN
3.1. Contribution schemes
There are five types of schemes:





Monthly limits (in FRF) Maximum monthly base (in FRF)
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
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3.2. Contingencies
The types of contingencies for which contributions must be paid are as follows:
1. General contingencies.
2. Contingencies relating to industrial accidents and illnesses (IMS and IT).
3. Other:
— Unemployment
— FOGASA (Wage Guarantee Fund)
This is an independent entity attached to the Spanish Ministry of Labour and So-
cial Affairs whose aim is to pay unpaid wages recognised as such pursuant to ad-
ministrative rulings in favour of workers, along with severance payments due to
insolvency, suspension of payment to creditors, business failure or bankruptcy.
— Vocational training
The following summary table sets out the items to be included in the contribution base,
the related maximum and minimum bases and the rates to be applied to each type of contin-







































































CONTINGENCIES RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND
ILLNESSES (IMS AND IT)
CONTRIBUTION BASE
The total compensation that worker is entitled to monthly, or that
which they actually receive (if higher) on account of work on a
dependent employment basis.
Not included in the contribution base are:
1) Travel expense allowances.
2) Indemnity payments for death, dismissal or similar.
3) Proceeds in kind.
4) Marital allowance.
5) Social Security benefits.
6) Overtime.
As for general contingencies with the exception of overtime, which is part of
the contribution base for this type of contingency.
MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM
CONTRIBUTION BASES
They are established for each professional category and in no
case exceed the following monthly limits:
  2001          2000  1999
Maximum EUR 2,500      EUR 2,450 EUR 2,403
                ESP 415,950   ESP 407,790  ESP 399,780
Minimum  EUR 505         EUR 495        EUR  485
                ESP 84,150     ESP 82,470    ESP 80,820
In the event of multiple employment, the maximum and minimum
limits will be distributed among all the companies in proportion to
the compensation paid to the worker in each of them.
Irrespective of professional category, the following monthly limits (in pesetas)
shall not be exceeded:
  2001          2000  1999
Maximum EUR 2,500      EUR 2,450 EUR 2,403
                ESP 415,950   ESP 407,790  ESP 399,780
Minimum  EUR 505         EUR 495        EUR  485
                ESP 84,150     ESP 82,470    ESP 80,820
In the event of multiple employment, the maximum and minimum limits will
be distributed among all the companies in proportion to the compensation
paid to the worker in each of them.
CONTRIBUTION RATES
28.3% of the contribution base, of which 23.6% relates to the
company and 4.7% to the worker.
In temporary contracts lasting less than 7 days, the employer's
portion rises by 36% to 32.09%
The compensation for overtime is subject to an additional
contribution that is not eligible for determining the regulatory base
for benefits.
Contribution rates for overtime:
a) Prompted by force majeure: 14%, of which 12% relates to the
company and 2% to the employee.
b) Rest of overtime: 28.3%, of which 23.6% relates to the
employer and 4.7% to the employee.
Set on the basis of the danger of the work performed.
There is an exhaustive list for each type of job. (RD 2930/79 of 29
December).



























































UNEMPLOYMENT FOGASA (WAGE GUARANTEE FUND) VOCATIONAL TRAINING
CONTRIBUTION BASE The same as for general contingencies with the exception of overtime, which for this type of contingency are part of the contribution base.
MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM
CONTRIBUTION BASES
                                                                    Irrespective of professional category, the following monthly limits (in pesetas) shall not be exceeded:
                                                                                                              2001        2000             1999
Maximum EUR 2,500      EUR 2,450 EUR 2,403
                   ESP 415,950   ESP 407,790  ESP 399,780
Minimum  EUR 505         EUR 495        EUR 485
                     ESP 84,150     ESP 82,470    ESP 80,820
In the event of multiple employment, the maximum and minimum limits will be distributed among all the companies in proportion to the compensation paid to the worker in each of
them.
CONTRIBUTION RATES
a) Permanent contracts and apprenticeship, stand-in and
substitution contracts except for disabled employees,
whether full- or part-time.
  2001   2000   1999
Payable by employer 6%   6%   6.2%
Payable by employee 1.55%   1.55%   1.6%
b) Fixed-term contract
  Full-time Part-time
Payable by employer       6.7%     7.7%
Payable by employee       1.6%     1.6%
The rates for fixed-term contracts have not changed in
the last 3 years.
The contribution rate is 0.4% and payable exclusively by
the employer.
The contribution rate is 0.7%, of which 0.6% is payable
by the employer and 0.1% by the employee.

ANNEX VIII
TAXES LEVIED ON COMPANIES
 IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
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1. INTRODUCTION
Business activity and the surpluses it generates, are taxed by the State and local tax au-
thorities. Thus, whether taxing the corporation directly (direct taxes) or indirectly (actions by
the corporation at different stages of its production chain or in following procedures necessary
for it to operate), a wide array of taxes surrounds the life of the corporation.
This annex briefly draws together the set of taxes currently levied on French and Spanish
corporations and the main characteristics of each tax, highlighting their most significant aspects.
They are presented in a table that allows both an overview of the aspects characterising the tax
























































































Tax Type  Persons or entities liable  Tax base Rate 
Main deductions, rebates and 
exemptions  
1 – Corporate income 
tax (Impôt sur les 
sociétés). 
Direct state tax on 
company income. 
Article 206 of the French tax code 
identifies 11 categories liable for 
the corporate income tax. They 
mainly comprise companies 
whose legal status requires that 
they pay the tax, i.e. companies 
with share capital, such as public 
limited companies (sociétés 
anonymes), limited stock 
partnerships (sociétés en 
commandites par action) as well 
as limited liability companies 
(sociétés à responsabilité limitée) 
not opting for the arrangements in 
place for partnerships. Some co-
operative companies are also 
liable. Other categories include 
non-trading companies (sociétés 
civiles ) engaged in commercial 
activities and banks enjoying 
special status, such as Crédit 
Agricole and Crédit Mutuel. 
Furthermore, certain legal entities 
that are usually exempt 
(associations and public 
institutions) are liable in respect 
of real estate income and part of 
their investment income. 
Income earned by French or 
foreign companies operated 
in France. 
In 2000, the corporate income tax rate 
was 33.3%, plus an additional 
contribution of 10% voted in 1994. 
Companies whose corporate income 
tax bill exceeds FRF 5 million 
(0,76 millions d’euros) have to pay a 
1.1% social contribution on profits into 
the fund set up to finance the reform of 
employers' social security contributions. 
The tax rate for these companies thus 
works out at 37.76% (it was 33.3% in 
1995, 36.6% in 1996 and 41.67% in 
1998). 
A reduced 19% rate is levied on part of 
the profits of companies reporting 
turnover of less than FRF 50 million 
francs (7,62 millions d’euros). 
A rate of 26% is levied on the real 
estate income of non-profit 
organisations. 
Long-term capital gains are deducted 
from net profit and taxed separately at a 
reduced rate of 19%. Taking into 
account various additional 
contributions, the tax rate for long-term 
capital gains came to an effective 
23.75% in 1998. 
The state, local authorities and public 
administrations do not pay corporate 
income tax. 
Dividends received by parent companies 
from subsidiaries are not liable. 
Certain research and training expenses 
and job creations enjoy tax relief. The 
European Commission is informed of such 
facilities. 
Temporary exemptions are granted under 
specific conditions to new businesses and 
companies setting up in declining industrial 
zones where business development has to 
be promoted through tax incentives. 
Profits earned by companies taking over 
failing businesses are temporarily exempt 
from the tax. The additional 10% 
contribution introduced in 1995 will be 
phased out over three years. It has been 
cut to 6% for financial years and 
assessment periods ending on or after 
1 January 2001 and to 3% for financial 
years ending in 2002. 
2 – Income tax applied 
to small and medium 
sized enterprises 
(SMEs)  
(Imposition des PME à 
l’impôt sur le revenu). 
 
Direct state tax levied 
on income. 
Since 1999, there have 
been three different tax 
regimes for industrial 
and commercial profits 
(bénéfices industriels et 
commericaux , BIC). 
See Table (2), p. 74. 
Most SMEs have to pay a BIC 
tax. According to the provisions of 
Article 34 of the tax code, this tax 
applies to income earned by 
natural persons from an industrial 
or craft enterprise. 
Industrial and commercial 
profits (BIC). 
Income tax applies not just to 
income generated by a 
salaried activity or wealth 
management, but also to the 
earnings of partnerships and 
certain professional activities. 
Three main types of income 
are covered: BIC, agricultural 
profits and non-commercial 
profits (bénéfices non-
commerciaux , BNC). The 
Same as income tax. 
The net taxable income of a fiscal 
household is divided by a given number 
of shares allocated according to the 
situation and dependants of the 
taxpayer's family (Art. 139 of the tax 
code on application of the family 
coefficient). The progressive income tax 
schedule, ranging from 0% to 54%, is 
applied to the taxable income per share 
thus obtained. 
The tax reduction from the family 
coefficient rule is limited to a set amount 



























































Tax Type  Persons or entities liable  Tax base Rate 
Main deductions, rebates and 
exemptions  
rules for assessing the tax 
base are identical to those 
used for corporate income 
tax. However, the territoriality 
principle of corporate tax 
does not apply to the profits 
of companies liable for 
income tax. 
3 – Minimum annual tax 
(Imposition forfaitaire 
annuelle, IFA). 
 All companies liable for corporate 
income tax reporting turnover of 
more than FRF 500,000 
(76 224,61 €).. 
Turnover. Varies from FRF 5,000 (762,25 €) to 
FRF 200,000 (30 489,80 €) depending 
on turnover. 
The IFA is deducted from the amount of 






























































Tax Type  Persons or entities liable  Tax base Rate 
Main deductions, rebates and 
exemptions  
4 – Payroll tax (Taxe sur 
les salaires). 
Wage-based. The payroll tax is paid by all 
employers based in France and 
its overseas territories that are 
not liable for VAT on at least 90% 
of their previous year's turnover. 
Total gross wages paid plus 
perks. 
Progressive annual schedule per 
tranche: 
- 4.25% on the first FRF 41,230 
(6 285,47 €) of individual wages; 
- 8.50% on the portion between 
FRF 41,230 (6 285,47 €) and 
FRF 82,390 (12 560,27 €); 
- 13.6% on the portion above 
FRF 82,390 (12 560,27 €). 
The payroll tax can be deducted from the 
base of the income tax or corporate income 
tax. 
The tax base is reduced for employers who 
are partly liable for VAT. 
Employers are exempt if the amount due is 
less than FRF 4,500 (686,02 €); they are 
entitled to a rebate if the amount due is 
between FRF 4,500 (686,02 €)  and 
FRF 9,000 (1 372,04 €). 
The other taxes levied on the basis of gross 
wages are: 
- the apprenticeship tax; 
- employers' annual contributions to ongoing 
vocational training; 
- employers' contributions to housing 
construction. 





training programmes for 
apprentices. 
- natural persons, companies 
subject to the partnerships 
tax regime, and economic 
interest groupings engaged 
in a commercial, industrial, 
craft or like activity; 
- companies and other legal 
entities liable for corporate 
income tax; 
- co-operative companies 
engaged in the production, 
processing, storage and sale 
of agricultural products. 
The base for calculating the 
apprenticeship tax is the 
same as the one used for 
social security contributions. 
0.5%. The apprenticeship tax is deductible from 
the income tax base or the corporate 
income tax base. 
The following are exempt: 
- small enterprises employing one or more 
apprentices with legal apprenticeship 
contracts; 
- payments towards actual apprenticeship, 
although, in order to qualify, the employer is 
obliged to allocate 40% (50% in France's 
overseas territories), of the tax due, as well 
as the other expenditure earmarked for 































































Tax Type  Persons or entities liable  Tax base Rate 
Main deductions, rebates and 
exemptions  
6 – VAT. Indirect tax. 
VAT is a general tax on 
consumption that 
applies to deliveries of 
goods and services in 
France. Imports and 
like operations as well 
as intra-Community 
acquisitions are in 
principle taxed 
according to the 
general guidelines set 
down by domestic law. 
VAT is levied on deliveries of 
goods and services: 
- arising from economic 
activities; 
- carried out in return for 
valuable consideration; 
- by liable persons, i.e. 
persons independently 
conducting activities that fall 
within the scope of VAT. 
All monies, goods or services 
received or to be received by 
the seller or service provider 
from the buyer, client or third 
party in return for the delivery 
of goods or provision of 
services, including subsidies 
directly linked to the prices of 
these transactions. 
The standard VAT rate has been 19.6% 
since April 2000. A reduced rate of 
5.5% is applicable to food products and 
transport, inter alia (p. 79). 
An extra-low rate of 2.1% is applied to 
medicines whose cost is refunded by 
social security, as well as to 
newspapers and periodicals. 
A special reduced rate applies in 
France's overseas territories. 
VAT is calculated in two stages: the person 
liable for the VAT must first calculate the 
VAT payable on his income (known as gross 
or invoiced VAT); next, he deducts the VAT 
invoiced to him (deduction system). 
The difference is the amount owed in VAT, 
unless the difference is negative, in which 
case a VAT credit is issued. 
7 – Indirect contributions 
and associated 
regulations (Excises). 
Tax on expenditure. 
Excises are levied by 
the General Directorate 
of Customs and Excise 
when the product is 
made available for 
consumption. 
 Excises are indirect taxes 
levied on the circulation or 
sale of certain products, 
notably tobacco, alcohol, and 
oil and oil-related products 
subject to the domestic tax on 
oil products ( taxe intérieure 
sur les produits pétroliers, 
TIPP). The TIPP is an indirect 
tax specific to a set of oil and 
oil-related products. It is 
assessed on the basis of the 
physical characteristics of the 
products taxed and is 
calculated according to tariffs 
set down in customs 
legislation. 
The Directive of 25 February 1992 and 
the 4 Directives of 19 October 1992 
harmonised tax mix rules for mineral 
oils, alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
































































Tax Type  Persons or entities liable  
Tax base 
Rate 
Main deductions, rebates and exemptions  
8 – Registration duties 
(Droits d'enregistrement). 
Registration is a formal 
process w hereby a public 
official examines a 
document and collects the 
duties required by law. 
A tax on assets. 
Usually received by the 
state. However, 
receipts from duties on 
the sale of buildings go 




The base is the market value (in 
this case, valeur vénale) of the 
goods on the registration or 
transfer date, i.e. the price at 
which the good in question could 
be bought or sold at market rates. 
Companies pay different 
registration duties depending 
on whether they are: 
- a new company; 
- a going concern; 
- being dissolved. 
 
  
9 – General tax on polluting 
activities (Taxe générale 
sur les activités polluantes) 
Introduced in the 1999 
Budget, this is the first 
component of a "green" 
taxation system in 
France. 
Chargeable from 1 January, it is 
payable on the full year by any 
natural person or legal entity 
running the business at that date. 
The tax is partly based on the 
operations of specified 
installations (see Act 76-663 
of 19 July 1976). 
Tax on polluting activities. 
The base was extended to 
water-polluting activities in 
2000. Also extended to 
energy inputs, a key part of 
France's strategy to combat 
the greenhouse effect. 
The departments in charge of 
inspecting the specified installations set 
the amount of the base according to a 































































DIRECT LOCAL TAXES 
The four main taxes, sometimes called the "quatre vieilles" (the four old ladies), are the descendants of four state taxes created during the French Revolution: the tax 
on commercial activities  (patente sur les activités commerciales), forerunner of the business licence tax (taxe professionnelle); the residential tax on movable property 
(contribution mobilière sur les habitations), which developed into the residence tax (taxe d’habitation); and the taxes levied on buildings and farmland  (contributions foncières 
sur les bâtiments et terrains agricoles), which became the tax on developed real estate and the tax on undeveloped real estate (taxes foncières sur les propriétés bâties et non 
bâties). The fiscal reform of 1914-1917 gave local government powers over these taxes, which owe their current form to the quasi-constitutional law (ordonnance organique) of 
7 January 1959. Not until the Act of 29 July 1975 was passed did the business licence tax replace the patente. 
The Act of 10 January 1980 authorised the smallest local government units, communes, to set rates freely. Each tier of local government (région, département and 
commune) decides on a rate for each of these taxes, although they are not allowed to exceed thresholds set by the state. The state keeps a roll of taxpayers and is in charge of 
tax collection. It compensates for tax relief granted by law to certain taxpayers, and takes on the outstanding debt of taxpayers that fail to pay. 
 
Tax Type  Persons or entities liable  Tax base Rate 
Main deductions, rebates 
and exemptions  
1 – Business licence tax 
(Taxe professionnelle). 
 The business licence tax is a general 
tax on economic activities. It is payable 
each year by natural persons and legal 
entities that regularly engage in a non-
salaried business activity that is not 
exempt from the tax. 
Until 1988, the base for the business licence tax comprised 
two parts: 
- 18% of total wages paid in the previous year; 
- and the rental value of fixed assets used by the taxpayer in 
the course of its business (a 16% general allowance is 
deducted). 
The 1999 Budget introduced a major reform that will lead to a 
progressive phase-out of the wage component from the tax 
base between 1999 and 2002. 
 Since 1995, a ceiling based 
on the firm's value-added has 
been applied to the 
contribution paid under the 
business licence tax. 
2 – Tax on developed 
real estate (Taxe 
foncière sur les 
propriétés bâties). 
 This tax is levied annually on developed 
real estate in France. 
The tax is payable by the owner of the property at 1 January 
of the year of assessment. It is based on the rental value of 
the real estate as defined in the official land records (valeur 
locative cadastrale). The tax base is made up of the land 
records revenue value (revenu cadastral), which is equal to 
50% of the land records rental value. Taxable properties 
comprise all real constructions with permanent attachment to 
the soil. 
Rates set by the 
local government 
units receiving the 
tax payments. 
State and local- government 
developed real estate is 
exempt. There is an optional 
two-year exemption for new 
companies setting up in land 
development zones. A five-
year exemption is accorded to 
buildings for business use 






























































Tax Type  Persons or entities liable  Tax base Rate 
Main deductions, rebates and 
exemptions  
3 – Tax on undeveloped 
real estate (Taxe 
foncière sur les 
propriétés non bâties). 
 This tax is levied annually on 
undeveloped real estate of all types in 
France (with the exception of those that 
benefit from a permanent exemption, 
such as public land, or temporary 
exemptions). The tax is payable by the 
owner of the property at 1 January of the 
year of assessment. 
The land records revenue value, which is used as the tax 
base, is fixed at 80% of the official land records rental 
value, according to updated official assessments. 
Rates set by local 
government units 
receiving the tax 
payments 
Exemptions are granted in the 
first years of operation for land 
used for low -profit activities 
(e.g. walnut tree growing). 
Some young farmers are 
accorded a 50% reduction. 
4 – Residence tax (Taxe 
d’habitation). 
Tax due on: 
- premises used for 
residence; 
- furnished premises 
occupied by private 
companies, 
associations or bodies 
not liable for the 




occupied by public 
authorities. 
The residence tax is payable by natural 
persons or legal entities who own, rent or 
use taxable premises in their capacity as 
owner, tenant or any other capacity (rent-
free occupation, for example). 
The base for the residence tax is the official land records 
rental value of the premises (in principle the same as that 
used to assess the real estate taxes). 
Rates set by local 
authorities. 
Affects few businesses 
because they have to pay the 
business licence tax and so are 
exempt from the residence tax. 
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3. TAXES LEVIED ON COMPANIES IN SPAIN
Initially, all the taxes levied on corporations are schematically enumerated, separating
them first into direct and indirect and, thereunder, classifying those that are State-wide and
those of a regional nature. Finally, there is a brief outline of the special treatment accorded to
certain territories, consisting fundamentally of the application of more advantageous rates or
additional rebates and deductions than those in the rest of Spanish territory.
The following section of the annex analyses the most salient characteristics of the main
taxes levied on Spanish corporations. They are presented in a table that allows both an over-
view of the aspects characterising the tax and a ready comparison of taxes in terms of the
characteristics analyzed.
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TAXES IN SPAIN (OUTLINE)
• DIRECT
1. State/ Regional (Autonomous) Communities (1)
— Personal income tax
— Wealth tax
— Estate duties
— Corporate income tax.
2. Local
— Property tax.
— Local business tax.
— Tax on mechanical traction vehicles.
• INDIRECT
1. State
— Stamp duty and legal documents tax.
— Value added tax.
— Excise duties:
• On alcohol and alcoholic beverages
• On hydrocarbons.
• On tobacco products.
• Special duty on electricity.
• On specific means of transport.
• On insurance premia
— Customs duties
2. Local
— Tax on buildings, installations and works
— Tax on increase in urban land value.
3. Territorial tax regimes.
— Basque Country
— Navarre
— Ceuta and Melilla.
— Canary Islands.










































































TAX NATURE TAXABLE EVENT TAX BASE RATE MAIN ALLOWANCES, REBATES AND EXEMPTIONS 
Corporate 
Income Tax (Law 
43/1995, and RD 
537/97) 
A direct, personal, 
composite and proportional 
tax on the income obtained 
by legal entities and other 
bodies without independent 
legal status to which the 
law attributes Spanish 
resident taxpayer status. 
Complementary to personal 
income tax. 
 
Constituted by the obtaining of 
income by the taxpayer in the 
taxable period, irrespective of 
where it may have arisen 
(worldwide scope), and whatsoever 
the source or origin thereof, 
provided that it is the result of 
corporate activity. 
The amount of income obtained 
in the tax period, reduced by the 
offsetting of negative tax bases 
for fiscal years ended in the 
previous ten years. 
Calculated on the basis of book 
results, adjusted via the 
application of the provisions 
stipulated in the law by means of 
non-accounting adjustments 
when differences between 
accounting and fiscal criteria 
arise. 
 
Standard rate of 35%, though there are special rates, 
including most notably: 
• SMEs (from 1997) and for that portion of the 
tax base between ESP 0 and 15 
million.…………………………...30% 
 
• Unions, federations and confederations of 
co-operatives …………………. 25% 
 
• Fiscally protected co-operatives 
…………………………20% 
 
• Hydrocarbon research and development 
institutions …...40% 
 
Allowances to avoid double 
taxation of dividends and 
international double taxation. 
 
• Allowances to encourage 




• Rebates relating to profits 
obtained in certain areas or 
on certain activities. 
 
Local property 
tax (Law 39/88 
and Law 29/94). 
A direct, real, objective and 
periodic tax levied on title to 
property located in each 
municipality. 
Taxes ownership of title to property, 
to beneficial right or to surface area 
of both rural and urban property. 
 
The officially assessed property 
value (which may not exceed its 
market value). 
There are minimum rates that depend on the nature 
of the property: 0.4% when urban property is involved 
and 0.3% for rural property. These rates may be 
raised or lowered by municipal authorities. 
Permanent exemptions of a 
personal (Red Cross), objective 
(inland ways other than toll 
motorways) and mixed nature. 
Rebates depending on the location 
of the property in certain areas 




(Law 39/88 and 
Law 6/91). 
A direct, real, objective and 
regular tax on the 
performance of bus iness, 
professional or artistic 
activities in national 
territory. 
The material factor of the taxable 
event for this tax is the mere 
performance of business, 
professional or artistic activities. 
The tax is determined on the basis of the application of rates , and there is no tax base as 
such. The tax comprises, on one hand, a municipal quota and, on the other, provincial 
and national quotas. 
 
Calculating the municipal portion involves a complex process in which the business 
licence charge is established and then added to the "location" quota, based on surface 
area. The resulting figure is multiplied by the population coefficient and the status index to 
give the municipal tax. Where appropriate, provincial surcharges may be added to this to 
give the final tax amount payable. 
 
Along with municipal charges are provincial and national taxes. The process is similar, 
and a distinction must also be drawn in this case between the business licence charge 
and the "location" charge. 
 
There are several exemptions: 
- personal (in favour of Public 
Territorial Entities and their 
Autonomous Agencies, Social 
Security Management Entities, 
the Spanish Red Cross, ...). 
- mixed (for public research and 
educational agencies, and 
associations and foundations 


































































A direct, real, objective and 
regular tax on the 
ownership of mechanical 
traction vehicles. 
Defined as the ownership of 
mechanical traction vehicles apt for 
driving on public thoroughfares. 
Calculated on the basis of various 
parameters such as fiscal power, 
number of seats or vehicle 
payload. 
Local tax legislation sets minimum charges for each 
group (cars; buses; lorries; tractors; tow vehicles; and 
motorcycles), which can be increased by local 
councils. 
  
Exemptions may be personal (for 
diplomatic delegation vehicles), 
objective (licensed public transport 
buses) and mixed (general 
government vehicles assigned to 
national defence duties, Red Cross 
ambulances). 
There will be a proportional rebate 
on the tax if the tax period is less 
than one calendar year. 
Rebates for promoting the use of 
environment-friendly engines and 
fuels.  
Rebates for vintage vehicles. 
 




(RDLg 1/93 and 
RD 828/1995). 
An indirect, real, objective 
tax with immediate effect. 
It taxes "inter-vivos" capital 
transfers for valuable consideration. 
 
The tax base will be the real 
value of the assets or rights 
subject to transfer, or the real 
value of the right established or 
assigned. 
 The following rates are applicable: 
 
    - On the transfer of property or the establishing and 
assignment of the real rights inherent to such 
property: 6% 
    - On the transfer of property and on the 
establishing of real rights thereon: 4%. 
    - On the establishing of real rights of guarantee, 
pensions, bonds and the assignment of loans of 
whatsoever nature: 1%. 
  
 
Personal exemptions for public 
entities and charitable, cultural, 
academic or scientific institutions.  
There are also certain cases where 
objective exemptions apply (see art. 
45 of RDLg 1/93).  
Tax on corporate 
operations 
(RDLg 1/93 and 
RD 828/1995). 
 
An indirect, real, objective 
tax with immediate effect. 
The carrying out of certain 
corporate operations that bear on 
the company's capital stock (capital 
increases and decreases, winding 
up…). 
 
For incorporation and capital 
increases, in the case of 
companies that limit liability, the 
tax base will be the nominal 
amount at which the capital is set. 
In the case of other companies, 
the tax base is set at the net 
value of the funds contributed. 
In shareholder contributions to 
replenish losses, the tax base will 
be the net value of the 
contribution.  
In company spin-offs and 
mergers, regard will be had to the 
capital-stock figure of the new 
entity created or the increase in 
the capital of the absorbing entity. 
In capital reductions and winding-
ups, the tax base will be the value
The tax payable is the result of applying the standard 
rate of 1% to the tax base. 
Personal exemptions for public 
entities and charitable, cultural, 
academic or scientific institutions. 
Some objective exemptions are also 





























































TAX NATURE TAXABLE EVENT TAX BASE RATE MAIN ALLOWANCES, REBATES AND EXEMPTIONS 
of the assets and rights made 
over to the shareholders. 
 
Stamp tax  
(RDLg 1/93 and 
RD 828/1995). 
An indirec t, real, objective 
tax with immediate effect. 
Taxes the documentation of certain 
acts, general notarial 
documentation, the administrative 
documentation of certain acts and 




The tax base will be the value 
reported, except in protest 
records, where it will be one-third 
of the value. 
Commercial documents 
A distinction is drawn between 
certificates of deposit, bills of 
exchange, documents acting as 
drafts and other documents. 
The amount of the tax base will 
be the nominal amount or the 
amount drawn. 
Administrative documents 
There is a rule only for provisional 
notices, since in the restoring and 
transfer of nobility titles a fixed 
quota is the case. 
The tax base will be the value of 
the right that is guaranteed, 
published or established. 
 
Notarial documents 
There is a set amount (50 pesetas per document, or 
25 pesetas per sheet), plus a variable component that 
Regional Governments may approve. 
 
Commercial documents 
A progressive scale is applied either to stamped bills 
or to documentary stamps. 




 0.5% on provisional notices. 
Personal exemptions for public 
entities of a charitable, cultural, 
academic or scientif ic nature. There 
are also some objective exemptions 
(see art. 45 of RDLg 1/93). 
Value Added Tax 
(Law 37/92 and 
RD 1624/92) 
VAT is an indirect tax on 
consumption, which is 
levied on the delivery of 
goods and provision of 
services by entrepreneurs 
and fee-earning 
professionals, and on intra-
Community purchases and 
goods imports. 
Taxes the delivery of goods and the 
provision of services by 
entrepreneurs or professionals for a 
consideration, habitually or 
occasionally, in the pursuit of 
business or professional activity, 
and intra-Community purchases or 
goods imports. 
Those engaging only in exempt 
transactions are not subject to tax. 
Comprises the total amount of the 
consideration for the transactions 
subject to tax (including interest 
for late payment, until delivery of 
the good). 
There are special regimes 
(simplified; agriculture, livestock 
breeding and fisheries; second-
hand goods and works of art; 
travel agencies; operations 
involving gold investment; 
equivalent surcharge) that align 
the tax to the particular activity or 
situation observed. 
 
There are three types of rate: 
 
Standard: Of a residual nature, as it is applied to all 
transactions subject to VAT to which none of the 
specific rates stipulated in the legislation correspond. 
It is set at 16%. 
Reduced: 7%. 
Extra-reduced: 4% on the consumption of certain 
staple goods. 
 
In the Canary Islands a similar tax (the IGIC) is levied, 
but with lower rates (standard: 4.5%, reduced: 2%, 
high: 13%)  
Full exemption for exports and 
deliveries of goods to another 
Community country. 
Limited exemptions for certain 
activities and instances (Sixth 
Directive). 
VAT borne shall be deductible if it 
has been incurred within the country 
and if the goods or services 
acquired are in transactions that are 
subject to and not exempt from the 

































































Indirect, real, objective and 
single-stage taxes that 
accrue immediately.  
  
This is a set of taxes made up of: 
-  Duties on alcohol and 
alcoholic beverages. 
-   Tax on hydrocarbons. 
- Tax on tobacco products. 
- Special tax on electricity. 
- Special tax on specific means 
of transport. 
 
The manufacture and import of 
products subject to these taxes 
within Community territory. The 
taxes are aimed at influencing the 
consumption of certain goods. 
Application varies according to the specific tax involved. 
- The levy on beer taxes this drink with rates that increase commensurately with 
strength and in terms of hectolitres. 
- In the levy on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, the tax base is the amount of pure 
alcohol in each product, and it is taxed at a specific rate per hectolitre of alcohol. 
- The tax on hydrocarbons is levied via specific rates on bases measured in units of 
volume or energy. 
- Specific rates are combined in the case of the levy on tobacco products on the basis 
of units with rates according to the value of the different products. 
- In the tax on electricity, the tax base is the result of multiplying the amount supplied 
for a consideration by 1.05113. The tax rate is 4.864%. 
- In the tax on specific means of transport, the tax base comprises, in the case of new 
vehicles, the same as that relating to VAT, and in the case of second-hand vehicles, 
the market value. The rates are 7% or 12%, according to vehicle category.      
There are exemptions on 
manufacturing taxes for products 
purchased as part of consular or 
diplomatic relations or by 
international agencies. 
 
Notably, for alcohol, there are 
exemptions for: 
- the harvester regime. 
- cases where the alcohol is not 
intended for the uses taxed 
(denaturalised, health, etc.). 
 
In the tax on specific means of 
transport, exemptions are envisaged 
on the basis of the use of the 
vehicle. Such exemptions require 
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